But how and through what process does democracy become established in a political system? This is a question we will address in more detail from this note onward. Seymour Martin Lipset first attempted to offer a theory on this matter in 1959. What Lipset meant by democracy was precisely electoral democracy. He measures democracy by the level of economic development and believes: "Perhaps the most widespread generalization linking political systems to other aspects of society has been that democracy is related to the state of economic development. Concretely, this means that the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy" (Lipset, 1959: 75). He measured wealth using indicators of per capita income, industrialization, urbanization, and public education. Lipset's theory later became known as modernization theory.

To prove his view, he identified four categories of countries including 1- stable European and English-speaking democracies, 2- unstable European democracies and non-democratic governments, 3- unstable democracies and dictatorships in Latin America, and 4- stable dictatorships in Latin America (ibid, 75-77) and applied his intended quantitative indicators to those countries to show that without economic development, democracy is not realized.

Later, criticisms were leveled at Lipset's theories, including that this theory is linear and deterministic and merely prescribes a model derived from a few Western countries to all the countries of the world. In response to these criticisms, Larry Diamond, a current professor at Stanford University, reconstructed and updated modernization theory several decades later. Instead of the indicators of gross national product and per capita income, he considers the Human Development Index as the criterion for development (Diamond, 1992: 460). According to the United Nations, the human development indicators are:

• Life expectancy
• Education including: a) Mean years of schooling for adults aged over 25 and b) Expected years of schooling for a child of school-entry age
• Gross national income based on purchasing power parity in dollars

While presenting a novel version of modernization theory and rejecting any causal relationship between democracy and economic development, Diamond considers a kind of correlation between the two and simultaneously pays attention to the issue of "equality," saying, "economic development promotes or facilitates democracy only to the extent that it alters and improves four vital, interwoven variables: political culture, class structure, international influence, state-nation relations, and civil society" (ibid, 476-483). Nevertheless, he still places greater emphasis on economic development and believes that without economic development, no society will achieve democracy, and there is a strong correlation between development and freedom. In this regard, in his classes, he presents the following table based on data available up to 2017 in defense of his theories to show that the higher the human development, and especially the gross national income, the greater the likelihood of democracy being realized.

Modernization Theories and the Transition to Democracy in Iranian Society

Much more could be said regarding the theories of Lipset and Diamond. Diamond continues to teach his theories at Stanford University and has updated them in light of global developments. But even this brief presentation of his theoretical perspective, which is derived from Lipset's theories, helps us reflect on the possibility of a transition to democracy in Iran based on modernization theory.

According to global statistics, Iran's rank up to 2019, before the coronavirus pandemic, in terms of the Human Development Index, was jointly 70th alongside Cuba. However, what is clear in these global statistics is that Iran's Human Development Index score and Gross National Income have been on a downward trend since 2018, concurrent with US sanctions. In 2020, Iran's Gross National Income was less than half of Turkey's, and this downward trend has likely continued into the current calendar year, i.e., 2022, and it is conceivable that Iran's rank in terms of the Human Development Index has also fallen compared to three years ago, i.e., 2019.

These figures clearly show that by the standard of economic development considered by Lipset and Diamond, Iran's conditions are not ready for a transition to democracy, and sanctions have played a prominent role in this. In other words, those who have defended the sanctions against Iran under the claim of advocating for democracy have, according to modernization theories and Larry Diamond's views, wittingly or unwittingly acted to the detriment of the realization of democracy in Iran. The continuation of the current trend, i.e., the continuation of sanctions, will continue to lead to a decrease in Gross National Income and a decline in the Human Development Index score, and this will delay the realization of democracy in Iran. Therefore, based on the theories of Lipset and Diamond, not only is Iran not currently in a position to transition to democracy, but as long as sanctions exist, such a transition will not be realized.

References:

Diamond, Larry. (1992), Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered, American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 35, No. 4-5.

Lipset, Seymour Martin, (1959), Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 53, No.1

Democracy Is Not Born from Violence

(Third note from the series of notes: How is democracy realized in a society?)

Theories of transition to democracy examine various economic, social, and cultural dimensions alongside political conditions both domestically and internationally. In the previous note, theories that considered economic conditions as the determining factor for the transition to democracy were discussed, and it was shown that if such theories were the criterion, Iran is not economically positioned to enable a transition to democracy. However, in this note, the subject of transition to democracy is addressed from a cultural perspective, and the questions of what the political culture of a society must be like for a transition to democracy and whether such a transition is possible without this culture are explored.

Cultural theory is among the structural theories of transition to democracy that explains the transition to democracy by emphasizing the cultural structure of society and its transformations. In this theory, the cultural structure of any society, in general, and the structure of the dominant political culture in society, in particular, are considered the foundational element of the transition process to democracy (Ghazimoradi, 1400: 119).

The Theories of Almond and Verba

According to Almond and Verba, success in political orientation for advancing the transition to democracy requires a certain level of civic culture. From Almond and Verba's explanation, it is concluded that: democracy is not established without a political culture suited to it (ibid: 124-125).

In their theory, they grant political culture the status of an independent variable in the transition to democracy. They also emphasize a pluralistic culture based on verbal communication[1] and persuasion, a culture based on agreement and disagreement, and a culture that allows for change while keeping it moderate, meaning without revolutionary movements. Hence, the main proposition of Almond and Verba can be written as: "A nation with a more sublime civic culture has better chances for the continuity of democracy" (Ghazimoradi, 1400: 126).

