Reificationist Theories of Meaning in Analytic Philosophy and the Science of Usul

Abstract: The present article consists of two parts: in the first part, reificationist theories of meaning in the analytic philosophy tradition are briefly introduced. These theories are, in order: 1. The ideational theory. 2. The ideational theory. 3. The propositional theory. 4. The possible-worlds semantics theory. The second part deals with the presentation and examination of the theory of meaning in the science of usul al-fiqh. Of course, there is no topic entitled "theory of meaning" in the usuli tradition, but another issue found in some sources is very similar to the topic of the theory of meaning in the analytic philosophy tradition. The issue in question is the problem of what kind of entity the referent of words (mawdu‘ lah) is. In usuli sources, four main theories have been presented on this matter, which are: 1. Positing for external existents. 2. Positing for mental forms. 3. Positing for nature, essence, or concept. 4. Positing for the concept insofar as it indicates instances. In the second part, these theories and the reasons for and against them are discussed in detail, and, in addition, comparisons and correspondences are drawn in various cases between the views of usuli scholars and theories of meaning in the analytic philosophy tradition. The conclusion ultimately reached in the second part is that the most common usuli theory (i.e., the third theory) has serious problems, and by modifying it, we arrive at a theory roughly similar to the propositional theory of meaning in the analytic philosophy tradition.

It should be noted that in this article, the problem of meaning is primarily considered with regard to general terms; hence, theories concerning the meaning of proper names, demonstratives, pronouns, and particles are not discussed, except for the purpose of laying the groundwork for other discussions.

Part One: Reificationist Theories of Meaning1 in the Analytic Philosophy Tradition

What is a theory of meaning?

It can be said that the problem of meaning lies at the heart of philosophical reflections on language. Hence, in a sense, the philosophy of language is nothing but the presentation and examination of various theories of meaning. But what is a theory of meaning? A theory of meaning, like any other theory in various disciplines, is based on initial data and seeks to provide an explanation of that data. The data for a theory of meaning are matters such as the following:

1. The very fact that certain sounds or written signs are meaningful.

2. The synonymy of some words with one another.

3. Homonymy.

4. The possibility of constructing and understanding an infinite number of new sentences based on a finite number of words and syntactic rules.

and so on. Common-sense understanding accepts these data, which play the role of sensory data in scientific theories.

These data can be called the facts about meaning.2

Every theory of meaning, in order to explain the above data, examines issues such as the following:

1. Why are some words and signs meaningful, and what is the difference between meaningful words and a string of sounds that convey no meaning? (The problem of the criterion of meaningfulness)

2. What is the criterion of synonymy between words?

In examining the above issues, we arrive at a more abstract and fundamental problem that is prior to the aforementioned issues, namely: What is meaning? This problem has two readings: the ontological reading3 and the epistemological reading.4 According to the ontological reading, the question is whether the meaning of a word (or an expression) is a specific object or entity.

In other words, when we say that a certain word has meaning, do we mean that there exists an object or entity with which the given word has a semantic relation, and that entity is the meaning of the word? And if the answer is affirmative, what kind of entity is meaning? Any theory that conceives of meaning as an entity is called a reificationist theory of meaning. In the epistemological reading, the problem is how the meaning of a specific word can be determined. Although this question is fundamentally an empirical one, its methodological principles are examined within the theory of meaning.

Considering the points mentioned, a theory of meaning can be approximately defined as follows: a set of theoretical propositions that seek to explain the facts about meaning.

Reificationist Theories of Meaning

As noted, theories of meaning can be placed into two general groups: 1. reificationist theories and 2. non-reificationist theories. Of course, one must approach these philosophical divisions with caution. Some theories cannot easily be placed in one of the two groups, and some theories of meaning are, in fact, considered a combination of elements from both groups.

Non-reificationist theories of meaning (such as the use theory of meaning and the truth-conditional theory of meaning) are newer theories in the field of the philosophy of language, and historically, they were proposed later than reificationist theories. Since the primary aim of this paper is to examine the theory of meaning in the science of Usul al-Fiqh and compare it with similar theories in the analytic philosophical tradition, we will not address non-reificationist theories, for almost all theories proposed in the Usuli tradition fall under reificationist theories of meaning.5

As stated, the reificationist theory of meaning considers certain entities as the meaning of words, and assumes a specific semantic relation between words and those entities. In this theory, facts about meaning are explained by these very semantic relations; for example, words are meaningful insofar as they have a semantic relation with the assumed entities (explanation of meaningfulness). Likewise, two words are synonymous if they have the same semantic relation with the same entity (explanation of synonymy).

The above picture shows the general framework of reificationist theories. However, for any reificationist theory to be considered a theory, it must answer two fundamental questions. First, what type of entity is the meaning of words, and metaphysically, in what category does it belong? And second, do different words, with the different grammatical roles they play, establish the same relation with the assumed entities? And if the answer is negative, what type of semantic relation does each grammatical role entail? Since different types of semantic relations are assumed in theories of meaning, in this paper, whenever the word (reference) or its derivatives are used, what is meant is merely the realization of some kind of semantic relation, without a specific type being intended.

Various reificationist theories offer different answers to the two questions above. In what follows, we will introduce four reificationist theories very briefly, with reference to the two mentioned questions, especially the first one. The said theories are: 1. the referential theory,6 2. the ideational theory,7 3. the propositional theory,8 4. the possible-worlds semantics.9

It is worth mentioning that presenting combined theories is also possible; for example, one might accept the referential theory for proper names and adopt another theory in other cases. Likewise, it might be said that to provide a complete explanation of the problem of meaning, one must combine elements from reificationist and non-reificationist theories. Accordingly, the division of reificationist theories into four theories is not a comprehensive and exclusive classification, and merely provides a general picture of the proposed views. Relating these views is, in fact, a prelude to presenting the views of the Usulis, so that the points of commonality and difference between these two intellectual domains regarding the problem of meaning may be clarified to some extent.

Hence, we will not refer to the objections and arguments that have been stated regarding each of the four theories, except in a few cases where mentioning the problems of each theory shows how subsequent theories emerged in an attempt to resolve these problems.

1 – The Referential Theory10 of Meaning

The simplest relation that words bear to the external world is the relation of indication and reference. A clear example of this relation is observed in proper names, pronouns, and demonstratives. The role of proper names is to designate particular objects in the world, as if they were labels or signs for them. A proper name picks out an object so that one can speak about it or describe it. The referential theory of meaning takes the semantic relation between proper names and objects as the standard model, and seeks to extend it to other words and structures of language; for example, in this view it is said that general terms like the word (human) refer to individual humans or to the set of all humans. According to the referential theory, all facts concerning meaning can be explained solely through the referential or indicative relation of words to the external world.

The referential theory in this crude form faces serious difficulties, some of which we shall point out:

First difficulty: This theory is incapable of providing a complete explanation even for proper names,11 because 1. In ordinary language, there are proper names without a referent, such as (Mount Qaf) and (Rostam), even though no object corresponding to them exists in the world. Hence, according to the referential theory of meaning, these words must be meaningless and empty, since meaningfulness in this theory is a function of the word's referential relation to the world. Likewise, sentences containing names without a referent will also be meaningless. This same difficulty is sometimes formulated in terms of determining the truth-value of such sentences: Is the sentence (Rostam was bald) true or false? It seems to be neither true nor false, because Rostam exists neither in the set of bald people nor in the set of non-bald people. Therefore, the referential theory leads to the violation of the law of excluded middle.

2. According to the referential theory, how can negative existential sentences be explained? The sentence (The Simurgh does not exist) is a meaningful and true sentence. The referential theory holds that the meaningfulness of every word arises from its reference to an external object. But if (Simurgh) refers to something external, then the aforementioned sentence is no longer true; and if the sentence is true, it is impossible for (Simurgh) to refer to an object, hence, this sentence is somehow paradoxical.

3. Some proper names have a single referent; such as (Hesperus) (the morning star) and (Phosphorus) (the evening star). According to the referential theory, these words must be synonymous, because they have established the same semantic relation with identical entities. Yet it is clear that the aforementioned words are not synonymous.

The third clause of the difficulty is closely connected with two other problems, both of which create difficulties for the referential theory. The two problems in question can be formulated as follows:

The Problem of Identity Sentences

Consider the sentence (Hesperus is identical to Phosphorus). According to the referential theory, this sentence merely says that the referent of Hesperus is the same as the referent of Phosphorus. But the referent of these two words is a single object. Therefore, the above sentence says that that single object is identical with itself. It is clear that the identity of any object with itself is known a priori and contains no new information about the external world. Yet the above sentence is a posteriori and contains important astronomical information.

The Problem of Substitutivity

If the sole role of proper names is to refer to the external world, it should be possible to substitute co-referential names12 for one another without changing the truth-value of the sentence containing them; for example, sentence (1) (Ali believes that Hesperus is the second planet of the solar system) should have the same truth-value as sentence (2) (Ali believes that Phosphorus is the second planet of the solar system). Yet this is not necessarily the case. Ali might not know that Hesperus is identical to Phosphorus, hence, sentence (1) could be true and sentence (2) false.

Second difficulty: The referential theory cannot provide an explanation for the meaningfulness of particles and connectives. What entities do words such as (and), (if), (whether), (then), etc., indicate? At first glance, it seems that no object corresponds to these words.13

Third objection: Leaving aside particles and connectives, the hikāyat theory cannot carry out the analysis it claims for generic nouns such as (human), predicates such as (white), verbs, and many other linguistic constructions. Consider, for example, the word (white). What entity does this word point to? The best options available to the hikāyat theory are: (1) the set of white objects, (2) the attribute of whiteness.

The first option faces difficulties, among them that according to this option, if two predicates have the same instances, such as (risible) and (rational), they must be synonymous, because they establish the same semantic relation with the same entities. A specific form of this problem arises where the assumed words apply to no object at all, such as the two words (chiliagon) and (chiliahenagon). According to option (1), the referent of both predicates is the empty set; hence, they must be synonymous.14

The possible-worlds semantic theory seeks to answer this objection by using the apparatus of possible worlds: the referent of a predicate is the set of its instances in all possible worlds, not the set of its instances in the actual world.15

On this basis, the two predicates (risible) and (rational) are not synonymous, because although they have the same instances in the actual world, their instances differ in many possible worlds. This solution is incomplete, because words can be found that have the same instances in all possible worlds yet are still not synonymous, such as the two words (trilateral) and (triangular).

The second option directly confronts us with the question of what metaphysical category attributes belong to. There are three main views about attributes: 1. Platonic realism, 2. Aristotelian realism, and 3. Tropism16 or the doctrine of particular attributes.

It seems that if we are to use attributes to explain the facts concerning meaning, Platonic realism fulfills this task far better than the other two views.17 According to the Platonic view, attributes or universals are entities that exist beyond time and space, and their existence does not depend on having instances. Even if no white object exists, the universal whiteness is established in its own realm. On the other hand, all white objects are characterized by whiteness by virtue of having a specific relation to that universal.18

Now, if we take the referent of generic nouns and predicates to be the Platonic universal corresponding to them, we do not encounter the objection that option (1) faced. The two predicates (trilateral) and (triangular), although they have the same instances in all possible worlds, are not synonymous, because their referents are two distinct universals; that is, the two attributes (being trilateral) and (being triangular).

