The Article 'Indeterminate Knowledge and the Categorical Proposition' by Mahmoud Morvarid

Among the important and noteworthy discussions in uṣūl al-fiqh (the principles of jurisprudence) is the topic of indeterminate knowledge (al-ʿilm al-ijmālī) and the issues related to it. This discussion has a wide scope and numerous branches. Scholars of uṣūl enumerate various foundations for this discussion; one of the most important of these foundations is the question of the nature of indeterminate knowledge and its difference from determinate knowledge (al-ʿilm al-tafṣīlī). In the terminology of uṣūl al-fiqh, indeterminate knowledge is knowledge of a proposition¹ whose subject is the concept "one of the two" (aḥaduhumā), such that the pronoun "the two" (humā) refers to specific objects in the external world.² Scholars of uṣūl are almost unanimous that the type of knowledge in indeterminate and determinate knowledge is the same, and the difference between the two goes back to the object known. Likewise, from the perspective of uṣūl scholars, the object known by essence (al-maʿlūm bi-l-dhāt) in indeterminate knowledge is a predicative proposition whose subject is the concept "one of the two" (aḥaduhumā). The main and disputed issue is what the concept "one of the two" (aḥaduhumā), or the proposition of which this concept is the subject, denotes; in other words, what is the object known by accident (al-maʿlūm bi-l-ʿaraḍ) in indeterminate knowledge. In most uṣūlī sources, whenever the phrase "the object of indeterminate knowledge" (mutaʿalliq al-ʿilm al-ijmālī) is used, what is meant is the object of indeterminate knowledge (i.e., the object known by accident), not the object known by essence. Moreover, uṣūl scholars mostly focus the discussion on the concept "aḥaduhumā," not the proposition of which "aḥaduhumā" is the subject, as if, from their perspective, by determining the referent of this concept, the referent of that proposition is also automatically determined; for example, when it is said: "The object of indeterminate knowledge is the individual or the actual fact," what is meant is that the concept "aḥaduhumā" denotes the individual or the actual fact. In any case, this issue is fundamentally a philosophical one, and whether the terms of indeterminate knowledge (i.e., the referents of the pronoun "humā") are religious obligations or not has no effect on the core issue. In a sense, this topic can be considered to belong to the domain of the philosophy of language, because the discussion concerns what logical structure sentences in which the word "one of the two" is used have and what reality they denote. The analysis of the concept "aḥaduhumā" is also influential in some other discussions in uṣūl al-fiqh besides the discussion of indeterminate knowledge, including the analysis of disjunctive obligation (al-wājib al-takhyīrī), the analysis of collective obligation (al-wājib al-kifāʾī), the presumption of continuity (istiṣḥāb) regarding the indeterminate individual, and the like. It is noteworthy that despite the philosophical character of this issue, Muslim philosophers and logicians have not addressed it, while, in contrast, later uṣūl scholars have presented multiple theories and engaged in detailed discussions about it. Overall, the views of uṣūl scholars on this issue can be classified under five theories: a) Indeterminate knowledge attaches to the indeterminate individual. Ākhūnd Khurāsānī adopted this view. b) The object of indeterminate knowledge is the actual fact or the individual itself. This theory was chosen by Muḥaqqiq ʿIrāqī. c) The object of indeterminate knowledge is the common element (al-jāmiʿ) between the terms. Muḥaqqiq Iṣfahānī and Ayatollah Sīstānī have each presented an account of this theory. d) The theory of Shahīd Ṣadr: In his view, each of the three aforementioned theories expresses an aspect of the nature of indeterminate knowledge, and all three theories can be combined in a single explanation. e) There is a difference between cases of indeterminate knowledge. In most cases, indeterminate knowledge attaches to the actual fact, and in some cases to the common element. Ayatollah Rūḥānī has accepted this differentiation. In this paper, we aim to show that none of the above theories are complete and they cannot provide an adequate explanation for indeterminate knowledge. It seems the fundamental problem with these theories is a presupposition that has been adopted in all of them as an axiomatic principle—and mostly in an unstated manner. This is that the proposition to which indeterminate knowledge attaches is a predicative, singular, and unquantified proposition. A sentence like "one of the two is standing" (aḥaduhumā qāʾim), in terms of surface grammar, is composed of the subject "aḥaduhumā" and the predicate "qāʾim" and is therefore a subject-predicate sentence without a quantifier, not, for example, a conditional or quantified predicative sentence. It is likely this very surface structure that has led uṣūl scholars to suppose that the proposition this sentence expresses is predicative, singular, and unquantified. According to the prevailing view in the philosophical-uṣūlī tradition, singular predicative propositions (such as "Ḥasan is standing") denote the extensional unity of the subject and the predicate. Therefore, to determine the referent of any singular predicative proposition, it is sufficient to determine the referent of its subject and predicate. Now, if the proposition "aḥaduhumā qāʾim"³ is also a singular predicative proposition composed of the subject "aḥaduhumā" and the predicate "qāʾim," determining the referent of this proposition depends on determining the referent of the subject and the predicate. It is clear that what is problematic and issue-creating in the aforementioned proposition is determining the referent of "aḥaduhumā," not determining the referent of the predicate.

From this it becomes clear why scholars of uṣūl al‑fiqh have concentrated most of their discussions and investigations on determining the referent of “one of the two” (aḥaduhumā), rather than on determining the referent of the proposition whose subject is “one of the two.” In their view, solving the first problem also solves the second.

It seems that scholars of uṣūl al‑fiqh have not begun the analysis of indeterminate knowledge (ʿilm ijmālī) from the right point. Although the surface form of a sentence such as “one of the two is standing” is a categorical proposition without a quantifier, for reasons we shall present, its logical structure is not so. The proposition expressed by the aforementioned sentence is either a disjunctive proposition (i.e., “Hasan is standing or Husayn is standing”) or a categorical proposition with a particular quantifier—and, as will be shown, the referents of these two propositions are, logically, very similar to one another. By reducing the proposition “one of the two is standing” to the disjunctive proposition, the problem of analyzing indeterminate knowledge is reduced to the problem of analyzing the disjunctive proposition, and ultimately, by analyzing the disjunctive proposition, one can offer a complete explanation for indeterminate knowledge, disjunctive obligation (wujūb takhyīrī), collective obligation (wujūb kifāʾī), and similar issues. Apparently, no scholar of uṣūl has so far analyzed and interpreted indeterminate knowledge in terms of the disjunctive proposition. Of course, in some passages by scholars of uṣūl, there is occasional mention of the equivalence between the proposition to which indeterminate knowledge attaches and the disjunctive proposition—such as certain passages by Mīrzā‑yi Nāʾīnī and Āyatullāh Sīstānī—yet even these scholars ultimately proceeded to analyze the concept of “one of the two” as a singular concept and followed the same path taken by other scholars of uṣūl.

In what follows, we shall first set out and examine the aforementioned theories⁴ and then present our preferred theory as the sixth view. To explicate the preferred theory, an important discussion concerning the analysis of the disjunctive proposition and its referent, as well as the referent of the proposition with a particular quantifier, must necessarily be put forward. The place for these two issues—despite their being among the important topics of the philosophy of logic and, moreover, the fact that several uṣūlī problems can be analyzed and explained in terms of the disjunctive proposition—remains empty in logical, philosophical, and uṣūlī books and treatises.