Therefore, in their view, a tolerant culture that recognizes the opposition and is moderate is a necessary condition for the transition to democracy, and if a society lacks such a culture, democracy will not be realized in it.

Many criticisms were leveled at Almond and Verba's theory; among them is that this theory is based on the political culture of two countries, America and England, and emphasizes modeling the norms and beliefs of Western civic culture.

In response to these criticisms, a few decades later, Ronald Inglehart attempted to present a new cultural theory through the study of democratic societies, using the theories of Almond and Verba and addressing the critiques made of them. In his study, he was also not indifferent to economic conditions and their impact on culture, and overall, he considers the three components of socio-economic development, changing cultural values, and the transition to democracy essential for creating genuine democracy (Ghazimoradi, 1400: 135). Emphasizing that "economic, cultural, and political transformations proceed in coordination with one another according to a coherent pattern" (Inglehart, 1377, 11), he sought to offer an integrated theory by combining modernization and cultural theories, taking into account global conditions.

Regarding the role of economic development in the transition to democracy, he points to the particularly important insight of "Weber" that "culture is not merely a secondary phenomenon determined by the economy, but is an independent set of factors that sometimes shape economic (and perhaps political) events, just as it is influenced by them" (Inglehart, 1400: 53) and, rejecting the determinative role of the economy in the transition to democracy, writes: "Although mass democracy is not possible without a certain degree of economic development, economic development by itself does not lead to democracy: unless certain changes occur in the social and cultural structure. [...] Economic development itself is influenced by cultural variables" (ibid: 71).

Endorsing Almond and Verba’s view, and especially their emphasis on “interpersonal trust” for achieving democracy, Inglehart seeks to demonstrate that “democracy requires a democratic culture.” He states: “The emergence of a strong middle class and the spread of participatory skills lead to the establishment of democratic political processes among elites and consequently become a factor that expands the sphere of political activity. But the evolution of stable mass democracy requires yet another transformation: the emergence of norms and attitudes among the general public that guarantee democracy. One of the most important of these attitudes is a sense of trust in one another. Interpersonal trust is a prerequisite for forming secondary relationships, which in turn are necessary for effective political participation in any large-scale democracy. A sense of trust is also necessary for the functioning of democratic rules. One must view opponents as ‘loyal’ opponents” (Inglehart, 1400: 24-25).

He believes that “life satisfaction, political satisfaction, interpersonal trust, a high level of political discussion, and support for the existing social order all go together: they constitute a syndrome of positive attitudes toward the world in which one lives. Most interesting of all is the fact that this syndrome appears to be related to the survival of democratic institutions” (Inglehart, 1400: 44). Later, in another article, he also emphasized the cultural indicators of “gender equality, an index of autonomy, and tolerance toward others” as necessary cultural conditions for the transition to democracy (Inglehart and Welzel, 2009: 132).

Thus, according to Inglehart, interpersonal trust is a necessary condition for effective political participation and, consequently, for the transition to democracy, and this, alongside tolerance toward others—which was also prominent in the theories of Almond and Verba—is among the necessary conditions for the transition to democracy.

Cultural Theories and the Transition to Democracy in Iranian Society

The two components of trust and tolerance are among the cultural factors that have been identified as necessary cultural components for the transition to democracy, not only in the theories of Almond and Verba and Inglehart, but also in the theories of other researchers. According to these researchers, a society lacking these two components does not possess the conditions for a transition to democracy, and should major changes occur in that society, those transformations will be violent and will likely lead to another form of authoritarianism. The question now is: to what extent do interpersonal trust and tolerance exist in Iranian society?

Answering this question is not difficult for those who observe Iranian society. Research shows that the level of interpersonal and institutional trust in Iranian society has declined. According to the third wave of the Survey of Iranians’ Values and Attitudes in 2016, respondents believed that 68 percent of people “cheat” in their behavior and 64.8 percent are “two-faced” in their conduct, and these figures clearly indicate the level of trust in society. Given the bitter years that have passed and the increase in social, economic, and political crises, these numbers are probably far higher today, indicating that the level of trust in society is very low.

On the other hand, trust in institutions and organizations has also been declining. The lowest voter turnout in parliamentary and presidential elections in the last two years, and the low level of participation in parties, institutions, and NGOs, show that many people have become distrustful of these institutions and organizations. The dominance of “scandal politics” on social media has further fueled this distrust and has caused people to be more distrustful than ever of elites and political institutions.

The low level of tolerance and forbearance in society, especially on social media, is no secret. Today, under the influence of media and social networks that fuel greater polarization in societies, the level of tolerance for opinions and viewpoints has declined. Many social media users typically follow their friends and like-minded individuals and prefer not to be exposed to opposing views and opinions, using tools such as blocking, unfollowing, and muting to this end. In this way, they can ignore voices that contradict their beliefs and convictions and only hear voices on their virtual pages that affirm their beliefs and convictions.

Moreover, verbal violence against opposing viewpoints has also been on the rise. The use of keywords such as "opportunist," "sycophant," and "destructionist" against political opponents, along with organized attacks against them on social media, is one of the signs of this very situation, indicating a very low level of tolerance in society.