Given the points mentioned, can it be said that the hikāyat theory is a successful theory regarding generic nouns and predicates? The answer is negative: an important point, perhaps first noticed by Frege, is that the semantic role of proper names is completely different from that of general terms (generic nouns and predicates). Even if we accept that the word (white) has a semantic relation with an entity, this relation is not one of hikāyat and reference. (White) is not the name of the attribute of whiteness (or the set of white objects) in the way that (Zayd) is the name of Zayd. There are various pieces of evidence for this claim, of which we will mention only one here: if (white) is the name of the attribute of whiteness, we must say that the word (white) is synonymous with the phrase (the attribute of whiteness), because both refer to a single entity. On the other hand, if in a sentence we substitute a word with a synonymous word, the meaning and truth-value of the sentence should not change. On this basis, the sentence (Snow is white) must have the same meaning and truth-value as the sentence (Snow is the attribute of whiteness), even though these two sentences have different meanings and truth-values.19 This same point can be raised in another form as a fourth objection to the hikāyat theory of meaning.

Fourth objection: Every meaningful sentence is composed of several meaningful words. According to the hikāyat theory, each word is meaningful because it is the name of an entity in the external world. But it is clear that stringing several names together never produces a meaningful sentence. Therefore, it must be said that at least some of the components of a sentence are not names of entities in the external world, and if, hypothetically, they have a semantic relation with the external world, this relation is not one of hikāyat and reference.20

2. The Idea-Idealist Theory of Meaning

This theory is attributed to the British empiricists, particularly John Locke. According to the ideational theory, the meanings of words are mental entities or ideas that exist in the mind of the speaker (or hearer). These entities are independent of language, and the role of language is to signify or serve as a sign for them. This theory has not been widely accepted in the last century. One of the most important criticisms leveled against this theory is that the meaning of a sentence is common to all who use it: when Ali says, “Snow is white,” and Hasan also uses the same sentence, both sentences intuitively have the same meaning. Yet if meaning were the speaker’s mental images, these two sentences—indeed, no two sentences—would have the same meaning.

3. The Propositional Theory of Meaning

The pioneers of the analytic philosophy movement (Frege, Moore, and Russell) were among the proponents of the propositional theory of meaning. The main elements of this theory can be explained as follows: the meanings of declarative sentences are entities that exist independently of the human mind and language. The independence of the assumed entities from the mind is because if meaning were mind-dependent, we would face the same problems that plagued the ideational theory of meaning. Independence from a particular language is because two sentences from two different languages can have the same meaning; for example, “Snow is white” and “الثلج ابیض.” These entities are usually called “propositions.”²¹ Every meaningful sentence in a language has a semantic relation with a proposition. It is clear that this relation is not one of reference. When we utter a sentence, we are not naming a proposition. If the relation between a sentence and a proposition were one of reference—that is, the same relation as between a name and its referent—the sentence “Snow is white” would have to be synonymous with the phrase “the proposition that snow is white,” yet it clearly is not. Proponents of the propositional theory usually call the relation between a sentence and a proposition the relation of “expressing.”²² It seems that the propositional theory can well explain many of the facts concerning meaning, both at the level of sentences and at the level of words. The explanation of linguistic phenomena at the level of words will follow, but at the level of sentences, it can be said that a sentence is meaningful if and only if it expresses a proposition; two sentences are synonymous if and only if they express the same proposition; if a sentence expresses two distinct propositions, it is considered ambiguous, and so on. Likewise, the objectivity of meaning and the possibility of communication and mutual understanding can be easily explained in light of the propositional theory: in the process of communication, the speaker expresses a proposition, and the audience understands that same proposition. This proposition is independent of the minds of the speaker and the audience, yet both can understand it, and, as it were, “grasp”²³ it, and this guarantees the unity and objectivity of meaning.

Functions of Propositions

Traditionally, several functions are enumerated for propositions:

1. Propositions are the meanings of sentences.

2. Propositions are the objects of propositional attitudes,²⁴ such as belief, hope, desire, and so on.

3. What is primarily and essentially characterized as true or false is the proposition, and derivatively, the sentence that expresses the proposition, as well as the belief that takes the proposition as its object, are characterized as true or false. Likewise, propositions enter into logical relations—such as entailment²⁵ and consistency²⁶—with one another, and also possess modal properties, such as necessity and possibility. Sentences and beliefs, derivatively from propositions, enter into logical relations and acquire modal attributes.

4. Propositions are the referents of subordinate clauses that begin with “that”;²⁷ for example, in the sentence “Ali believes that snow is white,” the phrase “that snow is white” refers to a proposition. It seems that our intuitions well support the claim that a single entity plays all these roles; for example, intuitively, the meaning of the sentence “Snow is white” is an entity that can be the object of belief, be characterized as true or false, and also be characterized by modal properties (in this case, possibility). Likewise, the phrase “that snow is white” in the sentence “Ali believes that snow is white” refers to this same entity.

Of course, as will be discussed, criticisms have been leveled against the first functional role. For this reason, a proposition is sometimes defined as: “an entity that possesses all or some of the aforementioned functions.” Some also define a proposition solely based on the second and third roles.²⁸

Proposition and the Meaning of Sentences

In classical propositional theories, the proposition is considered the meaning of declarative sentences. Objections have been raised against this thesis, two of which we will mention here:

First: Suppose Hassan and Ali both use the sentence (I am tired) in a non-figurative way. It is clear that the said sentence has one meaning in both utterances, because both homonymy and figurative usage are ruled out. However, this sentence expresses a distinct proposition in each use. The content of the sentence in the first use is Hassan's tiredness, and in the second use, Ali's tiredness. It is for this reason that the truth value of the two sentences can differ.

Given this point, the initial claim that the proposition is the meaning of the sentence is refined and made more precise: the proposition is what the sentence expresses, although it is not necessarily the semantic meaning of the sentence.

It should be noted that this objection only arises in cases where pronouns or demonstratives are used in sentences. Otherwise, one can adhere to the original thesis. The sentence (Ali is tired), no matter who utters it, expresses a single proposition; therefore, that proposition can be considered the meaning of the sentence.

Second: According to speech act theory, not all facts pertaining to meaning can be explained solely through the semantic relations of words with the external world (e.g., with propositions); for example, the two sentences (Ali is tired) and (Is Ali tired?) express the same proposition. But the first sentence is a statement and the other is a question. Therefore, any comprehensive explanation of the problem of meaning must consist of two parts: 1. clarifying the semantic relations of words with the external world, and 2. clarifying the different types of speech acts. In the same way, the meaning of any sentence is a function of (1) the semantic relations of that sentence and (2) the specific type of speech act the sentence has.

The propositional theory of meaning only addresses the clarification of the first aspect, and from this perspective, it can be said that speech act theory amends and completes propositional theory. Accordingly, the proposition is not the meaning of the sentence, but the content of the speech act performed with the sentence. A single proposition can be the content of various speech acts such as statements, commands, questions, etc. Of course, this does not diminish the importance of propositional theory. In classical propositional theory, the claim was that the problem of meaning could be fully explained with propositions, but now we use the same elements of propositional theory to explain the content of speech acts. In other words, propositional theory, although it cannot provide a comprehensive explanation of meaning, explains well the semantic relations of sentences with the external world—which is part of the nature of meaning. In what follows, by (propositional theory) we will mean this amended version; that is, a theory that merely seeks to explain the semantic relations of sentences with the world, and likewise, by facts pertaining to meaning, we mean only the facts related to semantic relations.

The Nature and Structure of Propositions

The proposition is a theoretical entity29; that is, we postulate the existence of such an entity to explain certain matters, much like the electron, whose existence we postulate to explain certain physical and chemical phenomena. Like any other theoretical entity, the properties that propositions possess are a function of the explanatory roles they play.

Proponents of the existence of propositions, based on these explanatory roles, usually establish the following properties for propositions: independence from mind and language, abstractness30 in the sense of being beyond time and space and, more precisely, not entering into temporal and spatial relations with other objects, eternality (true propositions are always true, hence they always exist, and likewise for false propositions), and necessity in the sense of being realized in all possible worlds.

These properties are more or less agreed upon, but there is an important disagreement among proponents of the existence of propositions, which is whether propositions are composite entities with parts? And, in common terminology, are they structured?31

There are two general views on this matter. One group does not consider propositions to be structured. In their view, the proposition expressed by a sentence is the set of possible worlds in which that sentence is true. Numerous criticisms have been leveled against this opinion, including that according to this theory, if two sentences have the same truth value in all possible worlds (such as the two sentences “All bachelors are unmarried” and “Every triangle has three sides”), they must express the same proposition. And this is clearly counterintuitive.

The more common view is that propositions are composite entities possessing structure. According to this view, if a sentence expresses a proposition, the constituents of the proposition roughly correspond to the meaningful words that make up that sentence. In other words, each word of the sentence designates an entity, and through the combination of those entities, a proposition emerges which is the referent of the sentence.32 Assuming propositions are structured, the propositional theory of meaning acquires the capacity to explain facts about meaning at the level of words as well; for example, the word “white” is meaningful by virtue of having a semantic relation with a particular entity. This entity is a constituent of all propositions expressed by sentences containing the word “white.” In the same way, synonymy and homonymy in words can also be explained. Of course, it is clear that until the propositional theory specifies what kind of entities the constituents of a proposition are, its explanation of facts about meaning remains incomplete. Before addressing this matter, it is worth noting a point, which is that all proponents of the propositional theory emphasize that the relation of words to the constituents of a proposition is not always a referential or denotative relation, and this is one of the points of difference between the referential theory and the propositional theory of meaning. Most of them consider the relation of general nouns, predicates, and verbs to the constituents of the proposition to be one of expressing. However, regarding proper names, there is widespread disagreement.

In what follows, we will very briefly touch upon three main theories concerning the structure of propositions:

A – Frege’s Theory

According to Frege, the constituents of a proposition are entities called senses.33 To clarify his theory, it is necessary to briefly refer to the distinction between sense and reference.34 From Frege’s perspective, every meaningful expression, whether a word or a sentence, has two different semantic relations with two entities: it expresses a sense, and it refers to a reference. Of course, an expression may lack a reference, but to be meaningful it must express a sense. The primary source of the distinction between sense and reference was the problems Frege observed in the referential theory of proper names. A brief account of these problems was previously presented under the first objection to the referential theory. Frege ultimately concluded that facts about meaning cannot be explained solely through the referential relation of a word to its reference. On this basis, he held that every proper name, in addition to denoting a reference, expresses a sense: and what constitutes the meaningfulness of a proper name is its connection with a sense. The words “Rostam” and “Simorgh,” although they have no reference, are meaningful because each expresses a sense. Likewise, “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus,” despite having a single reference, are not synonymous because they are associated with different senses. In the same way, the problem of identity statements is also resolved. The sentence “Hesperus is Phosphorus” is an a posteriori and informative sentence because the two aforementioned words express different senses.