A) The Theory of Indeterminate Knowledge Pertaining to the Indeterminate Individual

By the pertaining of indeterminate knowledge to the indeterminate individual, one of the following three possibilities may be meant: 1. The object known by essence in indeterminate knowledge is the indeterminate individual in its common predication (i.e., the referent of the indeterminate individual). 2. The object known by essence is the concept of the indeterminate individual. 3. The object known by accident in indeterminate knowledge is the indeterminate individual. None of these three possibilities can be accepted. The incorrectness of the first possibility is due to the fact that the object known by essence is a reality that is placed within the horizon of the soul as the object of knowledge and comes into being through cognitive existence. Everything that exists is necessarily determinate and cannot be indeterminate, because existence and determinacy are coextensive; therefore, the object known by essence cannot be an indeterminate individual (the referent of the indeterminate individual). The second possibility is also incomplete; the object known by essence in indeterminate knowledge is not the concept of the indeterminate individual. Of course, this concept itself is a determinate thing and can become the object of knowledge and the subject of a proposition (such as the proposition 'the indeterminate individual is impossible'), but in indeterminate knowledge such a concept is not the object known by essence and does not become the subject of a proposition; for example, indeterminate knowledge that either Hasan or Husayn is standing is not knowledge of the proposition 'the indeterminate individual between Hasan and Husayn is standing,' because in that case, the proposition would necessarily be false. For the indeterminate individual between Hasan and Husayn is fundamentally impossible and therefore cannot be standing. From this it becomes clear that the third possibility is also unacceptable, because if we suppose that indeterminate knowledge of the proposition 'one of the two is standing' is true, since the predicate is an existential matter, it is necessary that the subject of the proposition, i.e., the concept 'one of them,' have a referent in the external world, but that referent is certainly not an indeterminate individual, because the realization of an indeterminate individual is impossible.5 Most scholars of the science of legal theory (usul), based on the rule 'the indeterminate individual has neither identity nor quiddity,' have denied the pertaining of indeterminate knowledge to the indeterminate individual, but Ayatollah Rouhani, in Muntaqa al-Usul, considers the object of most instances of indeterminate knowledge to be the indeterminate individual. Of course, what he means by the indeterminate individual is other than what other scholars of usul deem impossible. By the indeterminate individual, Ayatollah Rouhani means an individual that in reality has determinacy, but is indeterminate for the person. He interprets and justifies the theory of Muhaqqiq Khurasani in the same way.6

B. The Theory of Indeterminate Knowledge Pertaining to the Actual Reality or Individual7

The totality of Muhaqqiq Iraqi's statements in expounding this theory can be summarized and presented as follows: The difference between indeterminate and determinate knowledge lies neither in the knowledge itself nor in the object known by accident. The object known by accident in both is the very side that is realized in actual fact; for example, if we have indeterminate knowledge that one of Hasan and Husayn is standing and in reality Hasan is standing, the object known by accident is the very reality of Hasan's standing. The difference between indeterminate and determinate knowledge lies in the object known by essence: the object known by essence in determinate knowledge is the determinate title or form of the thing, which indicates it in a clear and distinct manner, but the object known by essence in indeterminate knowledge is the indeterminate and ambiguous title or form of the external thing. This indeterminate form is the very concept 'one of them.' And in truth, it is a universal that is abstracted from the two sides. Both the determinate and indeterminate forms indicate a single thing, and for this reason, the object known by accident is the same in both.8 The theory of indeterminate knowledge pertaining to the actual reality is also incomplete, and on the whole two objections can be raised against it:

First Objection

If the object known by accident in indeterminate knowledge is exactly the same as the object known by accident in determinate knowledge, then one must necessarily say: what is disclosed to a person, for example, through knowledge of the proposition “Either Hassan or Hussein is standing” is precisely the same as what is disclosed through knowledge of the proposition “Hassan is standing,” whereas it is self-evident that through knowledge of the second proposition we become aware of more facts. In other words, the second proposition possesses more assertive content than the first proposition. Perhaps the researcher Iraqi would respond by saying that in cases of indeterminate and determinate knowledge, a single reality is disclosed to the person, and the intuitive difference between indeterminate and determinate knowledge is due to the fact that in determinate knowledge we uncover the said reality through a determinate form, whereas in indeterminate knowledge we do so through an indeterminate form, but the object of the form is one in both cases. This response is incomplete. One cannot say that the object known by essence in indeterminate and ambiguous knowledge is the form of the individual, because indeterminacy and ambiguity have no place in cognitive forms; according to the principles of Islamic philosophy, knowledge is a reality that is identical with manifestation, and that which is identical with manifestation cannot at the same time be ambiguous and indeterminate. Of course, knowledge of one matter may be accompanied by ignorance of another matter, but this is merely the conjunction of knowledge and ignorance (just as in the theory that indeterminate knowledge pertains to the universal, it is said that knowledge of the universal is accompanied by ignorance of the particularity), and it is clear that the conjunction of knowledge and ignorance differs from the cognitive forms being indeterminate.

The Second Problem

The origin of this problem was probably first raised by Ayatollah Khoei9 and it can be formulated as follows: If in reality both sides of the indeterminate knowledge are actualized; that is, for example, both Hassan and Hussein are standing, it is clear that the proposition “One of the two is standing” is a true proposition. Now, according to the theory that indeterminate knowledge pertains to reality, which side is the referent and the object known by accident? It is clear that the individual wavering between Hassan and Hussein is not the object known by accident. Likewise, one cannot say that one particular side is the object known by accident, because that would entail preponderance without a preponderant. Three other possibilities remain in the matter: 1. Both sides are the referent of the indeterminate knowledge. This possibility cannot be accepted, because in that case, the two propositions “One of the two is standing” and “Both of them are standing” would refer to a single reality, and this is necessarily false, because the first proposition has more assertive content than the second proposition. Moreover, the concept “one of them” is the same in cases where only one side is actualized and cases where both sides are actualized. Therefore, its referent must also be the same in both cases. 2. The object known by accident is the universal common to the two sides, not one particular individual. It is clear that this possibility violates the absoluteness of the theory that indeterminate knowledge pertains to reality. Furthermore, one cannot say that if only one side is actualized, the referent is that specific side, but when both sides are actualized, indeterminate knowledge refers to the universal, because the concept “one of them” is a single concept in both situations, and if the indicator is the same, the referent must also be the same. In addition, the theory that indeterminate knowledge pertains to the universal suffers from problems that will be explained. 3. The object known by accident is only one particular side; that is, the very side that caused the actualization of the indeterminate knowledge or has some existential connection with the indeterminate knowledge; for example, if Hassan is standing and we see him from a distance but do not recognize his face, such that we do not know whether it is Hassan or Hussein, we acquire indeterminate knowledge that Hassan or Hussein is standing. Now, if Hussein is also, in reality, standing in another place, both sides of the indeterminate knowledge are actualized, but the source of the indeterminate knowledge (through the mediation of the faculty of sight) is Hassan’s standing, not Hussein’s standing, and there is no causal relation between the indeterminate knowledge and Hussein’s standing. Hence, in this assumption, the indeterminate knowledge refers to Hassan’s standing. Ayatollah Rouhani has accepted this analysis in most cases and has responded to the second problem in this way.10 Professor Sadeq Larijani has also proposed a similar point as a possible response to the aforementioned problem.11 It seems that the third possibility is also incorrect, and in total, three objections can be raised against it:

The First Objection to the Third Possibility

In cases where both sides of indeterminate knowledge are realized, it is not the case that a causal relation always holds between the indeterminate knowledge and one particular side. Various examples can be offered for this point, of which we will confine ourselves to mentioning two. In the first example, there is fundamentally no causal connection between the indeterminate knowledge and the reality it reports, and in the second example, a kind of causal relation is observed, but it cannot be said that this relation holds between the indeterminate knowledge and one particular side. The first example is where indeterminate knowledge is based on the impossibility of the conjunction of contradictories or contraries; for instance, if there is a contradiction between the content of two reports, such as one report indicating the obligatoriness of a specific act and another indicating its permissibility, we acquire indeterminate knowledge that one of the two reports is false. Now, if in reality the said act is forbidden, both reports are false and both sides of the indeterminate knowledge will be realized. It is clear that in this case, there is no causal relation between the indeterminate knowledge and either of the two sides. Another instance of the first example is indeterminate knowledge of the proposition that (A is not white or is not red). The basis of the indeterminate knowledge here is the impossibility of the conjunction of contraries: no object can be both white and red. Now, if A is in reality black, both sides of the indeterminate knowledge are realized, without any causal connection existing between them and the indeterminate knowledge. The second example: if we have three balls, two of which are white and the other black, and we then randomly select two balls with our eyes closed, we acquire indeterminate knowledge that one of the two is white. Now, if in reality both of them are white, our indeterminate knowledge has no causal connection with the whiteness of any particular one; rather, the relation of the indeterminate knowledge to both sides is equal, and in a sense one can say the source of the indeterminate knowledge is the whiteness of both.

The Second Objection to the Third Possibility

If we disregard the first objection—that is, suppose that a causal relation holds between indeterminate knowledge and one particular side—a more fundamental objection can still be raised against the third possibility, which is that if a proposition is true, it has a determinate referent in the actual world, whether we have knowledge of that proposition or not; hence, that referent cannot be determined by the causal relation between knowledge and the external world. In other words, the referent of a proposition does not differ with the transformation of states of doubt and knowledge regarding that proposition; rather, if doubt concerning a proposition turns into knowledge, that same referent is disclosed to the person. Therefore, prior to the attachment of knowledge and regardless of it, every true proposition has a fixed referent, and naturally that referent cannot be determined by considering a causal relation with knowledge. For example, if both Hasan and Husayn are standing, the proposition (One of the two is standing) is true. Now, if we suppose we do not have knowledge of this proposition, which of the two sides is its referent?

The Third Objection to the Third Possibility

The third possibility encounters a problem at another point as well, namely where the indeterminate knowledge itself corresponds to reality, but its source is a false belief. For example, we see ball number 1 in the dark and mistakenly suppose it is black, and we place this ball with ball number 2 in a bag and shake them. In this supposition, we acquire indeterminate knowledge that one of these two balls is black. Now, if in reality ball number 1 is white and we have erroneously thought it black, and coincidentally ball number 2 is black, the indeterminate knowledge is true, because in any case, one of these two balls is black. The question here is: what is the referent of this indeterminate knowledge according to the third possibility? It is clear that one cannot say it has no referent, because the said proposition is true. Nor can the blackness of ball number 1 be considered the referent of the proposition, since this ball is not black at all. The blackness of ball number 2 also has no causal connection with the indeterminate knowledge. Considering the three objections mentioned against the third possibility, it becomes clear that the referent of indeterminate knowledge cannot be determined by using its causal connection with the external world. Therefore, the second objection to the theory of indeterminate knowledge's attachment to reality is valid.

The Theory of Indeterminate Knowledge's Attachment to the Common Element

A number of scholars of the science of usul, having observed that the object of indeterminate knowledge can be neither the indeterminate individual nor one specific side, have held that what indeterminate knowledge denotes is an abstract universal common to the two sides. In what follows, we will present and examine Mohaqqeq Sistani's version of this theory.12 To explain this theory, he distinguishes between the referent (mutabiq) and the instance of application (muntabiq 'alayh) of the concept

This theory suffers from ambiguity or difficulty in three respects: First: In this analysis, a distinction is drawn between the (correspondent) and the (referent) of a universal concept. In the standard logical and philosophical literature, these two terms are used synonymously; therefore, it appears that he has coined a new term in this context, while the boundaries and limits of this new term remain entirely obscure. Second: A necessary consequence of Mohaqqeq Sistani's theory is that, in addition to Hasan and Husayn, we must have another reality; that is, the referent (one of the two), with the difference that the first two realities are concrete and the third is abstract. Up to this point, the claim is not too far-fetched, for sometimes in other philosophical analyses we are also compelled to accept the subsistence of non-concrete realities.14 The problem begins where, according to Mohaqqeq Sistani's analysis, we must necessarily commit to the abstract reality in question being characterized by concrete attributes and accidents; for example, if Hasan is standing, the reality abstracted from Hasan and Husayn is also standing. What intelligible meaning can the characterization of the said abstract reality by a concrete attribute (standing) possibly have? Third: Even if we disregard the two preceding difficulties, the most important objection to Mohaqqeq Sistani's theory is that it leads to the conjunction of contradictories. Suppose Hasan exists and Husayn does not; in this case, these two propositions are true: (1) (One of the two exists), (2) (One of the two does not exist). The subject of both propositions is identical and denotes a single reality (the abstract universal common to Hasan and Husayn). But a single reality cannot both exist and not exist; the principle of non-contradiction governs both concrete realities and abstract, non-concrete realities. Perhaps in response to this objection, it might be said that the truth of both aforementioned propositions does not entail the conjunction of contradictories, because the first proposition denotes the existence of Hasan, while the second denotes the non-existence of Husayn. However, it is evident that this response amounts to abandoning the theory of indeterminate knowledge belonging to the universal and reverting to the theory of indeterminate knowledge belonging to the actual entity.

E) The Theory of Martyr Sadr

From the perspective of Martyr Sadr, the three theories of indeterminate knowledge belonging to the indeterminate individual, the actual entity, and the universal can be combined with one another to present a unified theory for interpreting indeterminate knowledge. Before stating his preferred theory, he mentions a preliminary point about how a concept becomes particular: A concept never becomes particular by the addition of other concepts and qualifications, because these qualifications are themselves, in themselves, universal (applicable to many) and, as a result, what is ultimately obtained is still universal, even if it has only one instance in the external world. Therefore, the particularity obtained in this way is relative particularity, not true particularity. The true particularity of a concept arises when that concept is used to indicate an external existent, for true individuation is only achieved through existence. Indication is a kind of employment of a concept that differs from the annihilative employment of the concept in its instance. In annihilative employment, true particularity is not obtained, unlike in indicative employment. After stating the above preliminary, Martyr Sadr proceeds to explain the core theory. The object of indeterminate knowledge is a universal concept, but this concept is considered in the mode of indicating the external world. Therefore, the theory of knowledge belonging to the universal is correct in one respect, since every concept, regardless of the mode of its employment, is always universal. On the other hand, the theory of indeterminate knowledge belonging to the actual entity is also correct, because the said concept indicates an external individual, although this indication is not of a specific individual, and in this respect, the theory of indeterminate knowledge belonging to the indeterminate individual is also acceptable. Indeterminacy in indication merely means that each of those two individuals is eligible to be the referent of the indication, not that an indication of an indeterminate individual has occurred, which would be impossible.15