Under such circumstances, where the level of individual and institutional trust in society has declined and, under the influence of social media, various political forces cannot even engage in dialogue with one another and crush the slightest disagreement, it must be said that if a major transformation were to occur in this society, we would likely witness violence among the people and political groups. Democracy will not be born from such violence, and the transition to democracy will not be realized. For the conditions for a transition to democracy to be met in Iranian society, it is first and foremost necessary for a degree of trust and tolerance to develop among different groups.

Can Political Elites Be Agents of Transition to Democracy in Iran?

(The fourth note from the series of notes on How is Democracy Realized in a Society?)

The issue of transition to democracy is increasingly being raised these days among some political elites. Some believe that this very inclination of elites toward democracy can be considered an important factor for the transition to democracy. Previously, in earlier notes, by examining structural theories of democratic transition, the question was addressed as to whether the economic structures and social conditions of Iranian society are ready for a transition to democracy or not; an examination of economic and social realities shows that the structural conditions for a transition to democracy are not present in Iran. However, some, by highlighting agency-centered theories, emphasize the role of political actors and believe that the very fact that a proper understanding of democracy and its necessities has now taken shape among political elites favored by the people is sufficient for a transition to democracy.

Agency-Centered Theories

In agency-centered theories, political agents—the people and their leaders—are considered, by virtue of their "historical choice," the primary cause for initiating the process of democratization and establishing democracy in any country. According to Rustow, as one of these theorists, in a pre-democratic situation where democratic institutions and attitudes have not yet gained public acceptance, it is political agents who choose the establishment of democratic values, attitudes, and institutions. Therefore, during periods of democratization upsurge, political agents rapidly—genuinely or even more or less feignedly—gravitate toward becoming democrats.

According to Rustow, the prerequisite or precondition for democratization is "national unity"; meaning that the overwhelming majority of citizens in any actually existing democracy must have no doubts or mental reservations about which political community they belong to. This occurs when neither public institutions nor values are democratic, and it is for this reason that agents play a prominent role in the movement toward democracy.

In his view, if the issue of national unity is not resolved before the start of the democratization process, the struggle of segments of the population, when the opportunity for a democratic struggle arises, will focus on resolving ethnic, racial, and religious tensions... rather than on the goal of establishing democracy, and perhaps, for instance, separatism will take precedence over democratization.

اما سرآمدان رویکرد افراطی گرایش نخبه‌گرایانه، جان هیگلی و میکائیل برتون هستند ک معتقدند اصلا نخبگان عامل اصلی روند دموکراسی‌سازی هستند و گذار به دموکراسی توسط اینان شروع و رهبری می‌شود(همان: 191).

آن‌ها معتقدند تا زمانی که نخبگان از وضعیت گسیختگی به انسجام نرسند، گذار به دموکراسی محقق نمی‌شود. اما منظور آن‌ها از گسختگی و انسجام اجتماعی چیست؟

گسیختگی: یکپارچگی ساختاری و اجماع ارزشی در این معنا، حداقلی است و بخش‌های نخبگان درباره قواعد و آداب و سلوک سیاسی و نیز ارزش نهادهای سیاسی موجود توافق ندارند. بر این اساس، نخبگان احتمالا نسبت به یکدیگر عمیقا بی‌اعتماد شوند و نتایج سیاسی را با مفاهیم «با جمع صفر» «یا سیاست به مثابه جنگ» بفهمند و در مبارزات نامحدود و اغلب خشن برای کسب سلطه با یکدیگر درگیر شوند (همان: 194).

انسجام اجتماعی: در این وضعیت یکپارچگی ساختاری در این معنا فراگیر است که شبکه‌های ارتباطات و تأثیرگذاری در ارتباط متقابل و در عین همپوشانی همه‌ی بخش‌های نخبگان را احاطه کنند و هیچ بخشی به تنهایی بر این شبکه‌ها مسلط نباشد و ]...[ نخبگان درباره قواعد بازی و ارزش نهادهای سیاسی موجود اجماع اساسی دارند. اینان پیامدهای قطعی و تأثیرگذار را در مفهوم بازی با جمع مثبت و سیاست به مثابه چانه‌زنی درک می‌کنند (همان).

از نظر جان هیگلی و میکائیل برتون تا زمانی که گسیختگی میان نخبگان تبدیل به انسجام اجتماعی نشود و همه نخبگان درباره قواعد بازی و ارزش نهادهای سیاسی به اجماع نرسند، امکان گذار به دموکراسی وجود ندارد.

نظریه عاملیت‌محور و امکان گذار به دموکراسی در جامعه ایران

نظریه‌پردازان گذار به دموکراسی که بر نخبگان سیاسی بیش از ساختارها تأکید می‌کنند، بر مقوله وحدت و یا انجسام میان نخبگان تأکید دارند. روستو به درستی معتقد است که اگر مسئله وحدت و انسجام میان نخبگان حل نشده باشد، مبارزات مردم به جای آن که معطوف به استقرار دموکراسی باشد، به حل تنش‌های قومی یا دینی یا ... معطوف می‌شود. این موضوعی است که امروز در جامعه ایران به وضوح دیده می‌شود. اجماع و وحدت آمرانه و از بالا شکل نمی‌گیرد بلکه از فرایند گفتگو ایجاد می‌شود. حال آن که امروز مسیر گفتگو در میان نخبگان سیاسی ایران اعم از داخلی و خارجی بسته است و نتیجه آن همین امر است که موضوع دموکراسی‌خواهی به حاشیه رفته و گروه‌های مختلف سیاسی که ادعای دموکراسی‌خواهی دارند بر سر موضوعات دیگری مناقشه می‌کنند.

