Candidly with His Excellency Prudence and Hope: On the Occasion of Renani's Open Letter to Mr. Rouhani

Alongside my academic and scholarly activities, I have also written and lectured extensively in the field of political economy. But “letters” have also been a part of my social engagement. These letters have essentially revolved around issues of political economy and have served as a kind of admonitory missive to the country’s senior officials. Apart from the book “The Political Economy of Iran’s Nuclear Dispute,” which was a 660-page letter intended for the Supreme Leader, over the past twenty years I have written ten other letters to the country’s senior officials (totaling around 250 pages). Only Mr. Khatami, when he was president, replied to three of my four letters; other officials have even refrained from acknowledging receipt. Some of these letters were also written during election periods. Three of my election-related letters have also been publicly released. One was a letter titled “Seyyed, Stay, For We Need You,” addressed to Mr. Khatami, written to encourage him to run for a second presidential term (the 2001 election); you can read this letter and Mr. Khatami’s response here:

http://renanistorage.ir/renani-article2/renani-article2(30).pdf

http://renani.net/index.php/texts/notes/130-renani-article2-30

Another was a letter titled “Let Us Embrace Eventfulness,” which I wrote during the 2013 presidential election, one day after Mr. Hashemi Rafsanjani’s disqualification, addressed to him and Mr. Khatami; you can read this letter and the reactions to it here:

http://renanistorage.ir/renani-notes/renani-notes(7).pdf

http://renani.net/index.php/texts/notes/643-2013-06-05

And the third was a letter I composed before the parliamentary elections (March 2016), titled “Iran’s Future in Trembling Hands,” addressed to the esteemed jurists of the Guardian Council; you can read this letter here:

http://renani.net/index.php/texts/notes/521-renani-article2-150

For quite some time, I had decided to distance myself from the field of political economy and gradually but systematically enter the field of “development.” “Development” is a neglected field, of which some of our officials have a completely flawed understanding, while others fundamentally oppose it, and I believe that until the political system clarifies its stance on this issue, we will continue to mark time. Adhering to this decision required that I gradually reduce the volume of my writings in the field of political economy thereafter. Thus, the first practical test of this decision was to write nothing about the 2017 election.

Meanwhile, in recent years I had realized that I was gravely ill. I have named this illness “Self-Deification Syndrome”; this illness, of course, has a historical precedent in our country, but in the years since the revolution, it has become extremely widespread among the country’s officials and political activists—so widespread that it has become normalized. The clinical symptoms of this illness manifested in me as a “lust for lecturing” and a “lust for writing.” After diagnosing this illness in myself, I made some decisions for its treatment. For instance, I reduced my lectures from 65 in 2015 to ten in 2016, and now I intend to bring them down to zero in 2017. Furthermore, I decided to write less. But of course, the illness of “lust for writing” is not a disease that can be completely cured, though it can be mitigated. To be honest, why hide it from you, for a year now I have also written the main framework of an article titled “Self-Deification Syndrome and the Failure of Development in Iran,” but I still do not know whether to complete and publish it or not. In any case, one of the reasons I wrote nothing during the recent election period was precisely this.

For this reason, despite facing requests from relatives, friends, civil activists, and even some government officials to actively participate in this election and write analyses encouraging society to vote for Mr. Rouhani, and despite the inner itch to write at a time when every election-related piece is voraciously read by hundreds of thousands of people in cyberspace within hours, I resisted and wrote nothing. Everything published under my name during this election period was either fabricated (which I denied upon learning of it) or taken from writings of previous years that were redistributed by others. Of course, once again, concern for the future did not let me remain still; in the final days, I began writing pieces titled "I Do Not Like Rouhani, but I Will Vote for Him" to publish if the election went to a second round. And thank God it did not.

But, of course, I had a more important reason for having no social or intellectual action in the 2017 election. In fact, I decided to be merely an observer in the 2017 election because I believed this election was the "final exam" for Iranian society after a hundred years of sitting in the "classroom of democracy," and like all final exams, one must not intervene but sit, watch, and see the result. Since the Constitutional Revolution, it has been one hundred and ten years that our society has been receiving theoretical and practical training for rational play within the framework of democracy. During this time, we transformed the traditional and maktab-based education system into a comprehensive and modern education system, then built universities as much as we could, and after the revolution, we even took our universities to the villages. During this period, immense developments such as the "Minor Tyranny," the 1921 coup, the change from the Qajar monarchy to the Pahlavi monarchy, the oil nationalization movement, the 1953 coup, the Islamic Revolution, the imposed war, the reformist wave of the 1990s, and finally the experience of the "Great Populism" of recent years, were important and very costly experiences that our nation has undergone in the past century. And to gain these experiences, we have, of course, consumed or destroyed a major part of our natural resources, from oil to minerals, groundwater resources, forests, and agricultural lands.

My assumption was that if the Iranian nation, after all this education and experience, has still not learned enough lessons, and is again deceived by the populist promises of politicians, and again becomes impatient, and again thinks that by disrupting the stage of political play and substituting one group or individual for another, it will reach its utopia, then for now we should have no hope for this society's readiness for a new and powerful entry into the transition process toward development. We must be patient for several more decades and several more costly experiences until our society reaches the necessary historical maturity. Therefore, the outcome of such a result for me was to no longer waste my energy and ability on intellectual assistance to put society on the track of development, but to rest and wait for Iranian society, through other experiences, to gradually enter its phase of historical maturity.

On this basis, in my view, this election was the "final exam" of a hundred years of democracy practice class for the Iranian nation. For this reason, I decided to take no action in this election and to be only and solely an observer. And, of course, the hardest part was resisting the pressure from my wife, who daily gnawed at my heart and incessantly said that if even one person is persuaded to vote by your writing, you must do it. But not only did I resist, but by a twist of fate, due to losing my birth certificate, I could not even vote myself. And, of course, to escape the pressures, I almost disappeared from March onwards and closed all my channels of communication with the outside world.

The election result was, of course, not only hopeful but astonishing. Although I am still not sure if the examiners had been Messrs. Rouhani and Ahmadinejad instead of Messrs. Rouhani and Raisi, would the Iranian nation still have passed this test? I have no clear answer, but evidence regarding the distribution of votes in the last three elections (2013, 2016, and 2017) indicates the consolidation of the urban middle-class vote and the gradual transformation of rural votes. Many predictions said that 90 percent of villagers would vote for Mr. Raisi, but in practice, this did not happen. In fact, the evidence suggests the gradual formation of a "deep awareness" in society, which can raise our coefficient of hope for the future of democracy in Iran.

I now believe that, so that this hopefulness and rationality of our nation is not harmed by another failed experience, we must all make an effort. In fact, I believe that if we do not all strive for the Rouhani administration to succeed and to resolve some of the urgent crises of Iran's economy, within two years at most, the process of the "Venezuelization of Iran's economy" will begin. Therefore, Rouhani's friends and supporters must be vigilant against the errors of the twelfth administration, keep their swords of criticism drawn, not let blind political affection blind them, and wherever they see a mistake, point it out and not allow the twelfth administration to move toward cronyism, rent-seeking, and lack of transparency. And of course, Rouhani's rivals and critics, and most importantly, the other branches of the political system and power groups, should also know that the path they have already embarked upon to undermine and cripple the Rouhani administration is a path that only depletes the administration's energy, destroys its ability to manage crises, accelerates the collapse of Iran's economy, and then we will all collapse together. If I have the life and opportunity, I will elaborate on this matter in the future in a piece titled "We Did Not Win, We Only Postponed the Collapse."

For this reason, we must all mobilize to "assist" and "oversee" the twelfth administration. Left and right, reformist and principlist, urban and rural, governmental foundations and civil institutions, ordinary people and elites, all of us must join hands, both assist the administration and place all our resources at its disposal and remove the obstacles to its progress, and through our continuous oversight, not allow this administration to err, and of course, all this oversight should be aimed not at destruction but at helping with crisis management. At the same time, wherever the administration falls short, it must engage in honest dialogue with society and call upon it for help.

Therefore, in fulfilling my oversight duty, I will begin my critique, for now as a first step, by publishing a letter I wrote to Mr. Rouhani four years ago. On July 11, 2013, less than a month after the election and a month before the inauguration ceremony, when Mr. Rouhani had not yet officially become president, I wrote a detailed letter to him titled "Candidly with His Excellency Prudence and Hope" and submitted it through one of his close associates. Of course, from that time until now, I have seen no reaction to that letter. But now, as I look back, some of the points and suggestions in that letter were heeded in the eleventh administration, and some were completely neglected. Given that I believe those points are still fresh and important, I decided to publish that letter.