An Examination of Martyr Sadr's Theory

ظاهراً مراد شهيد صدر از جامع در اين جا, همانند ساير دانش وران علم اصول, مفهوم (احدهما) است. اين مفهوم اگر به نحو غيرتبادلى لحاظ شود, البته كلى است, زيرا دو مصداق دارد.16 براى بررسى دقيق تر مطلب, ذكر نكته اى لازم مى نمايد و آن اين كه مصاديق مفهوم غيرتبادلى (احدهما) ذاتاً منحصر در دو مصداق است و اصولاً اين مفهوم قابل انطباق بر مصداق ديگرى نيست. مفاهيم متداول, مثل مفهوم (انسان), قابل انطباق بر مصاديق نامتناهى هستند, ولو آن كه مصاديق بالفعل آنها متناهى باشد و يا اصولاً مصداقى نداشته باشند. ولى مفهومِ (احدهما) گرچه به صورت مُشير لحاظ نشود, اين گونه نيست. علت اين خصوصيت آن است كه در مفهوم (احدهما), مضاف اليه, يعنى ضمير (هما), مشير به دو وجود خارجى لحاظ شده است. به دليل همين اشاره, مفهوم غيرتبادلى (احدهما ) مصداقى غير از آن دو وجود, نمى تواند داشته باشد. درهرحال, نكته اساسى تحليل شهيد صدر اين است كه مفهوم (احدهما) به نحو مُشير به وجود واقعى ملحوظ است. اين اشاره مورد ادعا, غير از اشاره اى است كه در مضاف اليه (احدهما) وجود دارد. اشاره (هما) به دو فرد خارجى امرى مسلّم و قابل قبول است, ولى به نظر مى رسد اشاره مورد ادعاى شهيد صدر, يعنى اشاره خود مفهوم (احدهما) نمى تواند تبيينى صحيح و وافى از علم اجمالى به دست دهد. البته بررسى كامل مسئله نيازمند تحليل گونه هاى مختلف استخدام مفاهيم و بيان خصوصيات هر كدام است. با مفروض گرفتن مقدمه اى كه شهيد صدر بيان كرده مى توان اشكال نظريه را اين گونه تحرير كرد: اگر مفهومى به نحو اشاره به خارج استخدام شود, مشاراليه آن بايد در واقع, تعيّن داشته باشد, گرچه نزد ما مردّد باشد, زيرا خارجيت و واقعيت مساوق با تعيّن است. هم چنين در خود اشاره نيز راه ندارد, زيرا اشاره هم يكى از موجودات عالم است. اين گفته شهيد صدر را كه (تردد در اشاره به اين معناست كه هر يك از دو فرد صلاحيت دارند مشار اليه واقع شوند) دو گونه مى توان تفسير كرد. نخست آن كه (صلاحيت) به معناى احتمال است;يعنى مشار اليه در واقع, يك طرف خاص است, ولى به دليل جهل خود, احتمال مى دهيم كه اين يا آن طرف باشد. تفسير ديگر آن است كه مشار اليه تردد واقعى دارد, و واضح است كه اين تفسير به فرد مردّد باز مى گردد و محال است. حال اگر مراد شهيد صدر تفسير اول باشد, باز دو اشكال پديد مى آيد:

اشكال اول

اين اشكال نظير اشكال دوم بر نظريه تعلّق علم اجمالى به واقع است. اگر هر دوطرف علم اجمالى محقّق باشد, مفهوم (احدهما) به كدام طرف اشاره دارد؟ اگر شهيد صدر در نهايت, ملتزم شود كه (احد هما) مشير به واقعيت سومى غير از دو فرد عينى است (مثل جامع انتزاعى بين دوطرف كه محقّق سيستانى, مطرح كرده است با همان اشكالات نظريه محقق سيستانى) به ويژه اشكال هاى دوم و سوم مواجه خواهد شد. علاوه بر اين كه اگر شهيد صدر واقعيت سوم را بپذيرد, مى تواند از همان ابتدا بگويد كه محكى (احدهما) واقعيت سوم است, بدون اين كه سخنى از استخدام اشارى به ميان آورد. در اين صورت, مطرح كردن بحث استخدام اشارى گره اى را در تفسير علم اجمالى نگشوده است.

اشكال دوم

The second objection rests on a premise, namely that if we wish to consider a concept in an indicatory manner, as was said, the referent must have real determinacy. Now, if this concept has a single instance in the external world, no problem arises; but if it has several instances (such as the concept 'man'), how does the referent become determinate? It seems there are only two ways for the referent to become determinate. One is to use sensory indication and say, for example: 'this man'. The other is to append concepts to that concept so that, ultimately, a single instance remains for the restricted concept. Now, if we set aside the first objection and assume, in principle, that only one side of the indeterminate knowledge is realized, so that the subject of the first objection is eliminated, can we indicate a determinate side with the expression 'one of them' and say, for example: 'one of them is standing'? The concept 'one of them'—if considered non-substitutively—has two instances. Hence, to indicate a determinate instance, one of the two aforementioned paths must be taken. Sensory indication of the standing person is not possible, because, by hypothesis, we lack detailed knowledge. Therefore, we must append a concept to 'one of them' so that the referent acquires real determinacy. Here, two possibilities exist: The first possibility is that the appended concept is the very predicate of the proposition; for example, we say: 'one of the two who is standing, is standing.' But it is clear that this proposition is merely a tautology and yields no new information about the external world, whereas indeterminate knowledge in ordinary cases provides fresh information. On this basis, the first possibility cannot be accepted. The second possibility is that a concept other than the predicate is appended to 'one of them' and makes the referent determinate; for example, if we know that the one wearing green is standing, but due to the darkness, neither the color of the clothing nor the standing person is discernible, we can express the proposition in this manner: 'one of the two who is wearing green is standing.' In this example, the concept 'the one who is wearing green' has been added to the concept 'one of the two' and has made the referent determinate. The second possibility also faces two problems: First: if, for example, we append the concept 'the one who is wearing green' to the concept 'one of the two,' what results is a new proposition that differs from the original proposition. The proposition 'one of the two is standing' has less indicative content than the proposition 'one of the two who is wearing green is standing.' Another indication of the difference between the two propositions is that their truth-values are not necessarily identical. Therefore, by analyzing the second proposition, we do not arrive at an answer to the original question, namely the analysis of the first proposition. The subject of the second proposition can be made to indicate a determinate instance, but this does not entail that the subject of the first proposition can also be made to indicate a determinate instance. To put it more succinctly, by appending any concept to the subject of the proposition, we depart from the point at issue, namely the analysis of the concept 'one of them.' Second: in some cases, no concept other than the predicate can be found to make the referent determinate. Such as when indeterminate knowledge is based on the impossibility of the removal of the two contradictories and we have no other information about the matter.