Frege’s solution to the substitution problem is somewhat more complex. In his view, in intensional contexts35 (that is, sentences that follow verbs such as “believe,” “hope,” etc.), the reference of each word is the very sense of the word in its ordinary uses. Therefore, if in the sentence “Ali believes that Hesperus is the second planet of the solar system,” we replace the word “Hesperus” with “Phosphorus,” we have not substituted words with the same reference for one another, because the sense of these two words is different; hence, the truth value is not necessarily preserved. Frege’s view on exactly what kind of entity a sense is, is not very clear. It is usually said that a sense is the mode of presentation36 of the reference. Also, a sense is sometimes considered a set of properties; for example, it is said that the sense of “Hesperus” is the property of “being the star that rises in the morning.” In any case, in Frege’s view, a sense is an abstract entity that exists beyond time and space, and although it is independent of the human mind, different minds can grasp it.

Frege extends the distinction between sense and reference beyond proper names to general terms (which occupy the predicate position in sentences) and to sentences themselves. He calls the sense of a sentence a “thought”³⁷—which is precisely what analytic philosophers term a proposition. On this basis, the constituents of a thought are the senses expressed by the subject and predicate of the sentence.

b) Russell’s Theory

In Russell’s view, if a sentence S expresses a proposition P, the constituents of proposition P are the very things that sentence S is about. For example, when we point to a book and say “This is red,” we have spoken about a particular book and the property of redness. The constituents of the proposition are likewise that particular book and the property of redness. It seems that any problem Frege solves with sense, Russell can also solve with properties and propositional functions. Hence, Russell’s theory has the advantage over Frege’s that, while possessing equal explanatory power, it involves less ambiguity and complexity.

In Russell’s view, at least one constituent of every proposition is a Platonic universal. This universal is sometimes one-place, such as the property of redness, and sometimes many-place, such as the relation of fatherhood. Thus, one difference between a Fregean proposition and a Russellian proposition is that in the former all constituents are abstract entities, whereas in the latter this is not necessarily the case.

Russell later cast doubt on the existence of entities called propositions, but in recent decades figures such as Scott Soames and Nathan Salmon have defended the Russellian view of propositions.

The third view concerning the structure of propositions is the possible-worlds semantics, which was introduced as the fourth of the reificationist theories of meaning. We will now take a brief look at this theory.

4. The Possible-Worlds Semantics

Possible-worlds semantics largely accepts the elements of propositional theories. The reason it was presented as a theory independent of propositional theories in the initial classification is an important difference it has with classical theories of propositions.

This theory is primarily motivated by nominalist concerns and attempts to explain the structure of propositions without presupposing entities such as Fregean senses and Platonic universals. Proponents of this theory (such as David Lewis and Cresswell) hold that one can achieve the same explanatory power that classical propositional theories (such as Frege’s and Russell’s) possessed by using possible worlds. If this claim is correct, the possible-worlds semantics is superior to classical propositional theories.

The reason for this is that the postulation of possible worlds is in any case necessary for the semantics of modal sentences.³⁸ If the semantics of all sentences of the language can also be provided using this same tool, then commitment to abstract entities such as senses or Platonic universals is unwarranted. According to this theory, the proposition expressed by the sentence “Socrates is wise” has two constituents: 1. Socrates, which is a concrete object and is the reference (Socrates). 2. A function that maps each possible world to the set of wise individuals in that world. Such a function is called an intension,³⁹ and is the denotation of the sentence’s predicate.

It can be observed that the only metaphysical categories the above analysis presupposes are: 1. concrete objects,⁴⁰ 2. possible worlds, and 3. sets and functions constructed on the basis of items 1 and 2.

This theory in turn has its own problems, one of which was mentioned earlier: according to this theory, if two predicates have the same extension in all possible worlds, they must be synonymous because they have the same intension, but this is not always the case. The two descriptions “three-sided” and “three-angled,” despite having the same intension, are intuitively not synonymous. It is clear that the theories of Frege and Russell do not encounter such a problem, because these two descriptions express different senses or universals.⁴¹

At the end of this section, we summarize and condense several final conclusions:

1. At least part of the problem of meaning is explained through the semantic relations of words with the external world.

2. The denotation of words cannot be a mental entity; rather, it must be an entity independent of mind and language in order for communication and mutual understanding to be possible.

In many cases (especially with common nouns and predicates), the referent of words is not a concrete entity or a collection of concrete entities.

There are two main options regarding the referent of common nouns and predicates: a) abstract entities such as Fregean senses or Platonic universals; b) intensions, i.e., functions constructed using possible worlds. Option b, although requiring fewer metaphysical commitments, is incapable of explaining certain semantic phenomena.

The semantic relation of words to their referents is not always one of designation. In the case of general terms and sentences, this relation is one of expression.

The above summary provides a suitable basis for comparing and contrasting theories of meaning in the science of usul and analytic philosophy.

Part Two: The Theory of Meaning in Usul al-Fiqh

The primary and original purpose of usuli scholars in addressing philosophical discussions about language was not to present a theory of meaning. They have, on occasion and as needed, raised various linguistic discussions in the preliminaries of the science of usul and also in the discussions of words (mabahith al-alfaz) within the science of usul. To provide a comprehensive picture of the usulis' views on the issue of meaning, it is necessary to examine various topics such as the nature of coinage (wad'), types of coinage, the meaning of particles, the meaning of syntactical forms, demonstrative nouns and pronouns, synonymy and homonymy, literal and figurative usage, declarative and performative sentences, usage, and so on. It is clear that even providing a summary report of these discussions is not feasible in the present article. Here, we will only address the issue of the nature of the subject of coinage (mawdu' lah), which a group of usulis have raised, and which bears considerable resemblance to discussions raised in the theory of meaning within the tradition of analytic philosophy. Before a detailed examination of the aforementioned issue, it is worth noting that the usulis' theory of meaning falls under the category of reificationist theories of meaning. The usulis consider the meaning of each word to be an entity to which the word refers, and it seems they explain the realities related to meaning based on this analysis, but this common view has exceptions. Occasionally, traces of a use theory of meaning can be observed in some usuli opinions, but the idea of explaining meaning based on use has never been developed in usuli theories. In the following, we will only point to a few instances of the traces of the use theory in usuli views:

1. According to the theory that the meaning of particles is created (ijadi), the meaning of particles comes into being through their use and at a stage subsequent to usage.42 In other words, the meaning of particles arises from and is dependent upon use.

2. In some accounts of commitment theories, it is said that the declarative sentence has been coined to express the intention of reporting about the external world, and the performative sentence has been coined to express a psychological matter other than the intention of reporting.43 It is clear that

what is meant is not coinage for the concept of expressing intention. Expressing intention is an act performed by uttering the sentence. In other words, in this theory, the subject of coinage for declarative and performative sentences is a speech act, not an entity.44

3. In many usuli views, the meaning of each word is considered an entity, yet they also leave room for the idea of the speech act; for example, many hold that with certain sentences, one can both make a statement (ikhbar) and perform an act (insha'), and the meaning of the sentence remains the same in both uses, although the act performed by using the sentence differs.45

This theory is more or less similar to combining a propositional theory of meaning with speech act theory, and it does not constitute a fundamental deviation from a reificationist conception of meaning. It can be said that what the usulis call (the meaning of the sentence) in these cases is the content of the speech act performed with the sentence.

In this article, we will only consider the dominant view in the science of usul, and without addressing the usulis' views on speech acts, we will only examine the issue of what kind of entities meaningful words have a semantic relation with, according to the usulis' perspective. As mentioned, the usuli discussion closest to the issue in question is a discussion that has been raised in some usuli sources under this title: (Is the subject of coinage of words external existents, mental concepts, or the nature itself?)46

At first glance, the question comes to mind: is the issue of the nature of the subject of coinage the same as the issue of the nature of meaning (in reificationist theories of meaning)? And if these two issues are separate, what is the relationship between them?

It seems that the two aforementioned issues—if interpreted literally—are distinct, yet there is a close connection between them, such that they ultimately coincide.

The explanation is as follows: from the perspective of usul scholars, the process of coinage (wad‘) for any word occurs only once (except in cases of homonymy and semantic shift), and in the issue of the nature of the subject of coinage (mawdu‘ lah), the discussion concerns the identity with which the word is linked during the process of coinage. But the issue of the nature of meaning (in its reificationist formulation) concerns the identity with which a semantic relation is established whenever a meaningful word is uttered. Unlike coinage, which occurs once for each word, the semantic relations considered in the philosophy of language (such as the relation of denoting or expressing) are repeated in every instance of the use of the given word. Accordingly, the nexus of coinage is something different from the semantic relation; hence, the question of the relatum of the coinage relation also differs from the question of the relatum of the semantic relation. Nevertheless, these two questions are closely connected, because the process of coinage is, in terms of rank, prior to the stage of word usage, and in the vast majority of cases, it also has temporal priority in addition to rank priority. During the process of coinage, the word is linked with a specific meaning in such a way that, after coinage, whenever the given word is used non-figuratively, it denotes that very meaning;47 that is, it establishes a semantic relation with that very meaning. Hence, the discussion of what type of identity the subject of coinage of words is, is precisely related to the issue of what identities words have a semantic relation with in literal usages. Now, if the usage is figurative, do the two issues still coincide?48 The answer seems to be yes. The explanation is that in figurative usage, the word is used in a meaning other than the subject of coinage, and consequently, it establishes a semantic relation with an identity other than the meaning that is the subject of coinage. However, most of the arguments presented in the issue of the nature of the subject of coinage can also be extended to the nature of the referent in use (musta‘mal fih); for example, the most important argument that allegedly proves that words have been coined for the essence of the nature itself also shows that the referent in use, whether literal or figurative, is the essence of the nature itself, and sometimes these arguments are initially concerned with the referent in use and are then applied to the subject of coinage. Therefore, the issue of the nature of the subject of coinage is connected to the discussion of what type of identity the referent in use of words (whether in literal or figurative usage) is. That is, with what iden

tities words have a semantic relation in their literal or figurative applications.

Thus far, we have shown that by examining the views of usul scholars on the issue of the nature of the subject of coinage, their perspective on the theory of meaning can be obtained. In usuli sources, several theories are usually mentioned regarding the nature of the subject of coinage:

1. The subject of coinage of words is external existents.

2. The subject of coinage is mental conceptions or mental existents.

3. The subject of coinage is the essence of the nature (or concept) itself, without taking external or mental existence into account.

4. The subject of coinage is the concept insofar as it denotes instances.

5. Universal words have been coined for the nature, and particular words (proper names) for external existents.

6. Words that have instances have been coined for external existents, and words without instances (such as ‘non-existent’ and ‘nothing’) have been coined for mental conceptions.

In what follows, we will present the views of usul scholars on the first four theories and, in addition, compare and evaluate the usuli views with reificationist theories in analytic philosophy.

Since this paper is solely concerned with the issue of meaning in general terms, we will not address the fifth theory. The degree of validity of the sixth theory will also become clear through the other discussions.