نتیجه‌ی این وضعیت را هیگلی و برتون به خوبی تشریح کرده‌اند. در نتیجه‌ی عدم اجماع و وحدت، نخبگان سیاسی به یکدیگر بی‌اعتماد می‌شوند و نتایج سیاسی را با مفاهیم «با حاصل جمع صفر» می‌فهمند. این امر به وضوح در سیاست ایران رخ داده است. نخبگانی که هنوز بر سر قدرت نیامده‌اند، پرچم حذف مخالفان خود را بلند کرده‌اند و خواهان حذف آن‌ها در آینده هستند. این امر نتیجه تلاش برای ایجاد وحدت از بالاست که اتفاقا عاملیت افراد را نادیده می‌گیرد و همگان را در خدمت یک فرد و اندیشه می‌خواهد. در نتیجه چنین وضعیتی، بدیهی است که در صورت هر گونه تحول بزرگ در جامعه ایران، آنچه متولد می‌شود دموکراسی نخواهد بود.

In general, the underlying assumption of agency-centered theories of democratic transition is that political elites desire the realization of democracy. Yet those who have today raised the banner of fundamental change essentially show no practical sign of wanting democracy to be realized. Not only are they unwilling to engage in dialogue with others, but they are in practice supported by the reactionary and undemocratic regimes present in the region. The outcome of this is already clear: any change that occurs in society centered on these individuals, since it has relied solely on foreign support without a process of dialogue within Iranian society and the creation of unity among elites, will not lead to democracy. These individuals even express their views recklessly in condemning elections and eliminating opponents. Therefore, not only do the economic and social conditions for a transition to democracy not exist in Iranian society, but the claimants of democracy, especially figures abroad who lay claim to it, do not adhere in practice to the conditions for realizing democracy, and for this reason, the possibility of a transition to democracy based on agency-centered theories also does not exist in Iran.

Can Social and International Conditions Encourage a Transition to Democracy in Iran?

A Series of Notes on How Democracy is Realized in a Society / Note Five

In previous notes, theories of democratic transition with economic, cultural, and elitist approaches were discussed and examined, and the question was answered whether, from the perspective of each of these theories, the possibility of a transition to democracy exists in Iranian society. Based on what was mentioned in those notes, it appears that the economic and cultural conditions of Iranian society are not currently ready for a transition to democracy, and the characteristics of the present political elites and the degree of solidarity among them are not such that, from an elitist perspective, the possibility of a transition to democracy is available.

In this note, the theories of one of the most famous and well-known theorists of democratic transition, namely Samuel Huntington, are examined. By studying the various waves of democratic transition, especially its third wave, Huntington has a comprehensive theory of democratic transition that simultaneously attends to its economic, international, and elite dimensions.

The primary reason Huntington cites for democratization is economic development. He finds modernization linked to politics from two perspectives: first, social mobilization, meaning that "people abandon the attitudes, values, and expectations tied to the former traditional world and turn to the values specific to the modern world. This transformation arises as a result of literacy, broader communications, education, increasing use of mass media, and urbanization." Second, "economic development, which relates to the growth of the total economic activity of society and its output" (Qazi-Moqaddam, 1400: 228).

Huntington considers modernization as distinct from development, and specifically economic development. In his view, modernization includes both social mobilization and economic development (ibid: 229). From his perspective, modernization is a complex process composed of many components. At minimum, these components include "industrialization, urbanization, social mobilization, differentiation, secularization, the expansion of mass media, the spread of literacy and education, and the expansion of political participation." In Huntington's view, the middle class plays a prominent role in the transition to democracy, and he sees the importance of modernization and economic development as strengthening the middle class.

Regarding the position of political elites in the process of democratic transition, he believes: "The two key factors affecting the stability and future expansion of democracy are economic development and political leadership" (Huntington, 1991: 315). He says in all successful cases of democratic transition, the leaders of political forces and social groups negotiated and compromised, overtly or covertly. The spread of a spirit of tolerance and moderation has everywhere been a prerequisite for compromise and coalition between the government and the opposition (Bashiriyeh, 1384: 49).

Of course, Huntington also considers transnational factors for the transition to democracy. He takes two transnational factors into account: “change in the policies of foreign actors” and “the demonstration effect of earlier transitions in triggering the democratization process in other countries” (Qazi-Moqaddam, 1400: 238).

The possibility of transition to democracy in Iran according to Huntington’s theory

In his previous notes, it was discussed in detail that the conditions of economic development, human development, and gross national product are such that the possibility of transition to democracy in Iran is not available. Economic conditions in Iran are such that the middle class, as the driving force of the transition to democracy, not only does not become more capable, but becomes weaker and thinner day by day, and its capacity for agency diminishes. If we also take into account the other components of modernization considered by Huntington, conditions are not favorable for a transition to democracy.