F) The Preferred Theory: Analyzing Indeterminate Knowledge in Terms of the Disjunctive Proposition

This theory is presented in three parts. In the first part, we demonstrate that the proposition expressed by the sentence (aḥaduhumā qāʾim) is not a categorical proposition without a quantifier, such that the concept (aḥaduhumā) is the subject and the concept (qāʾim) is the predicate; rather, this proposition is either a disjunctive proposition or a categorical proposition with a particular quantifier. In the second part, we analyze the structure and the referent of the disjunctive proposition, and in the third part, a brief discussion of the particular quantifier will be presented. Part One: The Non-Alternative and Alternative (aḥaduhumā) Two concepts of (aḥaduhumā) can be distinguished from one another: the non-alternative aḥaduhumā and the alternative aḥaduhumā. The mind is capable of considering two things, such as Hasan and Husayn, and constructing a concept whose instances are essentially limited to those two things and which cannot be truly predicated of a third thing. This is the non-alternative aḥaduhumā, where the pronoun (humā) refers to Hasan and Husayn. As previously stated, true particularity (the inability to be truly predicated of many) arises only in cases of connection to or sensory indication of the external world. Here, too, because of the reference of (humā) to Hasan and Husayn, the concept aḥaduhumā cannot be truly predicated of another thing; the said concept is predicable of both Hasan and Husayn. Hence, it is a universal concept, just like the concept (human). If we wish to predicate (standing) of (human), because the concept is universal, we can construct two quantified propositions with the universal and particular quantifiers. And fundamentally, without the use of a quantifier, the proposition is incomplete. The concept (aḥaduhumā), since it is universal, has the same characteristic. If we wish to predicate standing of it, we can construct the following two propositions: With the universal quantifier: (Every thing of which aḥaduhumā is truly predicated is standing) or (Everything that is one of those two is standing) or (kullu wāḥidin minhumā qāʾim). With the particular quantifier: (Some of the things of which aḥaduhumā is truly predicated are standing) or (Some of what is one of those two is standing) or (baʿḍu wāḥidin minhumā qāʾim). Of course, in ordinary language, the insertion of the quantifiers (every) and (some) before the expression (one of those two) is unfamiliar, but this matter has no bearing on the logical aspect of the issue. We call this (aḥaduhumā) non-alternative because, like other concepts, it applies to all its instances in a non-alternative manner. It is clear that the concept of the non-alternative aḥaduhumā differs from the concept of aḥaduhumā under discussion in indeterminate knowledge. Evidence of the difference is that if the non-alternative aḥaduhumā is made the subject of a proposition, it accepts a quantifier, and fundamentally, without a quantifier, the proposition is incomplete; however, the aḥaduhumā under discussion in indeterminate knowledge does not accept a quantifier. One cannot add a universal or particular quantifier to the beginning of the sentence (aḥaduhumā qāʾim). This (aḥaduhumā) can be called the alternative aḥaduhumā. The reason for this naming is that the proposition (aḥaduhumā qāʾim) indicates the standing of Hasan or Husayn in an alternative manner. In what follows, we will show that one cannot say the proposition (aḥaduhumā qāʾim) has a categorical structure without a quantifier, and that its subject is the concept of the alternative aḥaduhumā. The reason for this is that if this concept is the subject of the proposition, like other concepts that serve as the subject of a proposition, it is either universal or particular. If it is universal, it must accept a quantifier, yet the alternative aḥaduhumā does not accept a quantifier. If it is a particular concept, its referent is either the indeterminate individual, or one specific side, or a third abstract reality. A fourth possibility in the matter is inconceivable, but these three possibilities are, respectively, equivalent to the theories of indeterminate knowledge belonging to the indeterminate individual, the actual individual, and the universal, and the objections to each have been elaborated in detail. Thus far, it has become clear that, contrary to the apparent structure of the sentence (aḥaduhumā qāʾim), the proposition expressed by this sentence is not a categorical proposition without a quantifier. Now the question is: what structure does this proposition have? At first glance, two options appear: First option: The sentence (aḥaduhumā qāʾim) expresses a categorical proposition whose subject is the concept of the non-alternative aḥaduhumā and whose quantifier is particular. As was said, this concept is a universal concept and, like all universal concepts that serve as the subject of a proposition, it accepts a quantifier. Now, if we use the particular quantifier, what is obtained is the very proposition that becomes the object of indeterminate knowledge. In other words, the two sentences (aḥaduhumā qāʾim) and (baʿḍu wāḥidin minhumā qāʾim) express the same proposition; hence, they are synonymous. On this basis, it can be said that the concept of the alternative aḥaduhumā is, in reality, a combination of the particular quantifier and the concept of the non-alternative aḥaduhumā, and this is precisely why the alternative aḥaduhumā does not accept a quantifier, because what has already been quantified cannot accept a quantifier again. This analysis also shows why the alternative aḥaduhumā is not a true conceptual notion and cannot serve as the subject of a proposition. Fundamentally, the quantifier (whether universal or particular) is among the accidents and adjuncts of judgment; therefore, combining a quantifier with a conceptual notion does not yield a conceptual notion.

Second option: the sentence “One of the two is standing” is synonymous with the sentence “Hasan and Husayn are standing,” and the latter sentence expresses a disjunctive proposition;¹⁷ that is, the proposition “Hasan is standing or Husayn is standing.” Therefore, the object of indeterminate knowledge is in reality a disjunctive proposition, not a predicative one. The question that immediately comes to mind is whether the two options above are in fact two options, or whether both amount to the same thing. In other words, is the sentence “Some of that which is one of the two, Hasan and Husayn, is standing”¹⁸ synonymous with the sentence “Hasan is standing or Husayn is standing,” and do both express the same proposition, or not? Answering this question confronts us with the problem of the identity conditions of propositions.¹⁹ Analytic philosophers have put forward various views on this matter.²⁰ In the present paper, we assume that the two sentences mentioned express two distinct propositions, even though those two propositions have the same truth-value necessarily and a priori.²¹ On this basis, the first and second options are two distinct options, and a choice must be made between them. The best way to determine what proposition a sentence expresses is to attend to the syntactic structure of the sentence. Usually, the structure of the proposition expressed by a sentence corresponds to the syntactic structure of that sentence. However, in the present problem this method cannot be used. For the syntactic structure of the sentence “One of the two is standing” is a quantifier-free predicative structure, and we have shown that the structure of the proposition cannot be like this; that is, we must in any case deviate from the apparent predicative structure and accept either the first or the second option. But the difficulty here is that there is no clear intuition for preferring one of these two options. This very lack of intuition may perhaps be a reason that both options are correct. To explain: by assumption, the proposition “Some of that which is one of the two is standing” differs from the proposition “Hasan is standing or Husayn is standing,” yet, as was noted, these two are a priori concomitant in truth and falsity. This concomitance is so obvious that the ordinary mind does not distinguish between the two propositions, and employs the sentence “One of the two is standing” to express both. On the other hand, it might perhaps be said that the second option is preferable due to its greater simplicity.²² This issue requires further scrutiny and reflection. But the important point here is that, in any case, the simple conception that the proposition “One of the two is standing” reports the predicative attribution of the description “standing” to “one of the two” is incorrect. In what follows, we address the question of what disjunctive propositions, as well as propositions with a particular quantifier, report.