 

Text of Mohsen Renani's Letter to Mr. Rouhani in July 2013

 

Candidly with His Excellency Prudence and Hope

His Excellency Dr. Rouhani The Esteemed President-Elect Greetings to you

I deeply regret that I too was among those who, by writing articles in the press, sending letters to reformists and moderates, and signing the collective letter of support from economists, played a small part in your victory. By joining the wave of support, we cast you into towering waves from which emerging safely requires both divine grace and a conjunction of auspicious stars, demands both prudence and hope, needs both social capital and the people’s trust, and calls for the empathy of rivals, the cooperation of other branches of government, along with a resolute will within the entire system. And now, as atonement for the part I played in this injustice, I have decided to begin my work from this very moment, even before the government of Prudence and Hope takes office, so that perhaps a little of that injustice may be remedied. We threw you into the fray and cast upon your shoulders a mantle that we ourselves could not bear to carry and feared to see others don; and now, before our own conscience, we are ashamed that this act, though it contained a collective good, will undoubtedly bring serious and dangerous harms and difficulties to the unfolding of your being. Believe me, love for these noble human beings, witnessing the daily suffering of a patient people, and fear of the difficult future facing this land had blinded our eyes, and we did not realize what an injustice we were doing to you through our actions and our votes. And of course, we hope that you can emerge with your head held high from this agonizing trial through prudence, so that neither we regret our deed, nor you suffer loss for bringing yourself to this perilous arena.

          And I do not know why, these days, whenever I think of you, I find myself repeatedly humming the mystical ghazal of Jalal al-Din Muhammad Rumi in the soulful voice of Jamal al-Mulk Shahram Nazeri:

How could I know this passion would make me so insane / Make my heart a hell, turn my two eyes into a Jeyhun How could I know a torrent would suddenly sweep me away / And like a ship cast me into a blood-drenched sea A wave strikes that ship, splitting it plank by plank / So that every plank falls apart from the swirling gyres

     . . . . . .

There are many “how could I knows,” but I do not know / For I swallowed a handful of opium from a muzzle in that sea

And so it was that I resolved to fulfill my duty toward you from the very first day. Mr. Khatami, whom I held dear, I began writing to and critiquing from the very first months; some I published in the press, and some I sent to him privately. I did not care for Mr. Ahmadinejad, so I remained silent for the first year. Then, only alongside 57 other critical economists, we issued a warning and critiqued the policies, to which they retorted with bluster, and I understood that government had no need of our critique—and so it was until the issue of targeted subsidies arose. Silence was no longer permissible then; out of concern for this frail economy, I girded myself and critiqued and warned, and I was perhaps one of the most prolific in this field, until the targeted subsidies began, at which point I abandoned the critique—I had critiqued so that perhaps it would not begin, and once it did, critique was of no further use and resembled more a 'whine' than a critique. But you, since I hold you in much greater affection, I take up the pen from this very first day, even before your government begins its work; because we have little time, one cannot dither in expressing the public good. Therefore, with your permission, and before you assign responsibilities, I am preemptively choosing my own responsibility within your government and commencing my activity. For now, the government of Prudence and Hope, born of the collective effort of the majority of political, intellectual, social, and ethnic groups, must succeed, and we must all strive for its success, so we must not allow it to err, and we will speak and write and critique so that it does not err, for we no longer have the opportunity for error. We have already squandered our historical opportunities, and now, if we wish to endure, we have but one path: to succeed. Truthfully, I began writing this text one day after your election and had titled it 'A Premature Critique of Mr. Rouhani's Government,' and my plan was to publish it in the press before the inauguration. But sympathetic friends advised me to change both the title and delay its publication for some time. So, so that time does not pass and so that you might take action if you find my critique sympathetic, I am now sending it to you privately. And of course, so that our good people may also be informed of these views, and our critiques may aid in enhancing public insight and in making collective dialogue widespread—and so that we may practice, instead of remaining silent and waiting and then becoming disappointed and thereafter mass-producing satirical text messages against the government, striving to place the government's conduct under the sharp gaze of society and thereby assist you in successfully pursuing your stated goals—I may also publish this writing in the future. And of course, after that, I will also endeavor, individually or alongside other economists, to publish at least one analytical text per year evaluating and critiquing the economic policies of your era. I beg your leave to present the current text in several parts.

الف) اندر باب دولتِ گذارِ یازدهم همه حکومت‌های پس از مشروطیت در ایران، حکومت دوره‌ی گذار، گذار از عصر ماقبل مدرن به دنیای مدرن، بوده‌اند و جمهوری اسلامی نیز به‌طور اولی چنین بوده‌است. و البته اکنون جمهوری اسلامی در میانه‌ی دو دوره گذار است: یکی گذار به عصر مدرن و دیگری ورود به ایستگاه اول خط تاریخی توسعه. و متاسفانه اکنون ساختار نظام سیاسی ما دارای چهار ویژگی است که نسبتش را با توسعه در ابهام می‌گذارد. این ساختار از منظر ایفای وظایف حاکمیتی در برابر وظایف مدرن، «متناقض» رفتار می‌کند، از حیث نسبتش با توسعه «مردد» عمل می‌کند از نظر کسب و تقسیم منابع و منافع اقتصادی، «رانت جویانه» عمل می‌کند و از حیث منظر تقسیم قدرت سیاسی، از نوع «نفوذهای ناهمگن» است. این چهار ویژگی مانع عملکرد سازگار و کارآی نظام تدبیر کشور می‌شود و بنابراین علی‌رغم صرف هزینه‌های کلان و تاریخی، به شهادت شاخص‌ها، فاصله‌ی ما با شکل‌گیری فرایند توسعه (با رشد اقتصادی اشتباه نشود) همچنان عمیق است و ما بعد از انقلاب هنوز وارد ایستگاه نخست (فاز صفر) توسعه هم نشده‌ایم. و البته دولت شما در دو نقطه عطف تاریخی به دنیا آمده است و «آخرین دولت گذار دوره پیشاتوسعه» تلقی می‌شود. در واقع در دولت شما سرنوشت نهایی دو مساله، همزمان روشن می‌شود: «سرنوشت توسعه» و «سرنوشت جمهوری اسلامی». یعنی تا سال پایانی دوره دوم ریاست جمهوری شما باید روشن شده باشد - یعنی عملکردها نشان داده باشد- که آیا ماهیت جمهوری اسلامی با اقتضائات توسعه سازگار است یا نه. یعنی در پایان دولت شما ما از دالانهای تاریک و پر پیچ و خم موجود عبور کرده و به ایستگاه اول توسعه رسیده‌ایم یا نه. در این صورت در پایان دوره دوم (مفروض) ریاست جمهوری شما جمهوری اسلامی یا با پذیرش اقتضائات توسعه همراه با جامعه ایران وارد مراحل تاریخی توسعه شده است یا هم‌چنان مردد است و مقاومت می‌کند. که اگر این دومی باشد، تداوم آن با دشواری روبه رو می‌شود و بقای آن منوط به قلب ماهیت کنونی آن می‌شود. و البته این قلب ماهیت، زمانی موثر می‌بود که درآمدهای سرشار نفت هم می‌بود. و اکنون که سال 2020 سال چرخش نظام جهانی و ترک اعتیاد غرب نسبت به نفت و نقطه عبور نهایی اقتصاد جهانی از سوخت های فسیلی و تغییر نظام انرژی است، دیگر جمهوری اسلامی با قلب ماهیت هم نمی‌تواند در وضعیت بی نفتی دوام بیاورد.

So, in my opinion, as a scholar of social and economic systems, your government is the last government in the Islamic Republic with its current structure. The Islamic Republic must choose between remaining and submitting to the exigencies of development in the twenty-first century and other probable alternatives. And this is what makes your task and that of the Islamic Republic extremely difficult. It is clear that sooner or later, quickly or slowly, at low cost or high cost, development will occur, and it is the Islamic Republic that must clarify its position regarding this process. First, you must make the system aware of this great, compulsory turn, and second, you must secure the agreement and cooperation of all pillars of the system for this turn. And more importantly, you must prepare society to enter a period of great transformations. The success of your government in this matter is tantamount to the system's entry into the first station of development and is, of course, a great success. And your failure is tantamount to the failure of the development process and a final endpoint for development within the framework of the Islamic Republic. By the end of your term, the world will have overcome its addiction to oil; although it will still buy oil, it will not be like today, nor at such high prices, so there remains no hope for abundant oil revenues. That is, in the second term, you must expect a fall in oil prices—by that time, America and some European countries will buy less than half the oil they do today. And of course, politically as well, once the West moves beyond oil, the Persian Gulf will no longer hold the geopolitical value it does today, and we will be left to our own devices. And we have only this one opportunity (from now until the year 2020) to accomplish many of our overdue tasks, and of course, I do not know whether our country's officials are mindful of these critical circumstances or not. The system must realize that 2020 is the final year of our opportunities. You must seriously raise this and seek solutions with both the people and the Supreme Leader. Countless indicators confirm this. In fact, you must manage multiple fronts. First is the issue of exiting the "founder's trap." Our system of prudence is now both a rigid system and a type of government of heterogeneous influences, where each part pursues its own specific goals and lacks a unified and consistent set of objectives. At the same time, this political system has also entered the "founder's trap," meaning its body does not agree with its senior managers on its mode of management, and the senior management collective has adopted a defensive or offensive stance against the body's desire for change, and thus the country's economic and political system is in a situation that, in management science, is called the "founder's trap." When a system is in the founder's trap, the possibility of reforming it becomes very weak. Your first mission is to make the country's governing class aware of the danger of remaining in this situation for the long term and to obtain their agreement for transformation and exiting the trap. In a word, without the determination of the country's senior management to exit this deadlock, no structural reform is possible. Therefore, your first mission is to bring the country out of the founder's trap situation. Without that, your other missions will also fail.