Laws and social structures allow for less social mobility than in the past, and for example, the opportunity to enter universities through the entrance exam, which was one of the important opportunities for social mobility, is now almost exclusively available to a specific class, and the few remaining opportunities for social mobility have also been blocked. Political participation in these years has been at its lowest level, and a kind of isolation and withdrawal from any kind of political activism is observed, because serious doubts have arisen about its effectiveness in society. Of course, in the meantime, people’s inclination towards universal values and away from traditional values has strengthened, based on various surveys, including the Survey of Iranians’ Values and Attitudes, as well as the analysis of people’s behavior on social networks. But in the absence of a strong middle class, high social mobility, and political participation of citizens, the openings for transition to democracy that were seen in previous decades are now fainter than ever.

If we want to examine the conditions for transition to democracy in Iran from an international perspective, it must be said that Iran’s situation has changed dramatically compared to the first decade of the new century. Global data shows that after three broad waves of democratization, we are facing a kind of political recession, and since 2006, the number of democratic countries has been decreasing. The democratic recession is such that it is even said that the United States is no longer among the countries with high-quality democracy.

This is more pronounced in the Middle East region, where Iran is located. The rulers of the countries surrounding Iran are mostly lifelong rulers, and democratic countries are not making any effort or insistence to change their policies. The governance model of China and Russia has influenced the rulers of the Middle East, the Russia-Ukraine war has increased international economic crises, and under these conditions, the transition to democracy has fallen off the priority list of many countries and societies. All of this shows that neither are the policies of foreign state actors such that they seek to change the political direction of countries towards becoming more democratic, nor has any country transitioned to democracy whose effect could have rubbed off on other countries. Therefore, international conditions are also different from the years of the seventies and eighties, indicating that not only from the perspective of modernization and economic development, but also from an international perspective, the conditions for transition to democracy in Iranian society are not available.

The alternative to an authoritarian state is not necessarily a democratic state

The series of notes on How is democracy realized in a society? Note six

In the previous notes, the possibility of transition to democracy was examined based on theories that emphasized economic, cultural, social, international factors, or the situation of political elites, and it was concluded that according to none of these theories is today’s Iran ready for a transition to democracy. In this note, by looking at theories that emphasize “civil society,” the possibility of transition to democracy in Iran will be examined.

Graeme Gill is among the theorists of transition to democracy centered on civil society. He considers the people and elites as political agents. In his view, the people and elites, individually or collectively, realize their political agency in the struggle against authoritarian rule and the effort to establish and consolidate democratic rule when they are organized in civil society. [...] He believes that structural factors such as economic and social crises or crises in transnational relations can lead to liberalization in an authoritarian regime, but this does not result in a transition to democracy unless a strong civil society exists. Because even if internal and external crises lead to the fall of an authoritarian regime, in the absence of a broad and effective civil society, another authoritarian regime may well replace it. Thus, for the establishment of democracy, there must be organized, pro-democracy political agents who fight for democracy.

Regarding the role of civil society forces in the transition to democracy, Gill writes: "These forces are vital to the democratic transition process. Such forces provide the key elements in the dynamic of democratic transition... These are powerful interest groups in society with which the regime must reach an agreement. They are, therefore, the appropriate negotiating partners with the regime's elites... Civil society is not created from above, but must be formed through the activity of society itself. This is the essence of democracy."

Aware that the sphere of action for civil society institutions is limited as much as possible in authoritarian regimes, he considers the establishment of these institutions—civil society forces—as fundamentally part of the liberalization process at the beginning of the democratization process.

He writes: "Civil society takes three things for granted: [first] autonomous or self-governing groups independent of the state, through which people organize their interests and affairs and plan [for the realization of] them (politically as well); [second] a public sphere in which issues are discussed and those interests are pursued; [third] the recognition by the state of the legitimacy of the activity of these organizations and the public sphere in which they are active.

In order to theoretically explain democratic political transition, he considers the nature of the state and society each in two different forms, and thus specifies the relationship between state and society in relation to democratic political transition in four options:

"1- The Nature of the State

a) Unified Regime: A regime in which a high degree of unity has been created and the mechanisms for restoring unity in a situation where unity has decayed are rapid and effective.

b) Fragmented Regime: A regime in which unity is fragile and is characterized by fundamental disagreements among its different constituent parts.

2- The Nature of Society

a) Atomized Society: A society in which no independent public organizations exist to empower citizens to pursue their interests and affairs independently of the regime and even against it. Hence, state-created organizations primarily acquire the character of mobilizing the people in favor of the regime. There is no popular oversight over the rulers.

b) Civil Society: That part of society in which independent public organizations function that empower citizens to pursue their interests and affairs independently of the regime and even against it. The activity of these organizations is recognized as legitimate by the regime. Civil society is the instrument through which popular oversight over political life is created and exercised."

But the four situations created in the political relationship between state and society are as follows:

• The more unified the regime and the more atomized the society, the less likely democratic transition becomes.
• The more fragmented the regime and the stronger the civil society, the better the prospects for democratic transition.
• The more unified the regime and the stronger the civil society, the broader the prospects for a balance of power and intensification of violence.
• The more fragmented the regime and the more atomized the society, the weaker the prospects for transition to democracy become.

A: If a regime fractures and there is no pressure for democracy within society, it is possible that another authoritarian regime—possibly violently—will replace the existing one.

B: Another alternative is that the regime and state collapse and a state of anarchy emerges.

C: Popular mobilization is likely to intensify chaos unless it is organized by groups and organizations that possess the capacity for effective leadership. Thus, the re-establishment of authoritarian rule—either the previous regime or a new replacement—becomes probable."