Part Two: Analysis of the Disjunctive Proposition

In this part, we will draw upon some of the concepts and terminology current in analytic philosophy to analyze disjunctive sentences and propositions. It is therefore appropriate, before addressing the main issue, to offer a brief introduction concerning the distinction between proposition and fact. Many analytic philosophers believe in a particular metaphysical category called “propositions.”²³ From their perspective, propositions are entities independent of mind and language that perform the following roles: 1) A proposition is the content of a declarative sentence; in other words, every declarative sentence expresses a proposition. 2) A proposition is what is primarily and essentially characterized as true or false, and, consequently, the sentences that express the proposition, or the beliefs that are directed at the proposition, are called true or false. 3) Propositions are the objects of propositional attitudes (such as belief, hope, etc.). Some analytic philosophers, in addition to propositions, also accept another category called “fact.”²⁴ Propositions are true because they correspond to a fact, and in this respect one can say that they report or represent those facts. In any case, however, the content of declarative sentences and the object of belief is the proposition, not the fact. The distinction between proposition and fact in analytic philosophy is analogous to the distinction drawn in Islamic logic and philosophy between the proposition (qaḍiyya) and what the proposition denotes (maḥkī al-qaḍiyya). The proposition is roughly what is called the “intelligible proposition” (qaḍiyya maʿqūla) in traditional logic.²⁵ The proposition is something other than conception (taṣawwur) and assent (taṣdīq)—as mental acts—and is the object of both. Moreover, according to the principles of Islamic philosophy, every true proposition reports its corresponding reality. In Islamic philosophy it is commonly said that if we have a true belief in a proposition, the proposition is the object known essentially (the direct object of knowledge) and what the proposition denotes is the object known accidentally (the indirect object of knowledge). One can observe an almost exact parallel between the proposition/fact distinction in analytic philosophy and the proposition/denoted-object (indirectly known) distinction in Islamic philosophy. In light of the foregoing, analyzing disjunctive sentences requires examining two issues: 1) What is the structure of the proposition expressed by disjunctive sentences? 2) What fact does a true disjunctive proposition report, or, in other words, what does it correspond to? These two issues can also be expressed in another way: if we believe a disjunctive proposition, what is the object known essentially and what is the object known accidentally? Of course, as noted at the beginning of the article, the main aim of this paper is to determine the denoted object (i.e., the object known accidentally) in indeterminate knowledge, but for the sake of completeness and because of the close connection between the two questions, we will address both.

The Structure of Disjunctive Propositions

Some analytic philosophers do not regard propositions as structured at all, but the more common view is that propositions are composite entities possessing structure. There are differing views about the structure of propositions in general, and the structure of compound propositions (including disjunctive propositions) in particular.²⁶ Here we will merely refer to Frege’s theory.²⁷ From his perspective, the proposition that is the referent of a compound sentence has a structure corresponding to that sentence itself. The logical connectives in “compound sentences,” such as “and” and “or,” are incomplete²⁸ and unsaturated,²⁹ and must be saturated by two sentences for a compound sentence to arise. Corresponding to the connectives, in the realm of concepts³⁰ there also exists an incomplete entity that is saturated by two propositions, resulting in a compound proposition. This compound proposition is the referent of compound sentences.³¹ The picture Frege presents of the structure of disjunctive propositions is intuitive and natural, and one can arrive at a similar theory based on the discussions of scholars of uṣūl al-fiqh concerning the meaning of particles (maʿnā al-ḥarfī). From the perspective of many scholars of uṣūl al-fiqh, particles have been coined for relations and relational meanings.³² Hence, one can say that the meaning coined for the particle “or” is the disjunctive relation that obtains between two propositions, and from the combination of those two and the disjunctive relation, a proposition arises that is the meaning of the disjunctive sentence. The important point is that the two sides of the disjunctive relation are propositions, not facts (the denoted objects of propositions).

The Denoted Object of Disjunctive Propositions

Regarding the relation of true disjunctive propositions and sentences to facts, three possibilities can be proposed: First possibility: Truth is a primitive, indefinable concept and does not mean correspondence with reality. Hence, for a proposition to be true, it is not necessary to assume there is a reality independent of the proposition that makes it true.33 According to this possibility, the question of what fact a true disjunctive proposition reports is meaningless. Likewise, if we believe a true proposition, that proposition is known by essence, and we have no further reality as known by accident. This possibility conflicts with our intuitions about truth. According to intuition, every true proposition is true because of its correspondence with reality. Second possibility: Truth in simple sentences or propositions means correspondence with a fact, but in compound sentences or propositions it does not mean correspondence; rather, it is defined in terms of the truth of the components. For example, we define truth and falsity for p∨q as follows: if both components are true, p∨q is true; otherwise, it is false. Similarly, by convention, if at least one of the components of p∨q is true, we attribute the property of truth to p∨q; otherwise, the property of falsity. According to the second possibility as well, the question of the referent of a true disjunctive proposition is incorrect, because the word "true" does not mean corresponding to reality, so that one could ask, now that p∨q is true, with what fact does it correspond?34 It seems the second possibility is incorrect, and two arguments can be raised against it: First: The meaning of truth, as intuitively attributed to disjunctive propositions, is the same as the truth attributed to simple propositions, and that is correspondence with reality. Second: Suppose we accept that truth in compound propositions is a matter of convention. This convention occurs in the metalanguage,35 but to state the said convention we are compelled to use logical constants in the metalanguage again; for example, to determine the value of p∨q, we say in the metalanguage: "If (and only if) p is true, or q is true, then p∨q is true." It can be observed that this convention is expressed in the form of a conditional sentence, whose antecedent is itself a disjunctive sentence. That is, to determine the truth of the disjunctive sentence (p∨q) in the object language,36 we have again employed a disjunctive sentence ("p is true or q is true") in the metalanguage. Now, what is the meaning of the truth of this disjunctive sentence in the metalanguage? If we say this truth is also conventional, it clearly cannot fall under the aforementioned convention; therefore, we must assume another convention in the metalanguage, in terms of which the truth of the disjunctive sentence in the metalanguage finds meaning. It is evident that this process leads to an infinite regress. Hence, at some point we must break the regress and accept that the truth of the disjunctive sentence is not conventional and definition-based. But in that case, why not say from the very beginning that the truth of p∨q in the object language is not conventional?37 Third possibility: The conclusion of the aforementioned points is that the truth of disjunctive sentences and propositions means correspondence with reality. Now, we must examine what fact exists corresponding to disjunctive propositions. Three options can be proposed in this regard: First option: If only p is true, the referent of p∨q is *p (by *p I mean the fact that proposition p reports), and if only q is true, the referent of p∨q is *q. This option is equivalent to the theory that indeterminate knowledge pertains to the individual or the fact, and it faces the same objections that have been raised against that theory. The said objections are briefly as follows: (1) According to intuition, one cannot say the referent of p∨q is *p (i.e., the referent of p), because proposition p has more reportive content than p∨q. (2) If both p and q are true, what is the referent of p∨q? No acceptable answer can be given to this question. Second option: The referent of p∨q is the disjunctive individual between *p and *q. This possibility is also unacceptable due to the impossibility of the disjunctive individual. Third option: The only remaining option is to say that the referent of p∨q is a single fact, which only the proposition p∨q reports. To clarify the matter, we must pay attention to the truth conditions of this proposition. A disjunctive proposition is true if one of its components or both of its components are true. Accordingly, the referent of p∨q is also a fact that exists whether *p exists, *q exists, or both of them exist. It can be said that the said fact is, in one sense, dependent on *p (in the case of *p's existence) and *q (in the assumption of *q's existence), because the truth of p∨q is also a function of the truth of p and q. Such a fact can be called a "disjunctive fact." It might be said that accepting disjunctive facts is something strange and far from common understanding. In the external world, two facts exist: *p (in the case of p's truth) and *q (in the assumption of q's truth), but the existence of a third fact as a disjunctive fact is not acceptable.