The difficulty of the task lies in the fact that real power is not in the hands of a single, defined group, and political power is divided among multiple sectors of the government, with each sector fiercely guarding its share. You have one path: first, bring the principal pillars of the political system alongside you, and then, relying on the magical force of the people, reform or reconcile the heterogeneous parts of power. Without the cooperation of the other pillars of power, speaking to the people becomes impossible, and without the people's support, clashing with heterogeneous power groups becomes costly and dangerous. And without a homogeneous power structure, pulling the storm-tossed ship of Iran's economy and society out of the terrifying whirlpools ahead, at this historical turning point where the world is shedding its skin, seems an impossible task. Second: Our economy was floundering at the "event horizon" when the great shock of the eleventh election arrived and prevented it from sliding down the slope of singularity into a black hole of no return. But this halt will not be long-lasting. The watchful eyes of economic actors follow every move and stillness of your government and are waiting to see the first and most important achievement of your government, which is precisely the results of the upcoming negotiations on the nuclear dispute. In fact, your most important economic battleground is the nuclear negotiations. Our economy is now trapped in politics, and our politics is trapped in the nuclear dispute. All eyes of economic strivers are on the representative who goes to the next negotiations and on the results obtained from the talks. The fate of the smile that the economy has recently bestowed upon your election will be determined in the first nuclear negotiations. The economy is testing your ability to organize it on the battleground of the nuclear dispute. It knows that until matters are resolved there, nothing will change in the economy. So this smile that settled on the economy's lips with your victory, and this hope and expectation of improvement that was created, will stretch itself to the next negotiations and then decide which way to roll: towards hopefulness, improvement, and prosperity, or towards despair, caution, recession, and inflation. Do you know why? Because today, the primary indicator of "uncertainty," which is an important economic index, in our country, is the issue of the nuclear dispute. Economic actors have no problem with risk; they manage it or factor it into their calculations. The main problem for economic actors today is the "uncertainties" arising from the dispute, which are neither manageable nor calculable. And for now—rightly or wrongly—the nuclear dispute has become the "uncertainty index" for our economy. It is enough that Mr. Jalili still participates in the next negotiations; the economy will take this as a sign of your inability to manage the crisis, and the dollar will become several hundred tomans more expensive. You must demonstrate your capability and skill to society and the economy from this very beginning. So you must exert all your force at this very start of your work. To create agreement and consensus in the macro-management of the system and to overcome the deadlock of the dispute, engage in serious dialogue at the top and do not neglect the role of the people.

Engage in serious dialogue with the senior management of the system. Just as you must know that success in the swift and early management of the nuclear dispute is your first and last opportunity to slow down and halt the vicious cycle of stagflation in which the country is now trapped, the system must also know that your election and the trust that the people placed in you and the system is the system's last opportunity for a low-cost passage through the crisis and a grand but stable turn towards the development process. The system must now decide whether it wants development or not. This Rouhani opportunity is the last chance for the existing structure. Of course, in any case, on a longer horizon and at a greater cost, development will come. But if this very political structure decides to undertake this task, it will be much less costly and faster.

At the same time, your achievement in the battleground of the vote of confidence can also be considered by some social and economic actors as an indicator of your capability and the system's determination to overcome the crisis. And of course, even before that, resolving the issue of the prisoners from the post-2009 election events and the release of the leaders of the Green Movement is another important sign of your capability and the system's determination to overcome the current crises. In the following sections, I have spoken more about this. Let me summarize: Mr. Rouhani's efforts in the first stage must be focused on eliminating the sources of the crisis and ensuring that the crisis-generating factors lose the power to reproduce crises, because if he cannot accomplish this crucial task, most of his time will be spent beating a dead horse.

ب) On the Selection of the Cabinet I know that you are currently under intense pressure from all sides regarding the selection of your ministers. I do not wish to become yet another pressure alongside the others. However, I will try, by raising certain caveats and ideas and by recounting some experiences, to open up horizons, even if only at the level of brainstorming. Perhaps, in the realm of selecting ministers, you can free yourself somewhat from the grip of these pressures by adopting methods suited to the new world.

          First, do not forget that your government is a transitional government, and its capabilities must be compatible with the requirements of such a government. Therefore, in choosing your colleagues in the government, observe certain negative and positive criteria. Here, I will offer a few examples of negative criteria. As much as possible, avoid selecting several categories of managers. First, pragmatists who lack sufficient theoretical knowledge or high-level experience in the field they are to manage. Although these individuals work tirelessly and are commendable in this regard, they lack a clear vision of the long-term and structural consequences of their work. They choose a goal, lower their heads, and charge toward it relentlessly, without considering the proportionality of their actions with the government's other objectives and the country's needs. Second, inexperienced theorists who, upon taking office, turn the real world into a laboratory for their theories. In principle, be careful, except in certain specific technical fields, not to appoint claimants or proprietors of theories to positions of responsibility in any domain. For you will inflict that domain with the harms of "philosopher-king management." Executive managers must possess sufficient knowledge and serious experience in their field, but they need not be theorists. Because theorists, due to having firm personal ideas within their area of responsibility, are not open to consultation and are more intent on proving their ideas than solving problems with the help of collective wisdom. Consequently, their ministry will become a laboratory for their theories. Third, ineffectual and incapable individuals who are nonetheless reputable and enjoy a good name. Appointing these individuals may not cause problems under normal circumstances, but in the problem-ridden conditions your government faces, they act like suffocating weights, slowing the ship of government and rendering it inefficient.

Fourth, avoid selecting generals as ministers in your government. By generals I do not mean military men, but rather those who have held high governmental posts in the past and now, with aristocratic swagger, both harbor share-seeking expectations and consider themselves the only suitable option for certain positions, speaking from a position of superiority, regarding themselves as the final word in some managerial domains, and requiring others to obtain permission from their presence in order to access you. These are not inherently bad people, but their behavior is of the same kind as that of military generals. Although they know rational and traditional management and avoid the use of improvised methods and revolutionary behaviors in their managerial domain, their habituation to the general’s temperament renders them incapable of innovation and boldness in confronting new problems. You now need officers in the ministries who know the barracks, the capabilities, and the morale of the soldiers, can associate with them, know how to read maps and arrange the battlefront, and at the same time understand the language of the generals. Of course, appoint the generals as advisors to these officers. At historical moments, generals prevent major mistakes and are valuable advisors in critical decision-making, but the fronts on which you must fight are earthly and perilous fronts beyond the capacity of worn-out generals. Now, amid speculations about the composition of your government, the names of some generals are also being heard. Where in the advanced world have you seen someone who, for example, was a minister twenty years ago be appointed to a ministry again? It is not a good sign for a large part of a government’s officials to consist of former officials. Selecting former ministers intensifies the network of patrimonial connections. The error of the ninth government was that, in order to break the network of patrimonial connections, it brought a host of inexperienced, novice forces into the high echelons of the country’s administrative system, and the rawness of these individuals caused a large portion of the country’s expert specialists to be driven out of the administrative system. But rectifying this situation does not necessarily mean that the generals should return to the helm of affairs. Use seasoned officers—that is, experienced and knowledgeable bureaucrats who have gradually grown within the ministries and in specialized posts—and place the old and highly experienced officials, along with other experts, in the advisory councils of the ministries.

البته بر این سخن من تبصره‌ای هست. مواردی هست که گزینه بهتری نمی‌یابید و ناچار می‌شوید ژنرالها را بر مصدر کار بگمارید. در این صورت ژنرالها باید دست‌کم دو ویژگی داشته‌باشند: یکی این‌که مدارج ترقی را از گروهبانی تا ژنرالی در دستگاههایی که مرتبط با شغل آینده‌شان است طی کرده باشند، دوم این که دردوران پیشین که مسئولیت‌های عالی داشته‌اند موفق بوده‌باشند و ذینفعان آن حوزه از عملکردشان راضی باشند. در واقع گاهی ژنرالها فقط برای خودشان ژنرال نیستند بلکه در حوزه‌ای که قبلا فعالیت کرده‌اند به نوعی سرمایه نمادین تبدیل شده‌اند. یعنی بین فعالان و ذینفعان حوزه فعالیتشان مقبولیت فراگیر دارند و نوعی اجماع در مورد توانایی و کارایی آنها وجود دارد. البته چنین ویژگی باعث می‌شود که آنان به سرعت بتوانند مشکلات حوزه مسئولیتشان را با همکاری ذینفعان و نهادهای فعال در همان حوزه حل و فصل کنند و این یک مزیت است. برای نمونه به گمان من آقای مسجد جامعی در حوزه فرهنگ و آقای دکتر توفیقی در آموزش عالی دارای چنین سرمایه نمادینی هستند. شاید در حوزه های دیگر هم بتوانید چنین افرادی بیابید. پنجم، نظامیان و نیروهای امنیتی را هر چند با سواد و دارای تجربه باشند جز در مناصب نظامی و امنیتی نگمارید. گماردن نیروهای نظامی و امنیتی در مناصب کشوری، حتی وقتی هم که دارای تجربه و دانش باشند و به لحاظ اخلاقی هم انسانهای شریفی باشند، اقدامی ضد توسعه تلقی می‌شود. این کار نه تنها برای ناظران و سرمایه‌گذاران خارجی و نیز برای کارآفرینان داخلی این پیام را دارد که هنوز فضای کشور ما با نوعی نگاه امنیتی اداره می‌شود و این یک شاخص ضمنی «عدم اطمینان» در فضای کسب و‌کار خواهد بود، بلکه گماردن نظامیان در مناصب کشوری به منزله نفوذ ناخواسته و تدریجی نظامیان به همه عرصه‌های حیات اقتصادی و اجتماعی و سیاسی کشور است. این همان چیزی است که در دولت‌های نهم و دهم شاهد آن بوده‌ایم. نظامیان به‌طور طبیعی با طیف گسترده‌تری از نظامیان دوستی و آشنایی دارند و بنابراین یاران و همکاران خود را از میان آنان بر می‌گزینند و این حلقه در سطوح بعدی نیز تکرار می‌شود و این یک حرکت ضد توسعه است.

