Why Is Sunni-Shia Unity a Failed Project?

For nearly four decades, the interval between the two well-known historical Sunni and Shia accounts of the birth of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) has been commemorated as “Unity Week” and one of the country’s official observances—a measure in line with the idea of “rapprochement among Islamic schools of thought,” which was declared one of the Islamic Republic’s religious policies after the victory of the revolution. In practice, however, this commemoration has been confined to official media representations. In the everyday religious life of Shias and Sunnis, one can scarcely find a trace of attention to such an observance and the policy behind it. It is easy to see: by the irony of fate, this week falls immediately after days that a group of Shias, at least from the Safavid era to the present, have celebrated with festivities and merrymaking as the anniversary of the death of the second caliph (a figure intensely detested by Shias and just as intensely beloved by Sunnis). And it is not only Shias who pay no heed to Unity Week; Sunnis have also—naturally—held a negative and pessimistic stance. In other words, the objective, actual state of Iran’s Muslim society (both Sunni and Shia) during this week, as throughout the rest of the year, is entirely contrary to what the official media portray. In the media, an annual spectacle is staged during these days: Mamustas and Mawlawis warmly shake hands with Hujjat al-Islams and Ayatollahs, extend the hand of brotherhood, smile before the cameras, speak of the “necessity of unity for the Islamic Ummah,” especially at “this critical juncture,” speak of the need for vigilance against the common enemy, global arrogance, and even takfiri currents, speak of the “many points of commonality between Shia and Sunni” and the “principle of religious brotherhood,” and then a few images of Sunni celebrations for the Prophet’s birth are broadcast, along with perhaps two or three speeches by clerics affiliated with the regime—and that is all. By an unwritten agreement (as in many other areas), everyone, from the media to its audience, knows that these are a commissioned show that should not be taken seriously. A show that even the performers themselves do not believe in. Everyone knows that this ideal image is solely for media consumption and that reality is something else. Reality is what transpires in the heart of the Qom seminary and the Zahedan madrasa. Reality is what transpires in the back rooms of the jurists’ houses, the students’ cells, the mosques, and even the homes of Shias and Sunnis. Reality is the endless, repetitive, and sometimes childish disputes of satellite religious channel presenters over matters of the past. Reality is the intense, not-so-friendly, and fear-laden rivalry that, parallel to the fading of the idea of unity, has been and continues to be underway each year between the official clergy of these two schools and their followers. Its manifestation can be seen, on the one hand, in the increasingly elaborate growth of Shia rituals and the demographic anxiety of Shia sources of emulation, and on the other, in the wave of mosque-building and seminary student recruitment by Sunnis. Now, after nearly four decades, it can be said that the idea of unity is one of the Islamic Republic’s failed religious projects. The Islamic Republic has not only been largely unsuccessful in establishing this union, but by insisting—even if only for show—on this idea, it has unwittingly created a new religious opposition faction among traditional Shias. Shias who find no pleasant scent in the government’s reformist projects (such as managing and purifying mourning rituals, this very idea of unity, and the propagandistic and political campaigns against rival Shia currents under labels like “English Shiism”) and assess the sum of these as aimed at restricting and threatening Shiism. The emergence of certain confrontational behaviors, especially in recent years (such as the insistence on performing rituals that have been declared forbidden, like qameh-zani), is among the signs of such distrust. Given these circumstances, it is not far-fetched for someone to claim that the idea of unity has not only failed to solve the Shia/Sunni divide, but has even exacerbated the Shia/Shia divide (if we do not say it was fundamentally one of the factors that created it).

Where does the problem lie? Why has the remedy, as it happens, only increased the bile? Why have we arrived at this point? In my view, the main problem is that the idea of unity was an idealistic and unrealistic notion that was mistakenly proposed and pursued in three arenas: “history,” “religion,” and “the state.”

One. The Arena of History

It must be accepted that, for better or worse, the Shia/Sunni issue has never been resolved in the arena of history, nor will it be. The historical differences between these two denominations—which mainly relate to events following the passing of the Holy Prophet (PBUH)—may seem minor and trivial from the perspective of an external observer, but the history of Islamic denominations has shown that they hold extraordinary importance from an intra-religious perspective; especially as, over time, a theological aura has enveloped and reinforced them. The efforts of some Shia unity advocates to resolve these differences (such as the stance of the late Fadlallah) have not only failed to help resolve the crisis in practice, but have, on the contrary, fueled a greater distancing of traditional Shias from the ideas of unity and rapprochement, and increased their fear of the consequences of such ideas. Therefore, the first reality that must be accepted, and denying it is fruitless, is that the historical differences between Shia and Sunni firstly exist, and secondly are serious. Any attempt to negate or belittle them is like pounding water in a mortar, and due to the reaction it provokes, it will make the differences more prominent and significant. So, in the arena of history, the idea of unity stands little chance.

Two. The Arena of Religion

Another unrealistic aspect of the unity project has been that, in its first step, it sought to create unity among the official clergy of the two denominations. Oblivious to the fact that [at least a significant part of] the clergy (both Shia and Sunni) is itself the primary source of preserving religious division and schism. The prerequisite for the unity of the scholars of the two denominations is the removal of religious differences; differences that have historically been linked to the very raison d'être of the clergy. And this applies even more so to the Shia clergy (due to their being a minority). From this perspective, the fear of the sources of emulation and the clergy belonging to the discourse of "Traditional Shiism" regarding the unity project, and their lack of cooperation with it, is entirely logical and understandable. They have rightly realized that accepting such a thing means negating themselves. It is no wonder that Traditional Shiism feels its Shia entity is threatened by the unity project. The special and extraordinary emphasis on holding Shia rituals, particularly mourning ceremonies, and the will to expand them increasingly, is a defensive mechanism that Traditional Shiism has—intelligently—designed for its own survival; especially if we accept that (according to my hypothesis) the social basis of Shia rituals has fundamentally been based on opposition to and boundary-making with the Sunnis. That being said, if, with excessive optimism, one could harbor a shred of hope for resolving historical religious differences, no hope can be held for resolving religious differences. Because the clergy of the two denominations, their conventional raison d'être, is the safeguarding of these very boundaries. This is why, throughout history, dialogue and interaction between Sunni or Shia scholars and the scholars of other religions has typically been far easier than with the scholars of other Islamic denominations. Because they did not feel threatened by them.