1. The Theory of Coinage for External Existents

In recent periods, Mirza Mahdi Isfahani has adopted this view,⁴⁹ but nearly all usul scholars who have addressed the question of the nature of the subject of designation have rejected it. The author of Hidayat al-Mustarshidin mentions four interpretations of this theory: a) external existence is part of the subject of designation; b) external existence is a condition of the subject of designation; c) words are designated for concepts in respect of their realization in the external world; d) the subject of designation of words is concepts in respect of their indication of instances.⁵⁰ The fourth interpretation is the same as the fourth theory, and he ultimately accepts this very theory as the chosen view on the question of the nature of the subject of designation. The examination of the fourth interpretation and its difference from the other three will come in the evaluation of the fourth theory. In any case, the apparent meaning of the theory of designation for the external world is the first two interpretations, and the criticisms of the usul scholars are also directed at those two. This theory is roughly equivalent to the indicative theory of meaning, with the qualification that the meaning of words is merely individual entities;⁵¹ the argumentative universals⁵² mentioned in usul sources in favor of designation for external existents are as follows: In sentences such as "I bought a book," "I entered the house," "I left the city," and so on, the speaker's intention by the words "house," "book," and "city" is the very external objects and concrete entities. Therefore, one must say that the subject of designation of words is also external affairs, because otherwise we would have to commit ourselves to the view that all these usages and similar cases are figurative; that is, almost all words are used figuratively. It is clear that such a claim is unacceptable.⁵³

The response to the aforementioned argument is that according to the theory of designation for the nature itself (the third theory) as well as designation for the nature in respect of its indication of instances (the fourth theory), such usages are not figurative.

Therefore, the aforementioned argument can at most refute the second theory, i.e., designation for mental conceptions.⁵⁴

Usul scholars have, on the whole, raised four objections against the first theory:

First objection: If external existence is a part or a condition of the subject of designation of words, and the word "human" is used literally in the two sentences "Human exists" and "Human is non-existent," the first proposition will be necessary and the second will be a contradiction, whereas it is obvious that neither is the first proposition necessary nor is the second a contradiction.⁵⁵

This objection is similar to the problem stated in the first part of this paper (the second paragraph of the first objection to the indicative theory of meaning), as quoted from Russell. Nevertheless, two differences can be observed between these two objections:

First difference: Russell's objection is raised concerning the negation of existence (predication of non-existence), but usul scholars have stated the aforementioned objection both in the case of the predication of non-existence and in the case of the predication of existence. Hence, the usul scholars' formulation is stronger than Russell's, and their approach in generalizing the objection appears to be correct. Using Russellian terminology, Russell's argument against the indicative theory can be expanded as follows: If the semantic role of singular terms⁵⁶ is to refer to external objects, existential sentences such as "Hesperus exists" would be a priori, because their subject presupposes reference to an external object and its existence.

Second difference: Russell confined his argument to a class of singular terms, namely definite descriptions, but the usul scholars' argument is not specific to singular terms, and, as it happens, most of the examples mentioned are general terms. This difference arises from a fundamental divergence between the usul scholars' and analytic philosophers' conceptions of the semantic role of general terms. In the view of most analytic philosophers, even those who accept the reificationist theory of meaning, the role of general terms and indefinite descriptions is not indication or reference. If general terms have a semantic relation with the external world, this relation is one of expression, not indication. Therefore, Russell had no need to raise the problem of negative existential propositions concerning general terms as well. To put it more clearly, in the intellectual climate after Frege, the illusion of an indicative relation was entertained only in the case of singular terms, and Russell sought to dispel this illusion.

As noted earlier, the analytic philosophical tradition's understanding of the function of general terms is more precise. However, this does not mean that the generalization made by the scholars of usul is incorrect. The usuli argument in the first stage shows that general terms do not denote external existents (qua existents), and this is a correct point that analytic philosophers also acknowledge. But the next step that the usulis take based on this conclusion seems unwarranted. From the fact that general terms do not denote external existents, they conclude that the referents of general words are natures or universal concepts. Further details of this discussion will come in the examination of the third theory.

Second objection: There are meaningful words in ordinary language that have no referent at all, such as (partner of the Creator), (phoenix), and (ten-headed human). It is clear that one cannot say these words have been coined for external entities.57

This objection is similar to the first clause of the first objection to the denotative theory, with the difference that here too the usuli formulation is not limited to specific words. The source of this difference is the same point mentioned earlier.

Third objection: Consider these sentences: (Human is a species), (Animal is a genus), (Substance is true of multiple things). The referent of the subject in the aforementioned sentences is not external existents, nor the nature realized in the external world, but rather concepts that are realized in the mind, because no external object is a species or a genus, nor is it true of multiple things. On the other hand, the words (human), (animal), and (substance) are used literally. Therefore, the subject of coinage for these words cannot be external individuals.58

Sheikh Mohammad Taqi Esfahani considers this objection incomplete. In his view, it is true that the word (human) in the first sentence only signifies concepts realized in the mind, but this word is used figuratively. Because, firstly, what immediately comes to mind from the word (human) is only external humans,59 and secondly, one can negate the word (human) from concepts realized in the mind. One can say, without any figurative usage: (The concept of human that is realized in the mind is not a human). On this basis, the truth of sentences like (Human is a species) cannot be considered an objection against the theory of coinage for the external world.60 It seems that the response of Hidayat al-Mustarshidin is fundamentally correct. Whenever I conceive of a human, neither my conception itself (as a mental act) is a human, nor does the direct object of conception (i.e., in the words of the author of Hidayat, the concept realized in the mind) count as an instance of human.61 This point creates problems for the third theory in its common interpretation, which will be pointed out.

Fourth objection: The coinage of a word is done for the purpose of conveying understanding and communication, and transferring meaning to the mind of the listener. Transferring meaning to the mind of the listener means that the meaning comes to exist in his mind with perceptual existence (mental existence). On this basis, the meaning cannot be external existents, because it is impossible for external existents to come into mental existence again, and to put it more simply, external existents cannot be transferred into human minds. In the words of Muhaqqiq Esfahani, (the opposite does not accept the opposite). Therefore, words are not coined for external entities.62

A similar statement is made regarding coinage for mental existents. Muhaqqiq Esfahani based his own theory (coinage for the nature) on such an argument, and some usulis, following him, have accepted the aforementioned argument.63

Professor Sadeq Larijani notes a point about this argument: Perhaps someone could claim that the word is coined for the nature existing with external existence (or mental existence), but the ultimate goal of coinage is not the transfer of the meaning itself; rather, the goal is the transfer of a part of the meaning, i.e., the nature itself, to the mind of the listener. Therefore, Muhaqqiq Esfahani's argument cannot refute coinage for external existents.

In Professor Larijani's view, there is no proof for the claim that the goal of coinage is the transfer of the meaning itself, not a part of it. However, it is unnatural that while we can coin a word for something that is itself transferable, we coin it for something of which only a part can be transferred.64

A detailed examination of this argument will follow under the third theory. Here, it suffices to note that Muhaqqiq Isfahani interprets the phrase (transfer of meaning to the listener's mind) literally, and his argument rests on this basis. However, this interpretation appears to be incorrect. For understanding and communication to occur, it is not necessary to assume that meaning is an entity that first exists somewhere—for example, in the speaker's mind—and then the same entity is transferred to the listener's mind; that is, it comes into existence in his mind. Rather, this assumption is fundamentally unreasonable. It is impossible for a single thing to exist both in the listener's mind and in the speaker's mind.65 A more reasonable picture of the process of understanding and communication is that meaning has an identity independent of the minds of the speaker and the listener; that is, it does not exist in either mind, but humans can establish a kind of relationship with it, in the sense that they grasp it and, so to speak, apprehend it. Now, a person who has grasped it uses certain words so that the listener also grasps the same meaning. The transfer of meaning to the listener is solely in this sense. Here, it might be claimed that grasping meaning is nothing other than the realization of meaning as a mental existence. Further examination of this issue will follow in the upcoming discussions. As observed, of the four arguments mentioned in usuli sources against the first theory, the first two are acceptable, and counterparts of these two arguments (albeit with some differences) have also been raised in the tradition of analytic philosophy to critique the representational theory of meaning for particular words. However, the other objections that analytic philosophers have raised against this theory (especially the problem of identity statements and the problem of substitution) are not found in usuli discussions.

2. The Theory of Coinage for Mental Entities

The author of Hidayat al-Mustarshidin mentions several interpretations for this theory as well, and also presents the arguments advanced in its favor, evaluating them in detail.66 For the sake of brevity, we will refrain from reporting these matters and will only examine the objections raised against this theory in usuli sources.

First Objection: As previously indicated, the word (human)—for example—can be negated of mental conceptions: (The conception of human is not human). Therefore, this word has not been coined for mental forms.67

Second Objection: If the word (human) were coined for mental conceptions, it could not be applied to external entities, even though one can say without figurative usage (Zayd is human).68

Third Objection: Muhaqqiq Isfahani rejects coinage for mental existents for a reason similar to the one mentioned earlier. Coinage is undertaken with the aim of transferring meaning to the listener's mind (i.e., its realization in the listener's mind as a perceptive existence). Hence, mental existence cannot be included in the meaning of words, because a mental existence that, by assumption, is established in the speaker's mind cannot come to exist again as a mental existence in the listener's mind, since (a like does not receive a like). On this basis, mental existence is not included in the object of coinage of words.69

Our observations regarding this argument are the same as those noted earlier. For understanding and communication to occur, the transfer of meaning in the sense intended by Muhaqqiq Isfahani is not necessary. Of course, it is true that coinage for mental forms cannot explain the process of understanding and communication, but the reason for this is not what Muhaqqiq Isfahani has stated. The reason is the same as that mentioned in the critique of the ideational theory of meaning: if the meaning of a word were a conception existing in the speaker's mind, meaning would be a multiple affair dependent on individual minds, rather than a single, shared identity, even though, according to our basic intuition, the meaning of a word in all its uses (in the absence of figurative usage and homonymy) is a single thing. Perhaps Muhaqqiq Isfahani also had this point in mind, that meaning must be shared between the speaker and the addressee. In that case, the flaw in his argument is that he has introduced an unnecessary assumption to secure the shared nature of meaning; namely, the assumption that a single meaning must be realized as a mental existence in both the speaker's mind and the addressee's mind.

3. Coinage for the Nature Itself

The prevailing theory in the science of usul is that the subject of designation (mawḍūʿ lahu) of words is the nature itself (or quiddity, or concept), without external or mental existence being included in it.70 The meaning of the three terms (quiddity), (nature), and (concept) in this theory is roughly the same thing, which is called by three different names according to different considerations.