داگلاس نورث، برنده جایزه نوبل اقتصاد در سال 1993 نکته ارزشمندی دارد. او پس از مطالعه چند هزار سال تاریخ زندگی اقتصادی جوامع قدیم و ملل جدید دنیا به یک نتیجه شگرف و عمیق رسیده‌است. می‌گوید در دنیای معاصر هیچ کشوری را نمی‌شناسید که در مسیر توسعه به پیش رفته‌باشد مگر این که سه ویژگی در آن محقق شده‌باشد. این ویژگی‌ها را «شرایط آستانه‌ای توسعه» می‌نامد: نخست این که مقامات دولتی، یعنی فرادستان و اعضای اصلی ائتلاف قدرت، به‌طور جدی به قانون پایبندی داشته‌اند؛ دوم این که تعداد انبوهی بنگاه که عمر آنها از عمر بنیانگذارانشان بیشتر است در آن کشور مشغول به فعالیت بوده‌اند. و سوم این‌که نظامیان از عرصه‌های اقتصادی و سیاسی دور نگه‌داشته شده‌اند و بر نظامیان کنترل سیاسی وجود داشته ‌است. بنابراین دوری نظامیان از عرصه‌های اقتصادی یک شرط لازم برای توسعه محسوب می‌شود. و من امیدوارم که نه تنها شما در مناصب کشوری دولتتان از نظامیان و نیروهای امنیتی استفاده نکنید بلکه این امید جدی را دارم که در دوره ریاست جمهوری شما حضور افراد و نهادهای نظامی از عرصه‌های اقتصادی کم‌رنگ‌تر شود. و البته می‌دانم که می‌پرسید با این همه معیار محدود‌کننده دیگر کسی نمی‌ماند. این سخن به این معنی‌است که ما در طول سی سال گذشته هیچ کار جدی برای کادرسازی و تربیت نیرو نکرده‌ایم. و می‌دانید که چنین نیست. اگر اندکی جسارت ورزید و محدودیت‌های تنگ نظرانه‌ای که تا کنون در انتخاب مدیران عالی رعایت می‌شده‌ است را بشکنید، به ذخیره بزرگی از نیروهای توانمند دست می‌یابید. فراموش نکنید که اکنون کشور ما بیش از ده میلیون دانش‌آموخته و متخصص دارد، چشم هایمان را بشوییم و گشاده نظر باشیم آنگاه خیل بزرگی از نیروهای کارآمد و متخصص را در برابر خود می‌بینیم. آقای رئیس جمهور! شما فرصت تمرین ندارید. شما باید از همه ظرفیت دانش ملی برای راهبری دولتتان استفاده کنید. مبادا انتخاب وزیرانتان را به اتاقهای دربسته مشاوران محدود خود واگذار کنید. بنابراین مساله انتصاب رسمی یک شورای مشورتی از سوی رئیس جمهور برای هر وزارتخانه را جدی بگیرید. شما و جامعه ما دیگر فرصت آزمون مجدد مدیران ناآزموده را ندارید. باید سازوکاری به کار بگیرید که احتمال خطا را در سیاست‌ها و تصمیمات مدیران به حداقل برسانید. مهم‌ترین راهکار دنیای مدرن، شفاف‌سازی اطلاعات و گسترش نقد عمومی است، که امیدوارم در اولویت‌های اول دولت شما قرار گیرد. در کنار آن، تجربه برخی کشورها از جمله فرانسه نیز کارساز است.

A council composed of experts, authorities, thinkers, and university professors—drawn, of course, from different intellectual tendencies, especially critics of the government—is appointed by the President (not the minister) as an advisory and supervisory council for each ministry. This council has no executive standing and no right to intervene in the executive and day-to-day affairs of the ministry. However, it has the right to access all information and correspondence of the ministry, as well as the right to attend all ministerial meetings. The task of this council is to examine the conformity of the minister's performance with approved plans and policies and to report on this regularly to the President and the minister himself. In each case, it also offers corrective proposals. It is certainly necessary that critics of the minister's current policies also be members of this council. Such a mechanism prevents ministers from making impromptu and unprofessional decisions. If the minister becomes immersed in the day-to-day affairs of the ministry, this council acts as a supervisory eye and a watchdog for the ministry's policies and plans, thereby increasing the likelihood of the government's programs being realized. Moreover, the presence of this council prevents the imposition of rent-seeking pressures from interest groups outside and inside the ministries on the minister. And many other benefits. Allow me to add a bold suggestion to the one above. In your opinion, was the election of Dr. Hassan Rouhani as the eleventh president by the people a correct and astute choice or not? You are probably satisfied with this choice and have, to some extent, come to believe in the people's astuteness. If so, why not believe in the people's astuteness in choosing your ministers? The first step in adhering to moderation is right here: that the ongoing discussions for arranging the ministers not remain confined to a specific group of your former associates. Why not bring these discussions into society? Why not trust society? This is the same society that, despite the limited opportunity, was able to make the right decision with the same limited information and elect you to the presidency. Why do you not subject your team of colleagues to the vote and opinion of the country's large community of experts, or even to the opinion of the entire society? Is choosing your team of colleagues more difficult than electing the president himself? Do you not think that by doing this, you could tie the hands of political pressure groups seeking to impose their candidates on you? If a minister is ultimately not to succeed, let that minister be chosen by the people themselves or by experts emerging from the people, not by hidden powers behind the scenes who reap the benefits of imposing a minister while the smoke gets in your eyes and the costs are borne by the people. I certainly admire your initiative in launching a website for the public to introduce ministerial candidates, but I do not consider it sufficient for serious public participation. A mechanism is needed in which a truly large segment of the people and experts participate. Let me state a point candidly. As a specialist in systems theory, an instructor of economic systems, and a researcher in the field of economic development and Iran's economy, I submit that your government cannot do much for Iran's economy and its worn-out structures, the corrupt and inefficient administrative system, and the rigid and irrational structure of the country's governance system. Your government is a transitional government, and what the outcome of this transitional period will be depends entirely on the decision of the political system as a whole and society's reaction to that decision. If that is the case, at the very least, you can be more concerned with the actual realization of public participation and the continuation of the people's effective cooperation and presence in the arena of social management than with the success of your cabinet. In fact, in recent years, we have taken a step backward from the zero point of the development process. This claim has clear quantitative and qualitative indicators, which this is not the place to express. To return to the zero point of development and ignite the engine of the country's sustainable development, instead of short-term and capital-depleting palliation of public pains, you must bring development and its exigencies into society's consciousness so that public resolve turns from consumerism to developmentalism and entrepreneurship replaces opportunistic management. And such a transformation will only occur in the context of genuine public participation, both in the management of regional development and in the overall management of the country.

          Thus, you can employ more serious mechanisms for public participation in the selection of ministers, vice presidents, and even foreign ambassadors and governors. For instance, you could involve the entire expert apparatus of the ministries in the selection of ministers. In the 25 years since the war, hundreds and perhaps thousands of people have worked and held responsibility in middle management ranks (from director-generals to deputy ministers) in each ministry. With today's communication technologies, one can easily solicit the opinion of all of them regarding the proposed minister for their respective ministry and institutionalize this process. Surveying the middle managers of the ministries who have held responsibility in Tehran and the provinces over the past 25 years, while reducing the pressure from groups seeking a share, attributes the responsibility for the possible (and in my opinion, certain) inefficiency of the agencies and ministries not to the president's wrong choice, but to the error of the experts' selection. At the same time, in such a selection process, the role of civil institutions and relevant private sector entities whose activities are related to each ministry can also be considered in the process of choosing ministers.