However, it is necessary to note that the very same reason that compels us to accept simple facts³⁸ also applies to disjunctive facts. The main reason for accepting simple facts is the explanatory role these facts play in the correspondence theory.³⁹ Since truth consists in correspondence, there must be simple facts to explain the truth of simple propositions. Precisely the same point can be made about disjunctive facts. Truth in disjunctive propositions also consists in correspondence; therefore, we must assume that there are facts that make these propositions true.⁴⁰ Another point to bear in mind is that disjunctive facts are not composite. The truthmaker of pVq is not a fact composed of *p, the disjunctive relation (or an identity corresponding to it), and *q. The reason for this is clear. If the truthmaker of pVq had such a composition, it would exist only if both *p and *q exist; that is, if both proposition p and proposition q are true, even though it is evident that for the truth of pVq, the truth of one of the components is sufficient. As was said earlier, the disjunctive relation, which is the denotation of the word 'or', holds between two propositions, not between two facts. Therefore, the structure of the disjunctive proposition corresponds to the disjunctive sentence, but the structure of the disjunctive fact does not correspond to the structure of the disjunctive proposition and sentence.⁴¹ A similar point can be seen in other cases; for example, negative facts (i.e., the truthmakers of true negative propositions) do not have a structure corresponding to negative propositions and sentences.

Part Three: Analysis of the Proposition with an Existential Quantifier

As was stated, one possibility is that the sentence (One of them is standing) expresses a predicative proposition that has an existential quantifier. Now the question is, what reality do propositions with an existential quantifier report? If we consider the proposition (Some humans are poets), there are four possibilities regarding its referent: First possibility: This proposition reports the attribution of the predicate of being a poet to an indeterminate individual among humans. Second possibility: The referent of the proposition is the attribution of the predicate of being a poet to those very humans who are, in fact, poets. Third possibility: The aforementioned proposition reports the attribution of the predicate of being a poet to an abstract universal among humans. These three possibilities correspond, respectively, to the three theories of non-distinctive knowledge belonging to an indeterminate individual, the actual instance, and the universal, and they suffer from precisely the same aforementioned problems. Fourth possibility: The referent of the proposition is a single reality that is necessarily realized if at least one human is a poet. It is clear that among the four possibilities above, only the fourth is acceptable. This possibility is very similar to the analysis we presented of the referent of the disjunctive proposition. Here too, the referent of the proposition is not a reality composed of simple realities (i.e., the reality of Zayd being a poet, Amr being a poet, and so on), although its realization depends on the realization of at least one of them. In this article, we have merely analyzed the object of non-distinctive knowledge. As stated in the introduction, the analysis of the concept (One of them) is influential in several discussions of legal theory. Examining the results and implications of the chosen theory in these discussions requires another opportunity.

Endnotes:

* PhD student in Analytic Philosophy, Institute for Fundamental Sciences. 1. By 'proposition' in this article is meant an entity independent of language that (1) is the content of declarative sentences, (2) is characterized by truth and falsity, and (3) becomes the object of knowledge (i.e., is known essentially). As will be discussed, a proposition is roughly what is called a 'conceptual proposition' (al-qadiyya al-ma'qula) in traditional logic, as opposed to a 'verbal proposition' (al-qadiyya al-malfuza). Of course, there is a difference between a proposition (in the terminology of analytic philosophy) and a proposition (in traditional logic), which will be pointed out. However, this difference has no bearing on the discussions of the present article. 2. This definition of indeterminate knowledge is, in fact, a summary and imprecise definition, which nonetheless suffices to begin the discussion. Scholars of the discipline of usul al-fiqh hold differing views on the precise definition of indeterminate knowledge and its difference from determinate knowledge, some of which we will refer to as appropriate. 3. By 'the proposition "one of them is standing"' is meant the proposition expressed by the sentence "one of them is standing." In this article, whenever the word 'proposition' is added to a sentence, this is the intended meaning. 4. Of course, for the sake of brevity, we will refrain from presenting and examining the fifth theory. The degree of validity of this theory will become clear from the other discussions. See: Hakim, Sayyid Abd al-Sahib, Muntaqa al-Usul (Taqrirat Usul Ayatollah Ruhani), vol. 5, pp. 49–61, Amir Publications, 1414 AH. 5. What Muhaqqiq Isfahani has presented in Nihayat al-Diraya to refute the theory of indeterminate knowledge's relation to the indeterminate individual, as well as the words of Shahid Sadr in Buhuth fi al-Usul, only pertain to the first possibility. (See: Nihayat al-Diraya, vol. 3, p. 90 and vol. 4, p. 236; Buhuth fi al-Usul, vol. 4, p. 156.) 6. Hakim, Sayyid Abd al-Sahib, Muntaqa al-Usul (Taqrirat Usul Ayatollah Ruhani), vol. 5, pp. 50–51, Amir Publications, 1413 AH. 7. By the relation of indeterminate knowledge to reality is meant the relation of indeterminate knowledge to the individual. The word 'reality' here is used merely in contrast to the word 'universal' in the theory of indeterminate knowledge's relation to the universal. 8. Nihayat al-Afkar, vol. 3, pp. 47–48 and p. 299; Maqalat al-Usul, vol. 2, pp. 230 and 233; Hashiyat Fawa'id al-Usul, vol. 4, p. [missing number]. In Buhuth fi Ilm al-Usul, Shahid Sadr presents Muhaqqiq Iraqi's theory in a way that seems to differ from Muhaqqiq Iraqi's own expressions. (See: Buhuth fi Ilm al-Usul, vol. 4, p. 157.) 9. Fayyad, Muhammad Ishaq, Muhadarat fi Usul al-Fiqh (Taqrirat Usul Ayatollah Khu'i), vol. 4, p. 42, Islamic Publishing Institute, 1419 AH. 10. Hakim, Sayyid Abd al-Sahib, Muntaqa al-Usul (Taqrirat Usul Ayatollah Ruhani), vol. 5, pp. 58–59, Amir Publications, 1413 AH. 11. Advanced lectures on usul by Professor Sadiq Larijani, session 89. 12. Ayatollah Sistani's theory has two parts: (1) Indeterminate knowledge essentially denotes the universal. (2) According to rational persons and by their consideration, the referent of indeterminate knowledge is reality. Since this article is concerned solely with the logical aspect of the problem of indeterminate knowledge, we will only discuss the first part of Muhaqqiq Sistani's theory. Muhaqqiq Isfahani has also presented another version of the theory of indeterminate knowledge's relation to the universal, which we will not address for the sake of brevity (see: Nihayat al-Diraya, vol. 3, pp. 89–90, vol. 4, pp. 236–237). 13. Taqrirat Kharij al-Usul of Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Sistani, manuscript. 14. An example of this is some of the interpretations that have been offered of nafs al-amr (the fact of the matter). Likewise, Shahid Sadr, who considers the world of reality to be broader than the world of existence, holds that some real entities are non-existent (and, in a sense, non-objective). 15. Hashemi Shahroudi, Sayyid Muhammad, Buhuth fi Ilm al-Usul, vol. 4, pp. 159–161. 16. Regarding the two terms 'commutative' and 'non-commutative,' some explanations will follow. 17. It might be thought that the proposition 'Hasan or Husayn is standing' is a predicative proposition whose subject (i.e., the concept 'Hasan or Husayn') arises from the removal of the disjunctive relation between the two sides and denotes a non-objective reality. The referent of the proposition itself is also the attribution of that same non-objective reality to the description of standing. This depiction somewhat resembles Muhaqqiq Sistani's theory, and the second and third objections to that theory can also be raised here. 18. This sentence, although not a fluent sentence in Persian, was chosen solely because it clearly demonstrates the intended logical structure (i.e., a predicative proposition with a particular quantifier, whose subject is a non-commutative 'one of them'). The Arabic equivalent of this sentence is 'kullu wahidin minhuma qa'im.'