The theory of designation for the nature is entirely based on the metaphysical views of Muslim philosophers concerning universals, mental existence, the distinction between existence and quiddity, and so on. Therefore, for a precise examination of this theory, it is necessary to make a brief reference to some of the aforementioned discussions. The views relevant to the present discussion can be summarized very concisely in three points:

1. In every possible existent, two aspects can be distinguished from one another: existence and quiddity.

The quiddity of things is precisely what is called the quiddity or nature of the thing. On this basis, the similarity and difference between existents can be explained. The objective similarity observed among human beings is because they all possess a single quiddity; in other words, they are all individuals of one quiddity. The similarity between a human being and a horse is also due to their sharing in a part of their quiddity, and of course their difference arises from the difference in another part of the quiddity.

2. In Islamic philosophy, the metaphysical category of quiddity is usually used to explain conceptual, acquired knowledge (ʿilm ḥuṣūlī taṣawwurī). When we conceive of a human being, in reality, the very quiddity of the human being that exists in the external world also comes to exist in the mind through mental existence. The conception of a quiddity is nothing other than its realization through mental existence. In other words, just as every external individual human being is distinguished into the two aspects of external existence and the quiddity of humanity, the conception of a human being also has two aspects: mental existence and the quiddity of humanity. Hence, the conception of a human being is a mental individual of the quiddity of humanity. And because the very same external quiddity is realized in the mind, mental conceptions possess the characteristic of representation and indication of the external world. Of course, the effects of the external and mental individuals of a single quiddity are different; for example, only the external individuals of the quiddity of fire possess the property of burning.71

The term (concept) is applied to quiddity in consideration of the fact that quiddity is the direct object of conception. Of course, there is an absolute generality and specificity between (quiddity) and (concept). Some concepts are not quiddities, such as the concept of existence. As will be discussed, the broader formulation of the third theory is that the subject of designation of every word is a concept, even if it is not a quiddity in the specific sense of the word.

The aforementioned understanding of how knowledge of things is acquired creates problems for the theory of meaning among scholars of usul, which we will point out.

3. Muslim philosophers believe that nature is realized within individuals. However, regarding the relationship between nature and individuals, two theories have been proposed in the tradition of Islamic philosophy: a) The relationship of nature to individuals is like the relationship of one father to several sons, meaning that in all human individuals, a single nature (with numerical unity) is realized. Muslim philosophers reject this theory because, in their view, it entails unacceptable consequences; for example, if the nature realized within Hasan were exactly the same nature that exists within Husayn, it would necessitate that a single thing exists in two different places at the same time.

b) The relationship of nature to individuals is like the relationship of fathers to sons; that is, within each individual human being, a distinct nature comes into being. The nature that exists within Hasan has a specific, not numerical, unity with the nature that exists within Husayn. This theory is almost unanimously agreed upon by Muslim philosophers,72 and according to the principles of Islamic philosophy, it can also be extended to mental individuals: the nature of humanity that acquires mental existence in one conception is numerically distinct both from the natures realized within other conceptions and from the natures that have come into external existence.

As will be discussed, the view of Muslim philosophers regarding the relationship of nature to individuals creates a serious problem for the third theory.

Before examining the arguments for the third theory, a point is worth noting: unlike the propositional theory of meaning, the usul scholars do not distinguish between different kinds of semantic relations. In their view, the relation between general terms and their meaning is exactly the same relation that obtains between a proper name and its referent. Now, from the perspective of the usul scholars, is this relation one of referring or of expression? Since the usul scholars do not differentiate between these two relations, this question is almost meaningless. Yet one might say that they extend the very relation observed between a name and its referent to other cases as well, for the said relation is the most obvious mode of connection between language and the external world.

Professor Larijani also considers the usul scholars' theory of coinage for the nature to be a kind of referential theory of meaning, with the difference that what is referred to is not individual external objects but the nature itself. In his words, one could even say that words are labels for natures.73

Now, in light of the points mentioned, we continue the discussion by citing the arguments that the usul scholars have advanced for their claim:

1. Tabādur (immediate mental occurrence): What immediately occurs to the mind from any word is the quiddity itself, and the qualification of external or mental existence is not included in the meaning that occurs.74

2. Validity of division: If we consider the word (insān / human), we can divide the instances of its meaning into two categories: external individuals and mental individuals. But if external or mental existence were included in the meaning of (insān), this division would be impossible.75

3. Existence can be predicated of (insān) without the resulting proposition being necessary, and it can also be negated of it without a contradiction arising. Therefore, existence is not included in the meaning of (insān). Some usul scholars have advanced this argument only with respect to external existence,76 and some with respect to both external and mental existence.77

The second and third arguments, assuming they are complete, only prove that external and mental existence are not included in what the words are coined for, but they do not directly show that what is coined for is the nature itself. It seems that the arguers' intention is that, after refuting coinage for external or mental existents, the only remaining possibility is coinage for the nature itself.

4. The most important argument for the third theory is the argument put forward by Muhaqqiq Isfahani, parts of which were mentioned earlier. The purpose of coinage is to convey meaning to the mind of the hearer, and conveying meaning means the realization of the meaning through cognitive existence in the hearer's mind. But it is impossible for external and mental existents to come into mental existence a second time. Therefore, the meaning is the nature itself, which can acquire mental existence in the addressee's mind.78

Examination of the Third Theory

The question that comes to mind at first glance is whether one can say that all words have been coined for quiddity. According to the principles of Islamic philosophy, certain concepts—such as existence, non-existence, secondary intelligibles, and relational meanings—are not counted among quidditative concepts. In that case, what is the object of coinage for words like (mawjūd / existent), (maʿdūm / non-existent), and so on? Some proponents of the third theory believe that such words are coined for concepts, not quiddities; accordingly, a more accurate formulation of the third theory is that the object of coinage for every word is a concept, even if that concept is not a quiddity in the specific sense of the term. Professor Larijani defends such an approach,79 and even extends this theory to constructed and conventional quiddities such as (ṣalāt / prayer) and (khāneh / house). From his perspective, this broader formulation of the third theory is more reasonable and more justified than all other theories (whether in the tradition of analytic philosophy or in the science of usul).80

An examination of the extension of the third theory to words such as (wujūd / existence), (ʿadam / non-existence), words denoting conventional composites, and particles is not feasible in the present essay; hence, we confine our discussion to words other than the aforementioned cases. This theory—setting aside the cases of extension—faces two fundamental difficulties. Both difficulties arise from the metaphysical views of the philosophical-usuli tradition concerning quiddity, and they naturally extend to linguistic issues as well:

First objection: If the word (insān) has been coined for the nature of the human being, without regard to its external or mental existence, then it must apply both to external instances of the human being and to its mental instances, even though, according to common intuition, the word (insān) cannot be applied to the concept of the human being; rather, it can be negated of mental forms, and one can say: (The concept of the human being is not a human being).81

Perhaps in defense of the third theory one might say: The mental instance of the quiddity of the human being is analyzed into two aspects: mental existence and the quiddity of the human being itself. Now, what is meant by the claim that the word (insān), given its meaning, can be negated of the concept of the human being? There are three possibilities in this regard:

1. The word (insān) can be negated of mental existence.

2. This word can be negated of the quiddity of the human being insofar as it is qualified by mental existence.

3. The word (insān) can be negated of the quiddity of the human being itself (without regard to its realization in the mind).

The first two possibilities are correct, but they do not pose a problem for the third theory, because the claim of this theory is that the coinage is for the quiddity itself. The third possibility, however, which would serve the objection against the third theory, is not acceptable, because the quiddity of the human being itself, when it comes to exist in the mind—not insofar as it is qualified by mental existence—is a human being.82

It seems that the aforementioned response is incomplete. To clarify the matter, consider how (insān) is predicated of external instances. Every external instance is also analyzed into existence and quiddity. Yet, according to common usage, (insān) can be predicated of external existence, and also of the quiddity insofar as it is qualified by external existence. One can point to an external instance and say: (This existence is a human being) and (This existent quiddity is a human being). These two sentences are entirely permissible in ordinary language, and no figurative usage according to common convention has occurred in them. Of course, according to the principles of Islamic philosophy, a rational figurative usage has occurred in both sentences, because (insān) applies only to the aspect of quiddity.83 But such rational subtleties are not the concern of the general convention; hence, common usage employs both sentences without sensing any figurative usage whatsoever. Now we say: If the word (insān) has been coined for the nature itself, its application to mental instances must be of the same kind; that is, one must be able to point to a mental concept and say, without any figurative usage according to common convention: (This concept is a human being), because according to the third theory, at most a rational figurative usage has occurred in this sentence. Yet it is clear that common usage does not regard either of these two sentences as true.84

It seems that the objection of Hidāyat al-Mustarshidīn is a sound objection, but the question here is: What conclusion can be drawn from it? Let us review the objection again: If (1) words have been coined for the quiddity itself (the third theory) and (2) the concept of every quiddity is a (mental) instance of the quiddity (the theory of mental existence), it follows that (3) the word (insān) can be predicated of the concept of the human being. From the falsity of proposition (3), the falsity of at least one of propositions (1) and (2) follows. Therefore, two different stances can be adopted regarding this issue: The first stance is to reject the third theory. The author of Hidāyat al-Mustarshidīn has adopted this approach, which will be elaborated upon in the fourth theory. The second stance is to reject the theory of mental existence; that is, to hold that the concept of the human being is not an instance of the quiddity of the human being, and that, fundamentally, the quiddity of the human being is never realized in the mind. In this way, the third theory can be preserved against the objection of Hidāyat al-Mustarshidīn. Fāḍil Ardakānī has adopted roughly this approach in response to the aforementioned objection. On the one hand, he accepts the theory of coinage for the quiddity itself, and on the other hand, he does not consider mental concepts to be instances of the quiddity.85

Now, which of the two stances above is acceptable? It seems that there are independent arguments against the theory of mental existence, which this paper does not have the scope to address,86 and in addition, as will be shown, the theory of the author of Hidāyat al-Mustarshidīn faces its own problems and ultimately cannot prevent the application of the word (insān) to mental concepts. On this basis, the second stance is more acceptable.

The conclusion of the discussion is that the first objection is, in reality, an objection against the theory of mental existence, not against the theory of the coinage of words for the quiddity.

From this very point, another weakness in Muhaqqiq Isfahani's argument in favor of positing words for quiddity—the fourth argument—comes to light. In his view, because quiddity (unlike mental and external existence) is transferable to the mind, the referent of words must be quiddity. But if we interpret transfer to the mind as Muhaqqiq Isfahani does (i.e., realization in the mind), quiddity too is not transferable to the mind and, in this respect, is no different from external entities.

Moreover, the inadequacy of the second argument for the third theory also becomes clear: the meaning of no word is divisible into external and mental individuals, because quiddities fundamentally have no mental individuals.

The Second Problem: This problem addresses the fundamental conceptions of the philosophical-usuli tradition regarding nature and its relation to individuals, and ultimately shows that if the referent or meaning of words is to be nature itself, fundamental changes must be made in the views concerning nature. We will now set forth this problem: As was said, Muslim philosophers believe that nature is realized within individuals, and its relation to individuals is like that of a father to his sons. The question is whether nature, apart from the realization it has within individuals, possesses some other kind of realization or subsistence. There are two possible answers to this question:

First Answer: Nature has no subsistence other than existence within individuals. In this case, the theory of positing words for nature faces almost the same problems that the theory of positing words for the external faced. These problems can be set forth as follows:

First Problem: A corollary of the first answer is that predicating existence of 'human' is necessary, and negating existence from human is quasi-contradictory. The explanation is that the referent of the word 'human', by hypothesis, is nature, and according to the first answer, nature has no subsistence except within existent individuals (whether mentally or externally).