Undoubtedly, our community of industrialists can determine more precisely than the president who, for example, is suitable for the Ministry of Industry. Or what harm is there in asking for the opinion of university professors or holding a vote to choose the Minister of Science? For example, all professors could announce the names of their three nominees for the Ministry of Science via forms or through email or SMS systems, and the results could be processed at the center, allowing the president to choose the one he deems most suitable from among the top three candidates. For instance, regarding the Ministry of Science, I have no doubt that the president's preferred candidate would also be among the three candidates chosen by the academics, but through this method, the president frees himself from the bottleneck of pressure from power authorities or the bargaining of allied groups. This same two-stage method can be used for selecting governors, choosing the governor from among the two or three individuals who received the most votes from the province's experts and specialists. It is enough to retain the current governors for two or three months and select new governors through a collective participation process. This approach gains importance when we recognize the irreplaceable role of governors and other senior regional and provincial officials in advancing the development process. A governor is not merely the representative of the Ministry of Interior in a region or province. On one hand, they must play the role of the general agent of the sovereignty in realizing macro goals and observing national laws and the decrees of the country's upstream documents, and on the other hand, be the representative of the people and the main official responsible for guiding the endogenous development process of the province. A governor who is imposed on a province exogenously and solely as the representative of the Minister of Interior cannot play a pivotal role in the province's development process. If Iran's future development depends on changing the planning model towards regional planning and the production of indigenous development models, the governor must emerge from the regional expert system, have complete mastery over the province's development issues, and also possess public favor and regional mobilization capability.

The unbalanced development of many of the country's provinces today results from the dual imposition of plans and the custodians of these plans (governors) from the center. Let governors be introduced from within the provincial expert system; then, either the government's central authorities select one from among those who have received the most expert approval, or put the leading candidates to a public vote. But since this vote is a delegation of the presidential or interior minister's right to the people of the regions, there is no need to observe costly and time-consuming electoral processes. It is sufficient to choose one of the relatively defensible modern methods for this voting.

          From these very first steps, you must demonstrate your creativity in serious yet calm and tension-free management, as well as in genuine reliance on the people's vote; otherwise, those who are already demanding a share from you, if successful at this stage, will proceed to the next steps. In short, you, we, our economy, and our political system no longer have the opportunity for practice and error-prone experiments. We must utilize all the capacity of explicit and tacit knowledge available at the national level. So I repeat: beware of confining the selection of your government officials to the closed-door rooms of your limited advisors.        

پ) اندر باب انتخاب تیم اقتصادی دولت  اجازه بدهید با توجه به تخصص خودم، در باب تیم اقتصادی دولت شما اندکی بیشتر سخن بگویم. این قلم سال گذشته نظریه «تکینِگی اقتصاد ایران» را مطرح و شواهدی برای آن ارائه کرد و از آن پس هر چه گذشت شواهد بیشتری در تایید آن پدیدار شد. همین چند روز پیش دکتر کلانتری وزیر اسبق کشاورزی در مصاحبه‌ای به صراحت و روشنی بحران‌هایی را در حوزه مسائل آب و کشاورزی ایران مطرح کرده‌اند که دقیقا نشانه‌هایی بر وقوع تکینگی در این حوزه است. همچنان‌که می‌دانید وقتی سیستمی وارد تکینگی می‌شود مانند آن است که به سیاهچاله‌ای در افتاده باشد. در این صورت یا در آن وضعیت می‌ماند تا انرژی آن پایان یابد و مضمحل شود یا تنها با تزریق یک انرژی عظیم از بیرون سیستم که می‌تواند به صورت یک شوک یا ضربه بزرگ عمل کند، از سیاهچاله بیرون می‌آید. انتخابات اخیر به مثابه یک شوک بزرگ، زمینه‌های اجتماعی، روانی و اقتصادی لازم برای خروج اقتصاد ایران از روند تکینه شونده کنونی را فراهم آورده است که اگر نه فقط دولت بلکه کل نظام سیاسی عزم نکند تا این شوک تکمیل شود و اقتصاد از وضعیت بن‌بست کنونی خارج شود، دوباره با یک وقفه چند ماهه (حداکثر تا پایان سال) به روند مستهلک شونده سابق خویش برمی‌گردد. استفاده مطلوب از چنین فرصت استثنایی و البته به سرعت از دست‌شونده، دو شرط اولیه دارد: نخست، عزم نظام سیاسی در کمک به دولت برای خروج اقتصاد ایران از تکینگی و دوم، طراحی یک دوره «مدیریت ویژه» و به کار افتادن اتاق فکر بحران در حوزه مدیریت اقتصادی کشور است. بنابراین مبادا و مبادا گمان کنید با گماشتن یک تیم اقتصادی یکدست و از یک نحله فکری می‌توانید اقتصاد ایران را مدیریت کنید و از بحران کنونی خارج سازید. شرط اول با حل فوری مسائل سیاسی بی‌ثبات کننده اقتصاد و در راس آنها حل فروبستگی سیاسی داخلی و حل مساله مناقشه اتمی تا حدودی محقق می‌شود. که البته همه آن در دست شما نیست و نیازمند همراهی تمام عیار کل نظام سیاسی است و در این مورد در همین نوشته توضیحاتی داده شده است. اما تحقق شرط دوم به‌طور کامل به‌دست شماست. اقتصاد امروز ایران را نه آدم بی‌تجربه‌ای مانند من - هر چند ظاهرا نظریه پرداز - می‌تواند مدیریت کند و نه افراد عملگرایی که مثلا اولین دغدغه شان افزایش قیمت ارز برای تامین کسری بودجه دولت است. این اقتصاد نه اقتصاد رام و سربه زیر و امیدوار سال 1368 است که افسارش را به‌دست تیم تعدیل بسپارید و نه اقتصاد سرشار از درآمد نفت سالهای 84 به بعد که خرابی‌ها و خطاهای سیاستگذاران آن‌را به ضرب درآمد سرشار نفت بپوشانید و مخفی کنید. این اقتصاد همچون بیماری است که از درون پوسیده و آشوبیده است و از بیرون نیز دیگر دارو یا مواد نیرو زایی نیست که به آن تزریق کنید و سرپایش نگهدارید. پس زنهار و زنهار که آن را به دست یک تیم با اندیشه‌ای محدود بسپارید. برای بازسازی اقتصاد ایران به ظرفیت‌های علمی و تجربی کل جامعه ایران نیازمندید. البته تیم اقتصادی شما باید افرادی همفکر و همراه باشند که بتوانند با یکدیگر به‌گونه‌ای تنگاتنگ همکاری و اقتصاد ایران را مدیریت کنند، بنابراین حرجی نیست که وزرایتان از دوستان توانمندتان با زمینه‌های فکری نزدیک به هم باشند مشروط بر آن‌که فقط سکان مدیریت اقتصاد ایران در دست آنها باشد ولی نخواهند اندیشه‌های خود را نیز بر آن تحمیل کنند. در واقع راهبری فکری این تیم نباید محدود به توانایی‌ها و دانایی‌های خودش باشد. ناچار به تکرارم که ما و شما، دیگر فرصت آزمون و خطا نداریم. شما نه حق دارید تجربه‌های شکست خورده سابق را تکرار کنید و نه حق دارید یک تجربه شکست خورده دیگر به تجارب قبلی مدیریت اقتصاد ایران بیفزایید. چرا‌که از یک سو شما تجربه دولت‌های قبلی را در پیش چشم دارید و از سوی دیگر اکنون هیچ ذخیره اقتصادی برای دولت برجای نمانده‌است که با آن هزینه‌ی تجارب تازه را بدهد. پس هر بحرانی رخ دهد، هزینه‌اش مستقیما بر سفره کوچک مردمان این دیار تحمیل خواهد شد. زمزمه‌هایی شنیده می‌شود که قرار است تیم اقتصادی شما از تیم تعدیل اقتصادی انتخاب شوند. یادتان باشد دو تجربه بسیار پرهزینه در اقتصاد ایران وجود دارد که هر دو برآمده از یک اندیشه است. بی‌ثباتی‌های اقتصادی دوره تعدیل و آشوب‌های دوره هدفمندسازی هر دو دست‌پخت یک نحله فکری بوده‌است تنها کارگزارانش متفاوت بوده‌اند. مشاوران ارشد اقتصادی دولت نهم و دهم هم مسلکان فکری همان تیم تعدیل هستند تنها به علت تفاوت‌های روانشناختی، گروهی با دولت آقای هاشمی همکاری کردند و دیگری با دولت آقای احمدی نژاد. The flaw in both policies was that, although they started from correct analytical premises—premises recognized as conventional or orthodox economics, in which we all believe—both forgot that the prescriptions of economic textbooks must be adapted to the general conditions of the patient (the Iranian economy). In fact, neither team incorporated the existing political structure or the psychology and social behavioral habits of the Iranian people into their analysis. To put it more precisely, they lacked an institutional perspective on Iran's economy and analyzed it mechanistically. I, like the proponents of structural adjustment, am among the economics graduates who favor moving toward a free market. But the point is: within what timeframe and accompanied by what other institutional and legal transformations do we wish to achieve this goal? Without selecting a very broad and interconnected policy package, without choosing a sufficiently long timeframe, and without creating complementary institutional changes, neoliberal policies have costly social and economic consequences that span generations. If this same targeted subsidy plan had been designed and implemented over a period of ten to fifteen years, accompanied by the implementation of a comprehensive unemployment insurance scheme, the creation of an extensive system for key labor market information, the design of an evolutionary statistical system (instead of rapid data collection via questionnaires), and a clear, complementary policy package regarding the foreign exchange market, it would certainly have yielded very positive results. Therefore, the time for simplistic approaches to economic policy is over. Be careful not to entrust Iran's economy to economists who speak in elegant, textbook terms. Iran's economy cannot withstand another shock; you must treat it with great forbearance. If you wish to avoid repeating those same errors today, you need to form, alongside your economic team, a "National Economy Rescue Committee" or "National Economy Strategic Council," composed of a large group of the country's economists from different schools of thought, along with experts and those with managerial experience in the economy, and employ it as the intellectual arm of your entire economic team. Major policies should not be implemented without passing through this think tank and having their angles and consequences thoroughly examined. This committee would function as the supreme supervisory council for the strategic policies of the economic ministries. No plan from the economic ministries would be approved in the cabinet, and no economic bill would go to parliament unless this strategic council has approved it. Note that the majority of this strategic council must not be current government officials; the majority must certainly be independent experts, pundits, and economists, as well as former senior economic managers, with the share of current government managers being less than 50 percent. This council is not a replacement for the current Economic Council but rather an intellectual arm that provides advisory input to the entire government, including the Economic Council. Let us not forget that the Hashemi government was a government of allocation, the Khatami government was a government of stabilization, and the Ahmadinejad government was a government of distribution. Now, naturally, it is once again time for a government of allocation to take office. However, the economic turmoil that arose during the ninth and tenth administrations has been such that our economy is now embroiled in crisis and in need of serious reforms in all three areas: allocation, stabilization, and distribution. If your government's goal were merely allocation, employing policies aimed at liberalization and marketization (the policies of the structural adjustment era) would suffice. But because your government must simultaneously undertake all three forms of economic intervention, it requires a highly complex and cautious policy package, accompanied by an agile and timely statistical system for monitoring policy outcomes, and a strong, sophisticated intellectual and supervisory team.