The Possibility of Transition to Democracy in Iranian Society Based on Civil Society Theories

Graeme Gill's theories on democratic transition provide important insight in this regard. According to these theories, the replacement for an authoritarian government is not necessarily a democratic one; rather, depending on the condition of the state and society, a new authoritarian state or even an anarchic situation with a collapsed state may be born. This is something many advocates of democracy in Iran overlook.

Graeme Gill emphasizes civil society and the forces of civil society as a key factor in the transition to democracy. He believes, of course, that alongside a strong society, a strong state is also essential for democratic transition. However, today neither the state nor civil society in Iran is strong. The state's inefficiency and the economic and environmental crises it faces have placed it in a weak position, unable to fully exercise its authority. But more important than the state is the condition of society. Under sanctions and with the continuation of economic crises, the forces of Iranian civil society are becoming weaker and more emaciated day by day. In practice, many of them either cannot pursue their demands due to economic conditions, become disillusioned and passive and turn to emigration, or, if they continue their activities under these difficult circumstances, are restricted by the state.

Therefore, few doubt under these conditions that Iranian civil society is in one of its weakest states in recent decades, and various factors, from foreign sanctions to internal pressure, have contributed to this weakness. In such circumstances, the possibility of a transition to democracy essentially does not exist, and if a fundamental change does occur, according to Gill, it will either lead to the emergence of a new authoritarian state or to collapse and anarchy. This is an insight that Graeme Gill's theories can offer to all advocates of democracy.

Oil: A Major Barrier to Democratic Transition

The series of notes on How is democracy realized in a society? Note Seven

In previous notes, by examining various theories of democratic transition, the possibility of this occurring in Iran was discussed. These theories examined the possibility of democratic transition from economic, cultural, social, and political perspectives. Based on these theories and considering Iran's current conditions, it seems that the possibility of a transition to democracy in today's Iran is not available. In this note, the subject of democratic transition is viewed from a different perspective, and the possibility of a transition to democracy in a society with access to natural resources such as oil and gas will be discussed.

In the previous note, it was mentioned that according to recent theories, democratic transition requires a strong society and a capable state, and without both, the transition will not be realized. This is the central proposition that Robinson and Acemoglu presented in the book "The Narrow Corridor," demonstrating through the study of various societies throughout history that without a capable state and a strong society, democratic transition will not be realized.

Their fundamental argument in their book is that: "For liberty to emerge and flourish, both the state and society must be strong. A strong state is needed to control violence, enforce laws, and provide public services. [...] We need a strong, mobilized society to control and shackle the strong state. [...] Without a vigilant society, constitutions and covenants are worth no more than the paper they are written on."

The core foundation of Charles Tilly's theory of transition to democracy is also based on this. In his book, by studying various societies that have transitioned to democracy or failed along this path, he, too, proposes the theory of a strong state and a capable society for democratic transition, in a more structured framework and with more scientific language. He believes that "both infinitely high and infinitely low state capacity are obstacles to democracy."

On this basis, Tilly organizes the main explanations of democratization into three categories of major changes:

• Integrating "networks of interpersonal trust," such as kinship, religious membership, and relations among merchants, into public politics.
• Shielding public politics from "major categorical inequalities" of gender, race, ethnicity, religion, class, sect, etc., around which citizens organize their daily lives.
• Reducing the autonomy of "power centers" from public politics, especially those centers that control significant coercive means, such as the military, patronage networks, armies, and regime institutions.

This note will discuss the third factor, namely reducing the autonomy of arbitrary centers of power from public politics. These centers are powerful, play a role in government decisions, but consider themselves unaccountable to the people. Tilly states on this matter, "reducing the number of arbitrary power groups subjects states to public politics and facilitates popular influence over public politics." The reason for this is clear, because arbitrary groups are accountable to no one and, consequently, are not subject to public politics. As a result, the fewer these groups are, the greater the government's accountability becomes.

Now the question is, how can these powerful and arbitrary groups be controlled and made accountable? This is where revenue and money play an important role. The arbitrary power groups' need for money is one of the tools for restraining them. Tilly explains well that in societies where the transition to democracy has been realized, the powerful groups' need for the people's money and taxes compelled them into "committed negotiation" with the people, and consequently, through a process, the conditions for democratic transition were realized there.

But what has occurred in oil-rich countries is a different path. In these countries, oil has made the ruling establishment independent of public agreement and consent for its rule, because the ruling establishment compensates for its need for revenue and financial resources not through committed dialogue with the people, but through the sale of oil. In this regard, Tilly cites Venezuela as an example, saying that in Venezuela, "oil revenues provided rulers with tools that made them independent of committed negotiation with citizens." Based on the Venezuelan experience, he concludes that "the sale of rich subsoil resources like oil causes rulers to distance themselves from committed negotiation with the people."

As a result of such a situation, where the ruling establishment relies on oil revenues, arbitrary centers of power continue to hold power without needing to negotiate with the people, and popular influence over public politics diminishes. In this way, the main centers of power can capture the state without needing to persuade the people.