Hence, although existence is not a condition of the referent, it is its container; that is, words have been posited for nature at the time of existence (not conditioned by existence). And this much is sufficient for the predication of existence to be necessary and its negation to be tantamount to a contradiction.

Second Problem: For what entity have words like 'Simurgh' and 'ten-headed human' been posited? Since these words have no instances, and nature, according to the first answer, only subsists within individuals, and mental conceptions are not individuals of the quiddity, it must be said that these words have no referent and are meaningless.

Third Problem: One way to escape the previous problem is to consider mental conceptions as individuals of the quiddity. In this case, one can say that the word 'Simurgh' has been posited for a nature that is realized within its mental individuals. But we still face another problem, which is that every nature has distinct realizations corresponding to the number of its external and mental individuals. For which of these natures have the words 'Simurgh' or 'human' been posited? There are three possibilities in this regard. The first possibility is that the referent of the word 'human' is all the natures that are realized within multiple individuals. This possibility means that 'human' is homonymous; that is, multiple acts of positing have occurred with respect to it, and each time it has been posited for one nature.

The second possibility is that the mind abstracts a common aspect from the multiple natures of human, and the word 'human' is posited for that common, shared aspect. This possibility cannot be accepted either, because the common aspect that the mind acquires is nothing other than the concept of human itself, which is realized in the mind. But this concept is itself a mental individual of the nature of human. That is, it is one of the natures realized within individuals, which is numerically distinct from the other natures. Therefore, any attempt to abstract a common, shared aspect among natures only results in another nature (which comes to exist through mental existence) being added to the set of natures.87

The third possibility is that the meaning of each word for each person is only that nature which is realized in their mind at the time of using the word, not the other realizations of that nature. This possibility faces exactly the same problem as the ideational theory of meaning.

Second response: The upshot of the discussion above is that proponents of the third theory cannot, in any way, accept the first response and are compelled to assume for the nature a subsistence separate and independent from its realization within individuals, such that even if a nature has no instances, it still subsists in some manner. Professor Larijani has approached this very idea: (The view held by some that quiddities are mental is incorrect. Quiddity has its own realm of subsistence. Of course, the intention is not external subsistence; rather, when we, in a mental reflection, divide the world into the two aspects of existence and quiddity, we posit for quiddity a realm in which quiddities and limits exist; that is, limits are subsistent in their own world of limit-hood, where, of course, neither existence nor non-existence are involved in them. There are only limits, and we point to that limit).[88] It is also sometimes said that natures and quiddities, regardless of the existence of individuals, have nafs al-amr subsistence. The assumption of a realization for quiddity, separate from the realization of individuals, is fundamentally a correct assumption, and based on it, the aforementioned difficulties can be resolved. (Of course, the first difficulty contains a specific point that will be addressed later.) However, this theory has not been well developed in the philosophical-usuli tradition, and it seems that accepting it necessitates a revision of some of the accepted views of this tradition. In what follows, we will point to some of these discussions. The first question that comes to mind is whether quiddity, regardless of the realization of individuals, exists in the specific sense of the word or not? Usually, no explicit answer is given to this question, and sometimes instead of the term (existence), the word (subsistence) or (nafs al-amr subsistence) or (subsistence in its own specific realm) is used. An examination of these terms requires considering the views concerning nafs al-amr in the tradition of Islamic philosophy. Here, without addressing the issue of nafs al-amr, we merely note that (existence), (subsistence), (thingness), and (realization) all have the same meaning.[89] On this basis, it seems that in order to explain the meaningfulness of words—and other realities related to meaning—we must commit to the view that: quiddities, regardless of their instances, exist. For it is impossible for the word (Simurgh) and its like to be coined for something that is not. Coining is a relation, and for it to be realized, both sides of the relation must exist. The word (existence) here is used in precisely the same sense as it is used in other cases, and

using the term (nafs al-amr subsistence) in its place serves no function other than adding ambiguity and avoiding an explicit stance. Such a quiddity that exists independently of individuals can be called (Platonic quiddity or nature) because this conception of quiddity is exactly like the Platonic conception of universals. Likewise, we will refer to the nature intended by Muslim philosophers, which is realized within individuals, with the expression (Avicennan nature). This naming is based on the discussion that Ibn Sina raised in his encounter with the man from Hamadan. The characteristics of the Platonic nature are completely different from the characteristics attributed to nature in the tradition of Islamic philosophers:

1. The Platonic nature is not realized within individuals; that is, it does not exist through the existence of individuals.

2. Therefore, the Platonic nature is situated beyond time and space, not in the time and space where its individual comes into being. In this respect, it can be said that the Platonic nature is incorporeal.

3. Its relation to individuals is the relation of a father to his sons, not the relation of fathers to sons. For all the individuals of a single quiddity, there exists only one Platonic nature.

Now, it might be said that to explain the realities related to meaning, accepting the Platonic nature is necessary, but this does not conflict with also accepting Avicennan natures for independent reasons; for example, one can assume that a single incorporeal quiddity of human exists in the Platonic world, and in addition, within each individual human, a human nature is also realized, which are numerically distinct from one another.

But it seems that commitment to the existence of both categories (Platonic nature and Avicennan nature) together is not justified. Corresponding to this discussion is an issue raised in the metaphysics of analytic philosophy: Can one accept both universals and tropes?[90] The answer provided by some Western philosophers is that each of these two categories (universals and tropes) can, on its own, more or less explain the phenomena in question. Therefore, accepting both categories is unnecessary and, according to Ockham's razor, incorrect.[91]

The same holds for the present issue. Any phenomenon that Avicennian nature can explain can also be explained by Platonic Forms. Therefore, if we are compelled to accept Platonic Forms in order to explain the facts concerning meaning, there remains no reason to commit ourselves to Avicennian natures.92 Proving this claim and examining the related discussions would draw us into the long-standing and far-reaching dispute over universals, which the present article does not have the scope to address. In what follows, we will merely show that if the object of coinage or the referent of words is Platonic Forms, we do not encounter any of the problems that coinage for Avicennian natures creates.

On the basis of coinage for the Platonic Form, the second problem does not arise in principle, because even if a Form has no instances, it still exists. The third problem is likewise eliminated. For all the individuals of a Form, there exists only one Platonic Form (with numerical unity), and the object of coinage is that single entity. The situation of the first problem, however, is different. At first glance, it seems that the theory of coinage for Platonic Forms also encounters the same problem, or something similar. If we consider the object of coinage of every word to be a Platonic Form, we must commit ourselves to the view that predicating existence of any meaningful word produces a sentence whose truth is known a priori, because Platonic Forms, even if they have no instances, exist, and meaningful words, by hypothesis, designate Platonic Forms. Therefore, the sentence “The Simurgh exists” and similar sentences are true sentences whose truth does not require consulting the external world. But this is clearly incorrect.

To answer this problem, a preliminary remark concerning the distinction between the semantic relations of designating and expressing is necessary.

Consider sentence (1) “Zayd is courageous.” The subject of this sentence refers to an external object; therefore, its semantic role is designation and reference. The word “courageous” also has a semantic relation with the Platonic Form of Courage, but it seems that this relation is not one of designation and reference. The reason for this is that if “courageous” designated the Form of Courage, the word “courageous” would have to be synonymous with the phrase “the Platonic Form of Courage,” because in that case, both would establish the same semantic relation with the same entity. Consequently, sentence (1) would have to be equivalent to the sentence “Zayd is the Platonic Form of Courage,” but it is clear that this is not the case.

Now, if “courageous” does not designate the Form of Courage, what relation does it have to it? In the tradition of analytic philosophy, it is usually said that this relation is one of expressing or connotation.93,94 In any case, when it is said that a word in a sentence expresses a Form, what is meant is that the sentence in question is about the instances of that Form, and does not say something directly about the Form itself; for example, the sentence “Zayd is courageous” is directly about Zayd, not about the Form of Courage.95 But do we have words in ordinary language whose role is to designate and refer to Platonic Forms? Platonic realists usually hold that abstract nouns,96 such as “courage,” “whiteness,” and “humanity,” play such a role, and the relation of these words to the corresponding Forms is the relation of a name to the named.

Of course, this claim may not be absolutely correct, but in any case, one can construct a compound phrase that refers to Forms, such as “the Form of Human.”

According to what was said above, merely saying that a word has been coined for the Form of Human does not determine its semantic role; rather, it must be specified whether the word in question was coined for the purpose of designating the Form of Human, or for the purpose of expressing it. Hence, two types of coinage are possible for any Form. This, of course, does not mean that both types of coinage have actually occurred for every Form; for example, the word “human” has been coined for the purpose of expressing the Form of Human, but we may not have a non-compound word in Persian for designating this Form.

After this lengthy preamble, we turn to the core of the objection. The aforementioned difficulty stems fundamentally from a failure to distinguish between two kinds of semantic relation. In a simple predicative proposition, if the subject expresses a quiddity, the truth of the proposition is not a priori, because such a proposition speaks not of the quiddity itself but of its instances, as in “Man exists.” But if the subject denotes a quiddity, the proposition will be a priori true, as in “The quiddity of man exists.” And this is a curious matter. The latter proposition is almost like saying: “The quiddity of man is established in its own reality.”

It is clear that to ascertain the truth of such a proposition one need not consult the external world to investigate whether any individual man exists or not.

The second objection to the theory of coinage for the nature can be summarized as follows: There are two possibilities concerning the realization of the nature: 1. The nature is realized only within individuals. 2. The nature is realized regardless of individuals. According to the first possibility, coinage for the nature faces three serious problems. According to the second possibility, although the theory of coinage for the nature can explain the facts about meaning, to achieve this goal we must accept that:

a) Platonic quiddities exist abstractly (beyond time and space), regardless of individuals.

b) Their relation to individuals is that of a father to his sons.

c) Two kinds of semantic relation can obtain between words and the quiddity, and in the case of general terms this relation is one of expressing, not denoting.

Taking into account the first objection to the third theory, another item is added to this list:

d) The conception of a quiddity is not its realization in the mind. The quiddity has an identity independent of human minds, and conceiving it means establishing a kind of perceptual relation between the mind and the quiddity. Multiple minds can conceive the same quiddity; that is, they can establish a perceptual relation with the same quiddity.

It can be observed that all these items are features attributed to the referents of general terms in classical propositional theories (the theories of Frege and Russell). On this basis, it can be said that after applying the necessary modifications and revisions to the theory of coinage for the nature, what results is something akin to propositional theories of meaning.