          With these details laid out, now allow me to review the desirable characteristics of those who are to form the core members of the government's economic team: First, they must possess sufficient and deep economic knowledge. Note that sufficient and deep economic knowledge is not provided merely by holding a PhD in economics. A PhD in economics indicates that the individual has the specialized capabilities necessary for systematic and methodical thinking in the realm of economic issues. But whether they have truly thought and reflected sufficiently and deeply about Iran's economy—and not just textbook economic theories—is another matter entirely, one not achieved simply by holding a PhD in economics. Second, they must have serious experience in the realm of managing Iran's economy and know it well. By serious experience, I mean that their past experience should not have been solely in decorative positions lacking managerial substance. And third, they must lack systematic relations with hidden political and economic powers so that its policies are not contaminated by an orientation toward the interests of these beneficiary groups. Moreover, the state's economic agents, in addition to experiential and scientific expertise, need to possess courage and serious resolve for a calculated stand against bloated rent-seekers so that various coterie, security, and military networks, through economic rent-seeking, do not continue to close off the space for sustainable national development and swallow up the economy and politics more and more. Another important characteristic of theirs must be openness to consultation and criticism. If I said earlier that you should avoid employing generals in important positions as much as possible, one reason was this. The ninth and tenth administrations employed sergeants in a wide range of important positions. The sergeants were not open to consultation because they could not tolerate seeing generals or critical experts, and they displayed their identity through ignoring and sometimes belittling the experts, elders, and generals of their field. But note that the generals themselves also possess entrenched ideas and rigid convictions that they are unwilling to change, and in this respect, they too are not open to consultation. They consider themselves experienced and omniscient. Generals have a good stance and behavior in an advisory capacity, but they do not have a good stance in an executive capacity and are rarely open to consultation. Therefore, your economic team must be officers who, in terms of technical, specialized, and executive aspects, have the necessary experience, knowledge, and ability to manage Iran's economy, meaning that on the one hand they can make the sergeants obey them and employ them efficiently, and on the other hand, they are also prepared to benefit from the consultation of experts, specialists, and generals of their field who are appointed as an advisory team by the president. In my opinion, the team currently proposed as your economic team is a team of generals who have a rigid belief in orthodox economic theories and, due to the status they accord themselves, are also not open to consultation. Ultimately, I caution you not to employ this team alone, without the presence of advisory councils composed of diverse and critical experts. The American experience also tells us that whenever Federal Reserve officials were from one school of thought, the president's advisors were from another school of thought. Therefore, rest assured that if a mechanism is not devised to utilize all intellectual spectrums in the stage of economic deliberation and decision-making, after a period of latency and with the emergence of the first signs of error in policymaking, criticisms will begin, and the onset of criticism can, in itself, increase the vulnerability of your government's economic policies. The solution lies in establishing a mechanism for broad participation and collective thinking among various economists for the purpose of continuous monitoring of macroeconomic processes and providing early warnings about inevitable trends. It is not without reason that the great figures of economics have said that the more an economist knows of other sciences, such as history, psychology, sociology, mathematics, philosophy, anthropology, etc., the more of an economist they are. Because society is a living entity, and when prescribing an economic remedy for it, we must also pay attention to its behavioral characteristics, intellectual traditions, psychological habits, social structure, and political inclinations. For example, it would have been enough for the planners of the targeted subsidies program, in assembling their policy package, to pay attention to the behavioral temperaments and historical conception of the Iranian people regarding the state and the nature of their relationship with it, to realize that targeted subsidies in this manner would not work in Iran and would draw the government into a vicious cycle from which escape is very difficult and fraught with danger. Attention to the psychology of the Iranian people would have said that one addiction should not be treated with another addiction. Eliminating the addiction to indirect energy subsidies by creating an addiction to cash subsidies was among these errors. Or if they had been familiar with the rural psychology of Iran, they would have known how damaging the payment of cash subsidies to rural communities is, especially under conditions where agriculture is naturally exposed to destruction, and how it is a coup de grâce to the temple of our rural agriculture, accelerating the emptying of villages into cities, the mushroom-like expansion of marginal urban areas, and the widening of imbalance in regional development. Rural subsidies should have been paid in a different manner. After all, can one conduct economic policy according to textbooks for people who go to demonstrations on Fridays and chant “Death to America,” and on Saturdays, due to distrust of their government’s economic policies, go to the market with complete trust and calm, buy and hoard American dollars, and thereby vote for the continued dominance of the American economy? Mr. President! I beg your pardon for my boldness, and despite my intention not to enter into specific instances in this writing, I must caution you frankly on one point. Let us not forget that our economy is now trapped in the dead end of politics. Although assembling a strong economic team is important, rest assured that even if you gather the most elite economists in the world, they cannot do much for this economy. Iran’s economy is a sensitive and at times dangerous patient. For now, you must strive not to create new turmoil through the adoption of new policies in Iran’s economy, and do not even halt the current wrong policies overnight, swiftly, and with a single decree. What worries me now is that I fear decisions will be made for Iran’s economy and policies implemented before a serious dialogue among economists has had a chance to take place, leading to a new cycle of instability in the economy. I strongly suspect that your economic aides will soon place a straightforward and handy prescription on your desk, and you, given the severe budget deficit, the necessity of regular subsidy payments to the people, and other crises, will see yourself as compelled to submit to it, and that issue is the increase in the exchange rate. I fear that in this rush of events and haste in decision-making, they will surround you, justify it to you, obtain your consent, and the deed will be done. Now that the economic markets have calmed somewhat with the psychological shock of the elections, another currency shock will plunge Iran’s economy into a new wave of instability. Now, a new instability is a deadly poison that can destroy all favorable grounds for economic improvement. The story of increasing the exchange rate is like the story of targeted subsidies: a word of truth uttered at a wrong time, from which a false result is obtained. It is a correct statement whose time is not now. Avoid any move that would now disrupt the equilibrium established in the key markets of the economy. An important rule states that in unstable and uncertain conditions, preserving the existing low-level equilibrium is better than upgrading the equilibrium. Because in instability, you act to upgrade the equilibrium and disrupt the existing equilibrium, but you never reach the higher equilibrium. Exactly the situation that targeted subsidies faced. So, at no cost, do not allow them to raise the exchange rate this year under the pretext of covering the budget deficit or preventing corruption and rent-seeking in currency, etc., and speak of a single rate. It is no problem that rent-seekers have benefited from the dual exchange rate for thirty years; let them benefit for one more year, but the corruption and cost that a new instability creates in the economy are greater and more pervasive. Also, be careful that they do not seduce you by saying that the low exchange rate causes inefficiency and waste of national resources and so on and so forth. They are right, but let us remember that the ninth and tenth governments destroyed 700 billion in oil revenues, and no one batted an eye. You, too, let the currency continue at the current rate and allow some resources to be wasted and remain far from optimal allocation (like all the past 35 years), but do not inflict a new shock on Iran’s economy so that the economy can calm down a little. Find other solutions to cover your budget deficit. I say explicitly that under the current conditions, even foreign borrowing is more reasonable than increasing the exchange rate to cover the budget deficit. Note that the exchange rate is now no longer a purely economic variable—even if it were, it was important and key. Rather, it is a political-economic and social variable. Disrupting it disrupts many things in all three arenas. The difference between institutionalist theory and classical economic theory—which your prominent aides advocate—lies precisely here. Institutionalist theory does not see economic variables as merely economic but also considers their non-economic roots and consequences. Therefore, at least until the end of this year, do not allow any playing with the exchange rate. Even if you are forced to borrow from foreign countries, do so, but do not submit to increasing the exchange rate. The economic, moral, and social damage of changing the exchange rate is far greater and more lasting than the damage of borrowing from abroad. But of course, there is no need for borrowing to cover the budget deficit; numerous solutions can be devised, and much can be said, which will be expressed in the relevant technical and specialized committees if necessary. Therefore, since the exchange rate has become a key and politicized index, and in the absence of real and reliable economic indicators, this rate has turned into an efficient tool for economic forecasting by the private sector, manipulating it is highly sensitive. So I implore you, whatever they tell you about the benefits of increasing the exchange rate, do not yield to raising it, and delegate decision-making on several important issues such as the exchange rate, the future of subsidies, and matters of this kind to the outcome of expert meetings of a large team of economists. In a word, easy-to-swallow prescriptions are extremely dangerous for Iran's economy today. Neat and quick-fix solutions, however attractive, have perilous consequences. That is why I submit that the treatment of Iran's economy today should not be entrusted to the practitioner of a single school of thought. Let me put it more bluntly: do not even adopt good economic policies right now, because even a good policy requires change, and any change brings instability, and instability breeds uncertainty, and uncertainty means a foggy decision-making environment for the private sector, and that means a further halt in investment and deeper recession in production. Let me be perfectly frank with you. Do you want Iran's economy to grow? The government should not pursue the growth of Iran's economy. When the government pursues economic growth, it creates inflation instead of growth. Let the government do just one thing: do not create turmoil in Iran's economy, that is all. And changing the exchange rate brings a great deal of turmoil. I do not wish here to elaborate on the difference between orthodox economics—to whose dictates all post-war governments have been obedient—and institutional economics; I will leave that for another occasion, but I submit that it is no longer permissible to think of monetary and fiscal solutions for reforming Iran's economy. In fact, conventional economic tools, including monetary and fiscal policies, have encountered inefficiency and a lack of effectiveness in Iran's economy today, and solving economic problems requires transformation and new measures in the political arena and undertaking certain institutional changes.