Therefore, it can be concluded that the conditions for democratic transition are more difficult to achieve in oil-rich countries, and this can be observed in the statistics of oil-rich countries. Among the world's countries, in 19 countries, more than 60 percent of exports are oil and gas exports. 12 are in the Middle East and 7 are in Africa. These 19 countries, along with Brunei, Russia, Azerbaijan, and Venezuela, are oil-rich countries that rely on the export of petroleum products. None of these 23 countries (perhaps with the exception of Nigeria) is a democratic country.

Oil and the Possibility of Transition to Democracy in Iran

It goes without saying that Iran is one of the countries reliant on oil revenues. This dependence on oil over the past decades has reduced the ruling establishment's need for taxation; if the importance of taxes has increased somewhat in recent years, it has been under the influence of sanctions and the decline in oil sales. The state's lack of need for taxation over the past decades has led to parts of it not needing to be accountable to the people, as they have not felt a necessity to secure their satisfaction. Whereas if the state relied on tax revenues instead of oil revenues, then sooner or later it would be compelled to obtain the satisfaction of various segments of the people in order to collect taxes. But now, instead of the state collecting taxes from the people, the people are, in a sense, dependent on state revenues.

As a result of such a situation, a weak society has formed that is dependent on state revenues, and for this very reason, the state sees itself as having no need for accountability to or persuasion of the people. It is obvious that in such a situation and with such a weak society, democracy will not be realized; just as it has not been in other oil-rich countries in the Middle East. Therefore, regardless of economic and political conditions, making the state accountable to the people in a situation where the state relies on oil revenues is, if not impossible, very difficult. Thus, even if the political system in Iran changes, the probability of a transition to democracy remains low, because any political system ruling Iran, due to its reliance on oil resources, will see itself as largely unencumbered by the need to secure the people's satisfaction.

An Elegy for the Dream of Democratization; What Is to Be Done in the Condition of the Refusal of Transition to Democracy?

Mohammad Rahbari

Introduction

This writing consists of two parts. Its first part is my note in the latest issue of Seda weekly. This text was the eighth and final note from the series of notes "How is democracy realized in a society?" in which, by studying various theories, I had answered the question of whether Iranian society is ready for a transition to democracy or not.

The second part consists of supplementary points based on the first part regarding the political approach of the reformists in the future. Due to its nature, this part has not been published publicly or in the media, but it has been added to the text so that, by paying attention to the aforementioned theoretical foundations, it can critically examine the performance of the reformists in confronting the ruling establishment and offer more concrete suggestions.

I thank you in advance for your patience and attention in reading this text.

Part One

Is the necessary and essential groundwork for a transition to democracy in place in Iranian society? This is the question I have tried to answer in the past 7 notes from the series of notes "How is democracy realized in a society?" Now, at the end of this series of notes and relying on what has been presented before, a clear and explicit answer can be given to this question:

No; the necessary groundwork and conditions for a transition to democracy are not in place in Iranian society. This is a proposition that can be reached based on various theories of transition to democracy, and the following reasons can be presented in its defense:

• The economic conditions for a transition to democracy in Iran are not in place: According to what Lipset and Diamond argue, development and economic growth are necessary (though not sufficient) conditions for a transition to democracy, and a society in which a minimum level of economic development has not been achieved lacks the conditions for such a transition. Among the indicators for measuring economic development from Diamond's perspective are gross national income and human development. The state of these two indicators and Iran's revenues under the influence of sanctions in recent years has not been favorable; in 2020, Iran's gross national income was less than half that of Turkey, and in terms of the Human Development Index up to 2019, before the COVID-19 pandemic, it was jointly ranked 70th alongside Cuba. Other human indicators in Iran, under the influence of sanctions, are also not in a good state, and Iran has a tangible gap with economic development; consequently, the possibility of a transition to democracy from an economic perspective is not currently available in Iran.
• The cultural conditions for a transition to democracy in Iran are not in place: According to what Almond and Verba, and later Inglehart, claim, the cultural structure of any society, in general, and the structure of the dominant political culture in society, in particular, are considered the foundational element of the transition process to democracy. According to Inglehart, mutual trust is a necessary condition for effective political participation and, consequently, a transition to democracy, and this, alongside tolerance towards others—which is also prominent in the theories of Almond and Verba—is among the necessary conditions for a transition to democracy. However, the level of trust, tolerance, and forbearance in Iran is not in a good state. According to the latest ISPA poll last month, 68 percent of people in Iran do not trust one another, and on the other hand, trust in institutions and organizations is also declining, and their institutional and organizational participation is decreasing day by day. The low level of tolerance and forbearance in society, especially on social networks, is no secret. Today, under the influence of media and social networks that fuel greater polarization in societies, the level of tolerance for opinions and viewpoints has decreased.

Furthermore, verbal violence against opposing viewpoints has also been increasing. The use of keywords such as "opportunist," "sycophant," and "destructionist" against political opponents, and organized attacks against them on social networks, is one of the signs of this very situation, indicating a very low level of tolerance in society.