4. The Theory of Coinage for the Concept, in Respect of Denoting Instances

As mentioned, Shaykh Muhammad Taqi Isfahani mentions four interpretations of coinage for the external: 1. External existence is a component of what is coined for; 2. External existence is a condition of what is coined for; 3. What is coined for is the concept, but in respect of its being realized in the external world, even if it is not in fact realized externally; and 4. Words are coined for concepts in respect of their being designations for instances, whether they actually have instances or not.97 Sometimes the fourth interpretation is expressed by saying that words are coined for concepts in respect of a realization appropriate to them, even if they are not actually realized.

The difference between the third theory (coinage for the concept) and the third and fourth interpretations is that in the third theory, what is coined for is the concept itself, without any particular respect being involved, whereas in the third and fourth interpretations, what is coined for is the concept in a particular respect. The difference between the third and fourth interpretations also relates to that respect.

In the third interpretation, the respect of realization in the external world is considered, whereas in the fourth interpretation, the respect of a realization appropriate to the concept is intended. The author of Hidayat al-Mustarshidin prefers the fourth interpretation over the third, because, in his view, the third interpretation is correct only for words whose instances have the status of being realized in the external world, such as “man,” “simurgh,” and “partner of the Creator.” But the fourth interpretation, in addition to these, also covers the following cases:

a) Words whose instances have the status of mental realization, such as “species” and “universal.”

b) Words that have both mental and external instances, such as “evenness.”

c) Words that have realization only by rational consideration, such as “nothing” and “non-existent.”

The author of Hidayat al-Mustarshidin, in order to present a clearer picture of his chosen view, likens the coining of words to real propositions (qadaya haqiqiyya). From his perspective, when we coin a word for a concept, we consider the concept in the same manner that the subject is considered in a real proposition. In the proposition “Every human being is an animal,” the intention is to predicate only of the external instances of human being, not of its mental instances, nor of the absolute quiddity of human being (in a way that would also include mental instances), even though the subject of predication is broader than actual external instances and includes potential external instances. In the same vein, when the word “human” is coined for the concept of rational animal, the meaning for which it is coined (mawdu‘ lah) is neither the mental instances of this concept (i.e., mental forms), nor the absolute concept in a way that would also encompass mental instances; rather, the meaning for which it is coined is the concept considered in terms of its realization in the external world, without external realization being a condition of the meaning for which it is coined.⁹⁸

The author of Hidayat al-Mustarshidin presents three arguments for his chosen view, of which we will present here only his main argument, with slight modification. The said argument is based on two common-sense assumptions (irtikaz ‘urfi). The first assumption is that predicating existence and non-existence of the meanings of words does not entail repetition or contradiction. This assumption shows that external or mental existence is not incorporated into the meaning for which words are coined.

The second assumption is that the meaning of words can be negated from mental conceptions; for example, one can say that “the conception of a human being is not a human being.” This proves that the meaning for which words are coined is not mental forms, and furthermore, that words are not coined for the quiddity itself, because if the meaning for which they are coined were the quiddity itself without any qualification, negating it from mental instances would be incorrect.

The conclusion of the two aforementioned assumptions is that words are coined neither for external existents, nor for mental existents, nor for the quiddity itself. The only remaining possibility is to say that the meaning for which they are coined is the concept considered in terms of its indication of referents (hikayat az masadiq), even if it has no referent.⁹⁹

Examination of the Fourth Theory

As previously mentioned, Professor Larijani considers the second part of the author of Hidayat al-Mustarshidin’s argument to be incomplete. In his view, it is true that the meaning of words can be negated from mental forms, but one cannot conclude from this that words are not coined for the quiddity itself, because words can only be negated from mental existence, not from the quiddity that comes to exist in the mental receptacle. It was discussed in detail that Professor Larijani’s objection to the author of Hidayat al-Mustarshidin’s argument is not valid; however, the said argument suffers from a problem in another respect: the second assumption yields one of two conclusions: the incorrectness of the theory that words are coined for the quiddity itself, or the incorrectness of the theory of mental existence. Since the author of Hidayat al-Mustarshidin has taken the theory of mental existence for granted, he commits to the first conclusion, but it seems that the second conclusion should be accepted.

In addition to what has been mentioned, other criticisms have also been leveled against the core of the author of Hidayat al-Mustarshidin’s theory.

It is worth noting that the author of Hidayat al-Mustarshidin’s statements in explaining his chosen view are ambiguous and unclear. He employs two different expressions to state his theory. According to one expression, the meaning for which a word is coined is the quiddity considered in terms of its appropriate realization, even if it has no actual realization.¹⁰⁰ The other expression is that the meaning for which it is coined is the concept considered in terms of its indication of referents (or in terms of its being a title for referents), even if it lacks an actual referent.¹⁰¹ It is clear that the aspect of the quiddity’s realization in the external world differs from the aspect of the concept’s indication of the external world: firstly, indication is an attribute that is ascribed to the quiddity in the mental receptacle, but for ascribing realization to the quiddity, assuming its subsistence in the mind is not necessary. Secondly, indication, or being a title for referents, is a necessary and inseparable attribute of concepts. The essential characteristic of a concept is its indication of referents, even if it has no referent, but realization is not a necessary concomitant of quiddity.

In sources on the science of usul, two objections have been raised against the theory of the author of Hidayat al-Mustarshidin, each addressing one of the two aforementioned expressions.¹⁰²

The first objection addresses the first interpretation. When it is said that words have been coined for quiddities insofar as they are suitable for realization, this “insofar as” is either an explanatory condition or a restrictive condition: the explanatory condition is certainly not intended, so the restrictive condition must be meant. That is, external realization is a restriction on what is posited as the meaning. But in that case, the theory of the author of Hidāyat al-Mustarshidīn would simply be the coining of words for external existents.103

The second objection concerns the second interpretation. According to this interpretation, words have been coined for concepts in respect of their indicating (ḥikāya) their instances. It is clear that unless a quiddity is conceived in the mind, it does not possess the feature of indication. Therefore, what is probably meant is that the meaning posited is a quiddity which, if realized in the mind, indicates its instances. But the respect of indicating instances is an inseparable concomitant of concepts; hence, taking it into consideration in the act of coining is futile and a case of trying to attain what is already attained. Even if the coiner does not take the respect of indication into account, the concept that comes to mind upon hearing the word possesses this respect.104 Moreover, incorporating the respect of indication does not achieve the goal of the author of Hidāyat al-Mustarshidīn. His main purpose in adding this restriction is to ensure that the meaning of the word “human” does not apply to mental images. But if the meaning posited for “human” is the concept insofar as it indicates, the meaning of this word will be applicable to concepts realized in the mind, and also to mental images (by way of rational metaphor, not conventional metaphor). And this conflicts with the second presumption.

Comparing the coining of words for concepts with verity propositions (qaḍāyā ḥaqīqiyya) also has problems, which we will omit for the sake of brevity.

Endnotes:

* PhD student in Analytic Philosophy, Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences.

1. entity theories of meaning;این اصطلاح از لایکن (ص 78) أخذ شده است.

(این اصطلاح نیز از لایکن (ص 77) اقتباس شده است) 2. the meaning facts

3. ontnlogical reading

4. epistemological reading

5. البته رگه هایى از نظریه کاربردى معنا در برخى آراى اصولیان مشاهده مى شود, که به آن اشاره خواهیم کرد.

6. refrential theory

7. ideational theory

8. propositional theory

9. possible worlds semantics

10. (حکایى) در این جا معادل واژه (refrential) است که گاه (ارجاعى) یا (اشارى) نیز ترجمه مى شود. باید توجه داشت که منظور از (حکایى) در نوشتار حاضر, همان معناى ویژه اى است که در متن ذکر شده;یعنى رابطه اى که به نظر مى رسد بین اسماى خاص و اشیا وجود دارد. در ادبیات فلسفه زبان, این رابطه با افعالى چون (refer), (denote), (designate) بیان مى شود. واژه (حکایى) در زبان فارسى گاه معناى مُوَسّع ترى را نیز افاده مى کند, چرا که واژه (حکایت) و امثال آن به وفور در سنّت فلسفه اسلامى و اصول فقه به کار مى رود, و تقریباً معادل بازنمایى (representation) است. طبق این معناى مُوَسّع, هر چهار نظریه شىءانگارانه معنا (حکایى) هستند, مشخص است که این معنا درtheory) referential ) مد نظر نیست. در این مقاله, هرگاه الفاظ (حکایت), (ارجاع) و (اشاره) و مشتقات آنها به کار مى روند, معناى مضیّق آنها مد نظر است.

11. این اشکال از مقاله زon sense and referenceس فرگه و زon denotingس راسل اقتباس شده است. گرچه راسل در این مقاله صرفاً به اوصاف معیّن (definite descriptions) پرداخته, ولى اشکالاتى را که مطرح کرده است مى توان به اسماى خاص نیز تعمیم داد.

12. coreferential

13. هم در سنّت فلسفه تحلیلى و هم در علم اصول, تلاش هایى براى پاسخ گفتن به این اعتراض صورت گرفته است. در سنّت فلسفه تحلیلى, نظریه سمانتیک جهان هاى ممکن, مدلول اکثر حروف و ادوات ربط را توابع خاصى مى داند که با استفاده از جهان هاى ممکن ساخته شده اند. در سنّت اصولى نیز برخى مدلول حروف را نسبت یا هویّات رابط تلقى مى کنند (براى مثال ر. ک: نهایة الدرایه, ج 1, ص 57 ـ 51 ; بحوث فى علم الاصول, ج 1, ص 252 ـ 258). حتى اگر این تلاش ها موفق باشند; یعنى بتوانیم هویّاتى بیابیم که در رابطه سمانتیکى با حروف و ادوات ربط قرار دارند, به نظر مى رسد رابطه سمانتیکى مزبور رابطه ارجاع و حکایت نیست.

14. در خصوص اوصاف متّحدالمصداق نیز مسئله جملات اتحادى و مسئله جاى گزینى قابل طرح است.

Of course, as will be discussed, the more precise formulation is that according to possible-worlds semantics, the denotation of the word (white) — for example — is a function that maps each possible world to the set of white objects in that world.

tropism

In principle, one of the reasons adduced for the existence of Platonic universals is their explanatory role in the theory of meaning. The explanatory role of Platonic universals is not confined to this topic, but encompasses a wide range of phenomena, including: the phenomenon of objective resemblance between objects, the phenomenon of gradation in attributes, issues pertaining to the philosophy of mathematics, and so on.

This relation is usually called (participation), (exemplification), or (instantiation).

A similar argument can be raised against option (1): the two sentences (Snow is white) and (Snow is the set of white objects) are neither synonymous nor equivalent in value. Therefore, (snow) cannot be the name of the set of white objects.

As will be discussed, one of the criticisms leveled against the theory of meaning held by scholars of usul is the failure to distinguish between the various types of semantic relations words bear to the external world. It is possible that, from the perspective of usuli scholars, a defense against the fourth objection might be mounted as follows: the semantic relation of all the components of a sentence to the external world is the same, but the type of the referent differs. The referent of the nominal or verbal form is the copula or relational identity, and this is what makes the entire sentence meaningful, because this relational identity acts like a glue that connects the referents of the other components of the sentence (which are entities and attributes) to one another. Since this paper does not address the meaning of particles or the meaning of forms, the evaluation of this defense is deferred to another occasion.

proposition

expression

grasp; grasping a proposition is roughly what is called in Islamic logic the conceptualization of a proposition (the conceptualization of the subject, the predicate, and the assertive relation), and it stands at the stage prior to the affirmation of the proposition.

propositional attitude

entailment

consistency

These sentences are usually called (that-clauses) in English.