Three. The Arena of the State

Another factor in the failure of the unity project is that this concern is not an endogenous concern within the fabric of Islamic society; rather, like many other religious policies, it has been a state project. The "state" in modern Iran (Pahlavi Iran and the Islamic Republic) has always appeared in the role of the intellectual and superior reason. A reason that understands better than the subjects (citizens) and claims to be several steps ahead. In the Islamic Republic era, this superior reason also acquired religious prestige and sanctity. Therefore, one of its concerns has been the religious reform of society. The product of this approach has been a wide range of religious policies, encompassing everything from reforming the seminary and the university to reforming religious rituals and customs, and controlling and managing religious literature and art. The record of nearly four decades shows that, at least in some cases (including the unity project), the ruling establishment has failed in advancing its religious policies. One of the obstacles to this success has been that the superior reason did not want to, or did not deem it necessary to, "persuade" society before taking action. This very lack of persuasion has prevented these policies from being accompanied by the empathy of the body of society. The result of insisting on a matter without paying attention to the lack of a receptive context is that today, not only traditional Shiites, but also a significant portion of the body of supporters of "political Islam" and the religious devotees of the Islamic Republic are not empathetic to policies such as unity; although, if forced, they may feign empathy. The rift that has emerged, particularly in recent years, on religious issues between some "hey'ati" members and Hezbollahi "religious youth" and the system is a product of this very distance. The Islamic Republic's religious taste has diverged from the religious taste of the body of Shiite society and even from the religious taste of the body of its own supporters (at least in some cases). And for this reason, advancing religious policies is more difficult for the system than any other policy. *

Given this situation, what is to be done?

It seems that resolving the Shia-Sunni issue requires a new formulation. A formulation that takes into account the set of real and objective propositions of the lives of Shiites and Sunnis, firstly on a national scale, secondly on the scale of the Islamic world, and thirdly on the scale of the international system. For a new formulation, the following can be considered as suggestions:

1. Replacing the practical ideal of "coexistence of Sunnis and Shiites" with the idealistic slogan of "Shia-Sunni unity." As was said, the Sunni-Shia issue cannot be resolved in the field of history and religion. Just as it has not been resolved in these one thousand four hundred years, nor in these thirty-eight years. If this predicament has a solution, it must be sought in society. The historical and political religious problems, distances, and rifts between these two branches of the Islamic world are, at least for a vast portion of their believers, too serious to be negotiable. But social problems are not of that seriousness. In many secular domains unrelated to religion, Iranian Shiites and Sunnis have common interests; such as the social harms that have afflicted the Iranian family (regardless of religion). And many other political, economic, and cultural categories that require dialogue and exchange of views among the various elites of society. Instead of a fruitless conflict over a past that cannot be changed, one must think together about a present and a future that can be planned for. Instead of focusing on religious commonalities, one must point to shared social opportunities and threats. In pursuit of achieving peaceful social coexistence while recognizing and respecting religious differences.

2. Dialogue and interaction among intermediate layers and non-religious elites: Until now, the primary carriers of the discourse of rapprochement have been the clerics of both denominations. And perhaps this has been one of the reasons for the failure of the aforementioned project. It seems the time has come for clerics to hand over the arena of dialogue in this field to other elites of society. A dialogue outside the control and management of the state, aimed first at mutual understanding and precise knowledge of one another, and second at arriving at a list of implicit agreements, specifically in secular (and not religious) matters. If religious commonalities had the power to prevent violence, we would not have this dark history of religious other-antagonism behind us today. The outcome of the path that the two denominations, guided by Shia and Sunni clerics, are pursuing is excommunication and violence. In the end, it is either Seljuk-style Shia-killing or Safavid-style Sunni-killing. What might distance us from such a bitter outcome is commonality over the interests that bind us together. Naturally, such a thing is possible only when a bond of interests exists in the first place. And a bond of interests will exist when opportunities are equal. Therefore, one of the first steps is a joint effort by elites and social activists, especially Shias, to demand all the citizenship rights of Sunnis from the governing authority.

3. Highlighting other identity facets of Sunnis, parallel to the religious facet: It seems that one of the obstacles to Iranian Sunnis attaining all their citizenship and legal rights has been precisely this emphasis on their distinct religious character; whether from their own side or from society and the government. In other words, the representation of Sunnis in the country's public opinion has always been as the religious other of Shia society. The representatives and spokespersons of Iran's Sunni community have mostly been clerical figures and their religious elites. This very fact has paved the way for the emergence of religious sensitivities among the Shia clergy. Whereas the religious facet of ordinary Sunni citizens, just like that of Shia citizens, while important, is only one of their identity facets, and an excessive focus on it has overshadowed their other identity facets. Iranian society needs to hear other voices from its Sunni citizens, parallel to the religious voice.

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Why Is Sunni-Shia Unity a Failed Project?

Author: Mohsen Hesam Mazaheri

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