And the final point is that without the support and cooperation of the Supreme Leader with the government, the government's success in managing the economy is impossible. I emphasize "economic success," because he is the most important person who can not only produce signals of stability and confidence or instability and uncertainty in his speeches and stances, but also, with the oversight and authority he holds over other pillars of power in Iran, can prevent the production of economic, political, and social instability by other sectors of power. Presenting a list of demands and necessary conditions for success in economic organization that the Leader can fulfill, in order to secure his cooperation with the government's economic policies, is essential.

E) On Belief in and Trust in the People You can certainly change many of the "policies," and you will, but a large part of today's difficulties and destructions in Iran stem from the "structures," which you probably cannot change much, and the probability of success in many cases is negligible without the support of the rest of the establishment. So at least come and trust the people and increase their trust in you. Give them an identity in practice, leave behind a new experience, and raise the standard of the administrative system. Take the people seriously. Unfortunately or fortunately, the people have taken you seriously, and if you do not take them seriously, they will quickly pave the way for your incapacity, discredit, and downfall. Our people are a strange people — in both senses of the word. As quickly as they trusted you and came to the fore, they will turn away from you and bring you down. This issue goes back to the genetic, cultural, and historical characteristics of our people, which is not the place to elaborate on here. In any case, you have, willingly or unwillingly, made many promises: prudence, hope, a boom in production, reduction of foreign tensions, civil rights, reform of targeted subsidies, and a large number of other pledges and commitments. You know what a heavy value load each of these words carries, what immense social expectations they create, and in practice, what numerous obstacles their realization faces. And the main concern is that these will turn into empty slogans, squandering the social capital created during the election period, and that the same calamity that befell the ninth and tenth governments will befall this government as well — the same old story, printing new banknotes, increasing liquidity, and selling coins and dollars.

Economy must either sustain the strength and power of production or the trust and hope of the people, and in fact, both. And today, as we lack the former, we can only create economic stability and a new prosperity with the help of the latter. Be careful that this capital is not lost. The realization of your words has many important practical requirements, which if not fulfilled, the slogans will remain empty and create immense disillusionment. Then the very people who raised you up will set to work to bring you down. Pay attention: the success in realizing your slogans is not in the hands of the administrative system or certain claimants to politics and management; its solution lies in collective wisdom, and this requires devising special mechanisms. And of course, these people are so noble that if you honestly share the problems with them, they will not only moderate their expectations but will also rush to your aid. It is enough to trust them, and to gain their trust, devise real mechanisms for their participation. Regarding involving the people in the process of selecting the members of your government, I wrote earlier. Now I say: organize a regular program of direct dialogue with the people — even if brief — from the first week of your responsibility. This both ensures that the words you want to speak to the people are unmediated and eliminates the possibility of their selective transmission, and later prevents them from boycotting or censoring you when necessary, because the people will be waiting every week or every month to hear your speech. But do not forget honesty, and honesty with the people. The people understand. State the problems honestly and ask them for solutions. This increases the feeling of hope and collective capability among the people. Do not make the presence and participation of the people merely decorative. Of course, there are many mechanisms for shaping effective public participation in decision-making processes, which can be explained in their proper place. So, engage in regular dialogue with the people, weekly and monthly. Through this, the people will develop an empathetic relationship with you. Make it so that every week or every month, at a specific time, people eagerly sit in front of their televisions to hear your words, your report, and the account of your union and separation. Believe me, if you tell the people the truth, they will believe and support you even if you have fallen short. You can even ask them for solutions in times of difficulty. And of course, all of this is conditional on your speech with the people not being one-sided, and also allowing bold and critical journalists to address you as representatives of public opinion.

          And I say again, take the relationship with the people, dialogue with the people, and gaining the people's trust seriously. Instead of embarking on provincial trips and making people run after your car, from now on, directly and continuously keep the people informed of your decisions and the government's, and involve them in practice. Indeed, find a new mechanism for continuously referring to public opinion (referendum) on important government decisions. This has become very simple with modern information technologies. Just like the national ID, a "national phone number" can be registered for every Iranian so that each person can only cast one vote, and voting can be done through these phone numbers and the SMS system. A monitoring system can also be devised for it. Then, very simply, tonight you announce to the people that you want their opinion on a certain issue, or that in choosing a certain matter, for these reasons, you are in conflict or under pressure from political groups and you want the people's opinion. Believe me, the people will get your message and vote for your unspoken options. I have been teaching "The Theory of Democracy and Voting" in the field of economics for ten years; I say this from the perspective of an expert in "voting theory." The key to your success is in the hands of the people, believe in the people, believe in the people, believe in the people. You can eliminate many pressures this way, while also elevating the current problematic democracy by one step, and also, if the choices prove fruitless or inappropriate, a major part of the responsibility is transferred to the society itself.

          Avoid behaviors that suggest you wish to—and can—manage the universe. Our society does not want a prophet. Our society needs a companion who will sit with it, see its pains, hear its words, and find simple, inexpensive solutions for it. It is depressed, it lacks vitality, it is weary, its air is polluted, its driving is horrific and deadly, its youth are fleeing, lies have become abundant, moral corruptions are rapidly growing, it has over three million unmarried women with no opportunity for marriage, it has five million unemployed, it is the world's foremost consumer of opium and has the highest number of prisoners relative to its population, more than half of its population is entangled in the corridors of the judiciary, its youth are rapidly distancing themselves from official religion and falling into bewilderment, indifference, depression, or false mysticisms, the growth rate of its incurable diseases has accelerated, it has the lowest per capita milk consumption and the highest per capita sugar consumption in the world, a corrupt and inefficient administrative system has exasperated it, the majority of its families and productive units have become hostages or slaves to the banking system—meaning they run and work to pay the interest on their loans and take out new loans to settle previous overdue ones, the acceleration of life and the sluggishness of the administrative system have exasperated it, and no matter how much it runs, it cannot catch up, and it has hundreds of other such problems that it must solve with the government's help. These cannot be solved with sudden, directive, and shock policies. Solving these requires, instead of a "President of the Republic," a "Companion of the Republic." Set aside special time to identify, articulate, and find solutions for these problems of the people. Each month, focus on one of its problems and initiate a national dialogue about it. And to solve them, seek solutions and participation from the people themselves.