For example, McGrath (2005) has offered such a definition of a proposition.

theoretic entity

abstractness

structured propositions

It is worth noting that the aforementioned correspondence is not an exact, one-to-one correspondence, and different views have been proposed regarding the connection between the structure of a sentence and the structure of a proposition.

In the literature of the philosophy of language, the word (sense) has become prevalent as the equivalent of the German word (Sinn). Translating (sense) precisely into Persian is not very simple, because although lexically one could substitute (concept) or (meaning) for it, the problem is that the three words (sense), (concept), and (intension) are three technical terms in the philosophy of language. Although these three words are almost equivalent lexically, they are completely different in their technical usage. Hence, a separate word must be chosen for each in Persian. Since a standard translation for these three does not yet exist, we prefer not to translate any of them.

reference

intensional contexts

mode of representation

thought

modal sentences

intension

concrete

One can combine the semantic theory of possible worlds with the theory of tropism (the doctrine of particular attributes). In this way, the denotation of the word (triangular) is a function that maps each possible world to the set of particular attributes of triangularity in that world. In this case, the word (triangular) is no longer synonymous with (three-angled). An examination of this combined theory requires another occasion. However, at least one advantage of the classical propositional theories over this theory is their greater simplicity.

A version of this theory is presented in Ajwad al-Taqrirat (vol. 1, pp. 16–18) and Fawa'id al-Usul (vol. 1, pp. 37–45).

Muhadarat, vol. 1, pp. 91 and 96–100

When it is said (The declarative form has been coined to express the intention of conveying information), and (The word (asad) has been coined for lion), the word (for) is used in two completely different senses. This very difference illustrates the distinction between the use-based and reificationist approaches to meaning.

For example, see: Kifayat al-Usul, p. 27; Nihayat al-Diraya, vol. 1, p. 62.

In recent periods, this issue has not been much discussed, and only a few, such as Muhaqqiq Isfahani, have made passing references to it. However, before this period, a group of Usuli scholars addressed it in detail, including Shaykh Muhammad Taqi Isfahani in Hidayat al-Mustarshidin (vol. 1, pp. 334–362), Muhaqqiq Rashti in Bada'i' al-Afkar (pp. 184–186), and Fadil Ardakani in Ghayat al-Ma'sul (pp. 171–181). Perhaps the reason the aforementioned issue has not been raised in the last century is that the theory of wad' for the nature was a settled and accepted view, such that no need was felt to examine other theories.

This does not mean that the use of a word in a meaning is always concomitant with the word's signification of that same meaning. It is possible for a person to use the word 'shir' in one of its homonymous meanings but not provide any indication to specify the intended meaning. In this case, usage has occurred, but no signification has arisen. Rather, the point is that if a word is used in a specific meaning, under certain conditions (including providing an indication where necessary), it will also signify that same meaning.

It is clear that Sakkaki's conception of figurative usage (majaz) is not intended here; for in Sakkaki's majaz, the thing used (musta'mal fih) is the very thing originally assigned (mawdu' lah), and therefore, the answer to this question is obtained from the previous paragraph.

Mirza Mahdi Isfahani, in truth, accepted this theory with theological motivations. From his perspective, the alternative to the theory of wad' for the external world is wad' for mental conceptions, but a necessary consequence of wad' for conceptions is that God and His attributes can be conceived. Hence, to avoid this consequence, Mirza Isfahani commits himself to the theory of wad' for the external world. See: Abwab al-Huda, pp. 12–13 and 61–62.

Hidayat al-Mustarshidin, vol. 1, p. 334.

individuals

universals

Hidayat al-Mustarshidin, vol. 1, p. 342; Bada'i' al-Afkar, p. 185.

Hidayat al-Mustarshidin, vol. 1, pp. 342, 344.

Ibid., p. 340; Bada'i' al-Afkar, p. 185; Ghayat al-Ma'sul, p. 177.

singular terms

Hidayat al-Mustarshidin, vol. 1, p. 342.

Ibid., pp. 342–343.

One should not conclude from this statement that the author of Hidayat al-Mustarshidin holds the theory of wad' for the external world (according to the first or second interpretation). He considers this immediate mental impression (tabadur) to be compatible with the fourth interpretation, which is his chosen view.

Hidayat al-Mustarshidin, vol. 1, p. 344.

Of course, the expression 'a concept realized in the mind' is based on common conceptions in Islamic philosophy, which seems not to be a precise expression.

Buhuth fi al-Usul, p. 23.

Including Ayatollah Khoei in Muhadirat fi Usul al-Fiqh, vol. 1, p. 81.

Durus Kharij al-Usul, Ustad Sadiq Larijani, session 235, pp. 3–4, and also Dalalat wa Darurat, pp. 113–114.

Of course, the Aristotelian universal can exist in multiple things with the attribute of unity, but it is certain that Muhaqqiq Isfahani and, fundamentally, the tradition of Islamic philosophy do not accept Aristotelian universals.

Hidayat al-Mustarshidin, vol. 1, pp. 345–353.

Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 340 and 344.

Ibid., p. 349; Durus Kharij al-Usul, Ustad Sadiq Larijani, session 334. According to the author of Hidayat al-Mustarshidin, the theory of wad' for mental entities can be interpreted in a way that does not face this objection. Muhaqqiq Khurasani raised a similar objection against the wad' of generic nouns for the 'nature as unconstrained by anything, in a specific respect' (mahiyya la bi-shart qismi), which is only realized in the mind. (See: Kifayat al-Usul, p. 283.)

Buhuth fi al-Usul, p. 23.

For example, see: Bada'i' al-Afkar (p. 184); Ghayat al-Ma'sul, p. 171; Nihayat al-Diraya, vol. 1, p. 44; Buhuth fi al-Usul, p. 23; Muhadirat fi Usul al-Fiqh, vol. 1, p. 52 and p. 81; Dirasat fi 'Ilm al-Usul, vol. 1, p. 29; al-Hidaya fi al-Usul, vol. 1, p. 25.

71. For example, see: al-Asfar, vol. 1, pp. 263–277; Nihayat al-Hikma, vol. 1, pp. 143–151.

72. For example, see: Ilahiyyat al-Shifa', p. 208 and p. 315; Ta'liqat Sadr al-Muta'allihin 'ala al-Shifa', pp. 189–190; al-Asfar, vol. 2, p. 8; Hashiyat 'Allama Tabataba'i 'ala al-Asfar, vol. 2, p. 8; Nihayat al-Hikma, vol. 1, p. 277.

73. Durus Kharij al-Usul, Ustad Sadiq Larijani, session 234, p. 4 and session 235, p. 4.

74. Bada'i' al-Afkar, p. 184; Ghayat al-Ma'sul, p. 177; Hidayat al-Mustarshidin, vol. 1, p. 354.

75. Bada'i' al-Afkar, p. 184.

76. Ghayat al-Ma'sul, p. 177.

77. Bada'i' al-Afkar, p. 185; Hidayat al-Mustarshidin, vol. 1, p. 354.

78. Buhuth fi al-Usul, p. 23.

79. It is possible that Muhaqqiq Rashti also had the broader interpretation in mind, for in stating his view he does not use the term quiddity: ([The fourth view]: positing is for meanings in their neglected state, stripped of the consideration of their realization in the external world or in the mind, and this is the strongest view upon reflection) (Badāyiʿ al-Afkār, p. 184).

80. Advanced Jurisprudential Principles (Uṣūl) lectures, Professor Sadeq Larijani, session 235, p. 4; session 234, p. 4; session 265, p. 2.

81. Hidāyat al-Mustarshidīn, vol. 1, pp. 354, 344, and 340.

82. This response, with slight variation, is taken from Professor Larijani's lectures (session 240, p. 2).

83. According to the primacy of existence (aṣālat al-wujūd), predicating existence of human being is a rational trope (majāz ʿaqlī). Hence, predicating human being of existence must also be of the same kind.

84. Of course, one could say:

    49. For example, see: Loux (p. 29), as cited in: Wolterstorff and Strawson. Of course, in the analytic philosophical tradition, the terms (Platonic universal) or (Platonic attribute) are used, not (Platonic essence), but as noted, Platonic essence, in the sense intended in this article, corresponds to Platonic universals and attributes.

    95. Regarding the relation of expressing, i.e., the relation that obtains between predicates and Platonic universals, two approaches can be adopted:

    One approach is that the said relation is a primitive one, and is not definable in terms of other semantic relations; rather, it can only be grasped by reflecting on the semantic role of predicates. The other approach is that the relation of expressing is the same as the relation of implicit reference and indication. To clarify this approach, first consider the following example: in the sentence (Hasan is Ali's brother), the referent of the predicate (Ali's brother) is not Ali, yet the predicate indirectly refers to Ali, because there is a word within the predicate (namely, the word (Ali)) that directly points to Ali. Now consider the sentence (1) (Zayd is courageous). This sentence can also be written in another way: (2) (Zayd is an instance of the essence of courage) — (or (Zayd possesses courage), or (Zayd is characterized by courage); these two sentences are synonymous. The predicate of sentence (2), i.e., (instance of the essence of courage), although it does not directly refer to the essence of courage, contains within it a word (the essence of courage) that points to that essence; exactly as in the previous example. Therefore, when we say predicates express essences, it simply means that they indirectly indicate them. Hence, the distinction between the relation of indication and expressing is reducible to the distinction between direct and indirect indication. It should be noted that the second approach cannot be applied to all predicates, because it leads to an infinite regress. It was stated above that sentence (1) is rewritten as sentence (2). Now consider sentence (2) itself: (Zayd is characterized by courage). (Being characterized) is a two-place predicate, which, like all other predicates, expresses an essence. But if expressing means indirect reference, sentence (2) can again be written as: (3) (Zayd is characterized by being characterized by courage), and this process continues without reaching an endpoint. Moreover, the second approach faces other criticisms as well (for example, see: Soames, pp. 246–247). What follows in the text is based on the first approach, although based on the second approach, one could also defend the theory of positing for Platonic essences against the first objection in another way.

    97. abstract nouns

    98. Hidāyat al-Mustarshidīn, vol. 1, p. 334.

    99. Ibid., p. 337.

    100. Ibid., p. 340.

    101. Ibid., p. 337.

    102. Ibid., pp. 334–339.

    103. Of course, the separation of the two aforementioned interpretations and the objections to them, as presented within the text, are not found in the mentioned usuli sources.

    104. Ghāyat al-Ma'mūl, pp. 176–177; Khārij lectures, Professor Sadeq Larijani, session 239, pp. 2–3. Muhaqqiq Rashti (p. 185) also alludes to this objection.

    105. Badāyi' al-Afkār, p. 185.

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