19. identity conditions of propositions

20. See, for example, Jeffrey (2001) and McGrath (2005). 21. According to Bealer, the two propositions ~(p ∨ q) and ~p ∧ ~q are distinct, because it is possible for someone with very little knowledge of logic to believe the first while doubting or even denying the second. This itself shows that they are two propositions. Bealer holds the same view even regarding p ∧ q and q ∧ p; see: Soames. If we accept this criterion for the distinctness of propositions, it is clear that the two sentences mentioned in the text express two distinct propositions. 22. The proposition (Some of what is one of those two (Hasan and Hossein) is standing) can be written in formal logic as follows.

∃x(x=a ∨ x=b) ∧ Sx

In the above expression, a and b are constants that denote Hasan and Hossein, respectively, and Sx means that x is standing. The proposition (Hasan is standing or Hossein is standing) is written as follows: Sa ∨ Sb. It is clear that the second proposition has a simpler structure than the first. From this, it becomes evident that according to the first option as well, the connective of disjunction is used in the proposition (One of them is standing). Therefore, even if we accept this option, in order to provide a complete explanation of indeterminate knowledge, it is necessary to analyze disjunctive propositions.

23. Propositions 24. Fact

25. Of course, there is an important difference between the proposition (in analytic philosophy) and the proposition (qadiyya) (in traditional logic). The common conception in traditional logic is that the proposition is realized through mental existence in different minds, and fundamentally, the conception of a proposition is its realization in the mind through conceptual existence. Thus, a proposition like (Three is an odd number) has different realizations in different minds. But from the viewpoint of analytic philosophers, the proposition (Three is an odd number) has a single existence that is independent of all minds, though different minds can relate to it and, in technical terms, grasp it. It seems that the analytic philosophers' conception of the nature of propositions is more correct, but this difference has no bearing on the present discussion. Therefore, whenever we use the word 'proposition' in the following discussions, its independence from the mind or its realization in the mind is not intended. 26. See, for example, Jeffrey (2001). 27. It is worth noting that Frege uses the term 'thought' (Gedanke) instead of the word 'proposition'. A thought, in Frege's terminology, is what analytic philosophers after him call a proposition.

28. in complete 29. unsaturated

30. realm of senses. It should be noted that, according to Frege, the realm of senses is independent of the human mind. He sometimes refers to this realm as the 'third realm' (in contrast to material objects and mental entities). 31. Kenny (p. 203), quoting from Frege's article 'Compound Thoughts'. 32. See, for example: Buḥūth fī ʿIlm al-Uṣūl, vol. 1, pp. 252–258; Nihāyat al-Dirāya, vol. 1, pp. 51–57. 33. Frege and Moore (in the early period of his thought) hold this theory. Frege explicitly states that a fact is nothing other than the true proposition (or thought). 34. The second possibility is one of the formulations of the truth-theoretic approach to logical constants. According to this approach, the meaning of logical constants (such as 'and', 'or', etc.) is determined by truth tables. A corollary of this is that the predicates 'true' and 'false' are conventional for compound sentences, although this corollary is not usually made explicit. Among the proponents of this approach, one can name the early Wittgenstein (see: Tractatus, sections 4.4 to 4.43).

35. meta-language 36. object language

37. One way of responding to the second argument is to say that the truth of disjunctive sentences in the object language is defined by conjunctive sentences in the metalanguage; for example, in the metalanguage we say: (if p is true, pVq is true, and if q is true, pVq is true, and if p is false and q is false, pVq is false). In this definition, no disjunctive connective is used. Therefore, the second argument only shows that the truth of all sentences cannot be considered conventional, but it does not negate the possibility that the truth of some sentences (e.g., disjunctive sentences) is conventional. Examining this response requires another occasion. Here we merely raise the question: what advantage do conjunctive sentences have over disjunctive sentences? Why not define the truth of conjunctive sentences in terms of disjunctive sentences in the metalanguage? It seems that, according to our basic intuition, conjunctive and disjunctive sentences have no priority over one another; hence, the truth of both must be interpreted in the same manner. Since the truth of both cannot be conventional, it is better to consider the truth of both as meaning correspondence with reality. 38. By "simple fact" we mean merely the fact that is the referent of a simple proposition; otherwise, as will be discussed, a disjunctive fact is also simple in the sense of being non-composite. 39. Of course, in analytic philosophy, other roles are also assumed for facts; for example, according to some theories, facts are considered the relata of the causal relation. Now, can disjunctive facts also play such a role? 40. In principle, interpreting truth as correspondence has ontological commitments that go beyond ordinary and common understanding. (And of course, this is not a criticism of the correspondence theory, because the nature of many philosophical, and especially metaphysical, theories is determinate). It is interesting that we encounter a similar issue in Islamic philosophy as well. Some Muslim philosophers, in order to explain the truth of certain propositions, resort to positing the world of nafs al-amr. In principle, the world of nafs al-amr was introduced to solve the problem of truth for propositions that have no referent in the ordinary world of concrete entities. Hence, it is said that the container of truth for these propositions is nafs al-amr. Martyr Sadr, in a different idiom, has expressed almost the same point. In his terms, the Tablet of Reality is broader than the Tablet of Existence, and the truthmaker for some propositions (such as ethical propositions) is the Tablet of Reality, not the world of existence. In the present discussion, without using terms and concepts like the world of nafs al-amr or the Tablet of Reality, we simply say that disjunctive facts exist, in precisely the same sense that simple facts exist. 41. Regarding conjunctive sentences, it can be said that the structure of the sentence, the proposition, and the fact are all parallel. In other words, corresponding to the conjunction connective in language, there is an entity in the realm of senses and another entity in the world of facts.

Bibliography:

Isfahani, Sheikh Mohammad Hossein, Nihayat al-Diraya fi Sharh al-Kifaya, Qom: Al al-Bayt Institute for the Revival of Heritage, 1414 AH. Boroujerdi, Sheikh Mohammad Taqi, Nihayat al-Afkar (Taqrirat of the Usul of Muhaqqiq Iraqi), Qom: Islamic Publishing Institute, 1404 AH. Hakim, Sayyid Abd al-Sahib, Muntaqa al-Usul (Taqrirat of the Usul of Ayatollah Rouhani), Amir, 1413 AH. Sistani, Ayatollah Sayyid Ali, Taqrirat al-Usul, manuscript. Iraqi, Aqa Zia al-Din, Ta'liqat 'ala Fawa'id al-Usul, Qom: Islamic Publishing Institute, 1405 AH. ———, Maqalat al-Usul, Qom: Islamic Thought Complex, 1420 AH. Fayyaz, Mohammad Ishaq, Muhadarat fi Usul al-Fiqh (Taqrirat of the Usul of Ayatollah Khoei), Qom: Islamic Publishing Institute, 1419 AH. Larijani, Sadeq, booklets from advanced Usul classes. Hashemi Shahroudi, Sayyid Mohammad, Buhuth fi 'Ilm al-Usul (Taqrirat of Usul), Qom: Encyclopedia of Islamic Jurisprudence Institute, 1419 AH.

Jeffrey , k . (2001),زstructured propositionsس , in Stanford Encyclopedia of philosophy. Kenny , A. (2002) , Frege: An introduction to the founder of modern analytic philosophy, Oxford: Blackwell. McGrath, M. (2005),زPropositionsس, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Sowyer, (2002), زPropertiesس, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Withgenstein, L. (2001), Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, London: Routledge.

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The Article 'Indeterminate Knowledge and the Categorical Proposition' by Mahmoud Morvarid

Journal: Naqd va Nazar » Fall and Winter 2005 - Issue 39 and 40 (29 pages - from 178 to 206)