          The beginning of your connection with the people could be by presenting a complete report and a detailed balance sheet of the indicators and the current state of the country in various economic, social, and political domains. You could present this report yourself in regular programs on the national broadcaster, or a simpler and more effective approach is for each of your proposed ministers to give the people a complete picture of the current state within their area of responsibility. In particular, existing crises should be pointed out. This will both block the path for opportunistic demands by rivals and the opening of their obstinate tongues in the coming months—when numerous crises will arrive—and will make the people aware of the existing realities and moderate their expectations, and it will be a starting point from which you can regularly engage in dialogue with the people through the national broadcaster about each of the raised crises and find solutions. After all, until a dialogue about hidden challenges and looming crises begins, the fear of raising them will not allow comprehensive, collective solutions to be found for them. Break the policy of concealing problems and crises, keep the people informed of the realities, and of course, give them hope and seek their help in solving the difficulties.

C) On the Subject of Some New Actions

One — If I were in your place, I would establish an organization or a “Ministry of Truth.” Lying, especially in its behavioral form, has destroyed society from within and driven social capital to ruin. Our economy has been brought to its knees by two things: lies and the instability of the business environment. The main problem of our economy is neither money, nor human resources, nor a dollar deficit. Those are second-order problems. The first-order problems are distrust of any kind of information available to economic actors, and then the instability of the country’s political and economic processes. Why do we think that if a manager spends a few million from his organization’s budget without documentation, he must be investigated and prosecuted by the Supreme Audit Court, but if his lack of commitment to his promises and his non-compliance with the law causes the bewilderment and discouragement of investors and clients, and numerous opportunities are lost for the country, he should not be prosecuted? This latter is far more damaging, both for society and for the economy. Lies, in thousands of forms, have taken root and manifested in the body of the country’s governance system. From a minister who announces unrealistic programs and goals disproportionate to his organization’s capabilities and resources, destroying the country’s resources, and is then transferred to another organization without being held accountable, to a director-general who, under the pretext of a meeting, keeps his clients waiting for hours, to an employee who falsely claims a file must wait its turn but takes a bribe and moves it out of turn, to a bank manager who falsely claims orders have come not to issue any loans but gives them to friends, to a doctor who performs surgery in a public hospital and takes under-the-table payments, to a professor who goes to class unprepared and holds one-hour classes in half an hour, to a street sweeper who sweeps up the trash and dumps it in the stream, to a police officer who collects fines in cash — all are caught in behavioral lies. Lies have infiltrated our lives to a nauseating degree. Something must be done, at least a symbolic gesture must be made. In my opinion, given modern communication and information technologies, many of these deceitful behaviors can easily be corrected. In my critique of the targeted subsidy plan, one of my arguments was even that the implementation method of this policy should not lead to deceitful behaviors in our society; rather, by changing the method of implementing the targeted policy, many deceitful behaviors and wrongdoings in society could also be reduced. How is it that we establish a Cultural Heritage Organization to protect our tangible and physical cultural heritage, but we allow our ethical traditions and behavioral and moral cultural heritage to be destroyed, with no one held accountable for it? Without ethics, the mosque and the tavern will collapse, and of course, tourists will also show no interest in a country whose historical buildings captivate the heart but whose people terrify it.

Two — Apparently, the issue of reviving the country’s Management and Planning Organization is one of your priorities. I am one of those who wrote and analyzed the most in criticizing this action at the very time of its dissolution, and I presented the “Theory of the Impossibility of Planning in Iran.” Now, while I agree with the principle of its revival, there are serious considerations in this regard that require reflection. The rapid revival of this organization is just as damaging as its overnight dissolution was. The factors that had turned this organization into a problem, which the ninth administration sought to resolve by adopting the simplest solution, namely dissolution, still remain. The rapid revival of the organization could, in addition to the previous problems, create new issues for the government. Many of the skilled and experienced experts who left the organization after its dissolution are now practically unable or unwilling to return to the organization. It is likely that only a small portion of them, and that too over a lengthy process, can return to the organization. The rapid revival of the organization will turn it not into a reference expert institution, but into an assembly of invaders and seekers of new and profitable positions, which will lead the new organization astray. The experience of new institutions established in recent years has shown that the hasty establishment of new institutions only adds new salaried employees to the body of the government, while the problems these new institutions were established to solve still remain. That is, we have organizations lacking an organizational tradition, and therefore adrift and aimless, and consequently inefficient. This danger will also lie in wait for the new Management Organization.

          Since the Management Organization is the institution that generates thought for national development and the expert authority for the rational development of agencies' activities, if it is revived hastily and without sufficient deliberation, it could lead the administrative system and economic development astray for decades. In my opinion, rather than quickly reviving the organization, appointing a head, and tasking them with proposing an organizational structure, it would be better to assign an expert panel of specialists from the fields of economics, management, budget, and planning to examine the past and present issues of the organization over a specified period and present concrete proposals to the cabinet on how to revive it, especially on how to restore its capacity for thought and its expert authority. In a word: reviving the Management and Planning Organization requires "management" and "planning"; avoid haste in this matter. This recommendation becomes more serious when we realize that the era of comprehensive planning has come to an end, not only in the world but also in Iran. A large part of the regional imbalances that have emerged within and among the country's provinces and regions is the result of these very comprehensive plans devised by central authorities. If we must turn again to reviving the Management Organization—and we must—this revival should involve changing the country's planning model towards regional and local planning with a participatory and community-based approach. If this is the case, it will undoubtedly be necessary for the Management Organization to be revived within the framework of the requirements of regional planning.

          Let us not forget that governors-general are one of the serious forces resisting the potential revival of provincial management organizations. Therefore, it is possible that you and your colleagues, subconsciously, in order to avoid facing future resistance from governors-general against the re-establishment of provincial planning organizations and their independence from governorates, might try to revive the organization before appointing new governors-general. First, the outcome of the studies might suggest that it is better to revive the central Management Organization while keeping provincial management organizations under the governorates. In any case, for now, a commitment can be obtained from the new governors-general that they will not resist if the government's final decision is to revive the provincial management organizations. But there must be absolutely no haste in reviving the organization.

          Third – Obtain a written commitment from your ministers and deputies regarding their own and their families' financial affairs. That is, someone who is to become a minister must accept, along with their family, that during this transitional period, they will steer clear of certain dubious financial matters, rents, and special privileges. Therefore, an ethical and financial covenant should be prepared for ministers and deputies, which they and their immediate family members must sign before receiving their appointment decree. A minister whose immediate relatives are inclined to be involved in large-scale transactions and interests in the Islamic Republic would do better not to seek a ministry from the outset, so as not to cause trouble for themselves, the government, or society. And of course, how excellent it would be if the signing of this covenant begins with you and your own family.

          Also, be vigilant against the infiltration of elitism and luxury into your team of colleagues. Although I believe that from the perspective of macroeconomic performance, elitism and luxury, if not of the nature of legal corruption, have many positive consequences in a growing society, in the mind of our society, which has been wounded by rent-seeking and injustices, elitism and luxury are quickly perceived as synonymous with rent and corruption, and this diminishes the legitimacy and acceptability of the government and opens the way for antagonists and detractors. Therefore, in the government's ethical-financial covenant, without casting your colleagues into the pitfall of hypocrisy, include warnings concerning elitism and luxury.

Fourth — It can be predicted that you will not employ marked Reformists in prominent and direct executive positions. There is no objection to this. And of course, Reformists have an advantage in the sphere of civil society more than they do in power. Their advantage is not in execution but in their abilities to strengthen civil institutions and expand collective rationality. Involvement in executive affairs distracts them from this important task. However, I strongly recommend that Reformist experts and specialists be used as advisors in the President's advisory team and the consultative councils of ministries, alongside other academic specialists and experts from other factions. Many academics, specialists, and intellectuals, although they understand and analyze issues well, either lack the freedom to voice their critiques or lack the necessary ability to convey their specialized insights to society. The ability to critique in a way that is understandable to all is particular to those who have experienced activity in the civic sphere and have been closely engaged with the body of society. Your reform measures will only become institutionalized when society understands their concept and necessity and sees itself involved in them. Reformists have a good ability to expand and strengthen civil institutions. Therefore, assuming that the expansion of civil institutions is one of your government's priorities, the presence of Reformists in expert and advisory circles provides the necessary groundwork for its realization.

Fifth — You will never become a national hero, for in that path you would inflict harm upon us, but strive to gradually transform from a "political asset" into a "symbolic asset" for the country. I say this not for your own sake, but for the need of our asset-destroying society. The historical and psychological problem of our society is the inability to systematically produce symbolic assets and an eagerness to destroy them. It makes no difference; both those who scribble graffiti on ancient monuments and those who, by participating in the dissemination of rumor-mongering group text messages, target political and social figures, are engaged in destroying symbolic assets. We must teach society how damaging this mode of operation is. But first, we ourselves must observe the behavioral requirements of a symbolic asset.

In closing, I declare that regarding what has been stated in this letter, there is readiness to provide necessary explanations and elaborations in writing or orally whenever required. Allow me to conclude my words with a couplet that I imagine reflects your state of mind:

When I fell in love, I thought I had seized the sought-after pearl

I did not know what waves of blood this sea scatters

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PDF file of Renani's letter to Mr. Rouhani

Audio of Renani's letter to Mr. Rouhani Part One | Part Two | Part Three |Part Four

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Mohsen Renani

Associate Professor of Economics, University of Isfahan

20/4/1392

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