• The political conditions and the relationship among political elites are not suitable for a transition to democracy: According to Rustow, as one of the agency-oriented theorists, in a pre-democratic situation where democratic institutions and attitudes have not yet gained public acceptance, it is the political agents who choose the establishment of democratic values, attitudes, and institutions. In his view, if the issue of national unity is not resolved before the start of the democratization process, the struggle of segments of the population, when the opportunity for a democratic struggle arises, will focus on resolving ethnic, racial, and religious tensions instead of being directed at the goal of establishing democracy, and perhaps, for example, separatism will take a more important place than democratization. And this is precisely the condition seen in Iranian society today. Today, the path of dialogue among Iran's political elites, both domestic and foreign, is closed, distrust among them is severe, and the possibility of unity among them is low. The result of this is that the issue of democratization has been marginalized, and various political groups that claim to advocate for democracy dispute over other issues. Under these conditions, elites understand political outcomes in terms of "zero-sum" concepts. This has clearly occurred in Iranian politics. Elites who have not yet come to power have raised the banner of eliminating their opponents and are calling for their elimination in the future.

Moreover, many of the political elites critical of the political system in Iran are not fundamentally pro-democracy to want to realize the idea of democracy in Iran. Not only are they unwilling to engage in dialogue with others, but they are also practically supported by the reactionary and undemocratic regimes present in the region. These individuals even express their views recklessly in condemning elections and eliminating opponents. As a result, the relations among elites and the culture governing them are not suitable for a transition to democracy.

• Social conditions for a transition to democracy in Iran are not met: Alongside economic and cultural dimensions, one of the indicators that Huntington, as one of the most prominent theorists of democratic transition, emphasizes is social conditions, including social mobility. In his view, modernization includes both social mobility and economic development. But the situation Iran is experiencing today has made social mobility very difficult. Laws and social structures, more rigid than before, allow for social mobility, and for example, the opportunity to enter universities through the entrance exam, which was one of the important opportunities for social mobility, is now almost exclusively available to a specific class, and the few opportunities for social mobility have been blocked.
• International conditions for a transition to democracy in Iran are not met: Another component that Huntington emphasizes is the international situation. While stressing the importance of external actors, he believes that the transition of other countries to democracy in a region will be a stimulus for other countries in that region that are ready to transition to democracy.

If we want to examine the conditions for a transition to democracy in Iran from an international perspective, it must be said that Iran's situation has transformed greatly compared to the first decade of the new century. Global data shows that after three broad waves of democratization, we are facing a kind of political stagnation, and since 2006, democratic countries have been in decline. This is more pronounced in the Middle East region, where Iran is located. The rulers of the countries surrounding Iran are mostly lifelong rulers, and democratic countries are not making efforts or insisting on changing policies there. The governance models of China and Russia have influenced the rulers of the Middle East, the Russia-Ukraine war has increased international economic crises, and under these conditions, the transition to democracy has fallen off the priority list of many countries and societies. All these conditions indicate that the international conditions in Iran are not ripe for a transition to democracy.

• There is no strong state and society in Iran: Charles Tilly, Robinson and Acemoglu, and Graeme Gill have shown in various studies that the existence of a strong state and society is a necessary condition for a transition to democracy, and if society is weak, in the event of the collapse of the political system, chaos or the rise of another authoritarian government is likely.

However, today, neither the state nor civil society in Iran is powerful. The inefficiency of the state and the economic and environmental crises it faces have placed the state in a weak position, unable to fully exercise its authority. But more important than the state is the condition of society. The forces of Iranian civil society, under sanctions and with the continuation of economic crises, are becoming weaker and more frail day by day, and practically many of them either cannot pursue their demands due to economic conditions, or have become disappointed and passive, turning to emigration, or if they continue their activities in these difficult conditions, they are restricted by the state. Under such circumstances, the possibility of a transition to democracy, according to the views of the aforementioned theorists, is not available.

• Oil, an obstacle to the transition to democracy: Not only are the economic, social, cultural, and political conditions for a transition in Iran not met, but oil and resource abundance have also become another obstacle to the transition to democracy. According to Tilly's theories, the transition to democracy is realized when autonomous power groups become subject to laws and agree to engage in committed dialogue with the people. Oil prevents such an event from occurring.

Oil in these oil-rich countries has made the ruling establishment independent of public agreement and consent for its rule; because the ruling establishment compensates for its need for revenue and financial resources not through taxation, but through the sale of oil. The independence of these states from taxation leads to their independence from committed dialogue with the people. As a result of such a situation, in which the ruling establishment relies on oil revenues, autonomous centers of power continue to hold power without needing to negotiate with the people, and the people's influence over public policies diminishes. In this way, the main centers of power can capture the state without needing to persuade the people. Under such conditions, the possibility of transition to democracy is not available.

Therefore, and based on the 7 aforementioned reasons, the necessary groundwork and conditions for a transition to democracy are not available in Iranian society.

In a situation where the possibility of transition to democracy is not available, what is to be done?

For any reformist and transformation-seeking force concerned with the transition to democracy, understanding the issue that Iran is not in a state where a transition to democracy is possible is bitter. The successive failures of the democracy-seeking and reformist movement in recent decades also clearly attest to this very reality that Iran is not ready for a transition to democracy, and the reality is that today, Iranian society is in a worse state for a transition to democracy compared to past decades, and many of the achievements of past years are now lost.

The sum of these factors creates a kind of sense of despair among reformist and pro-democracy political activists, and this despair can be seen in the passivity of these forces. What can be done in these circumstances?

In the author's belief, understanding the issue that the realization of democracy in today's Iranian society is not possible can be a way forward. If reformist and pro-democracy forces know and understand that the structural and other conditions in Iran are such that a transition is not possible for the foreseeable future, they might be less disheartened by successive failures and define and choose more achievable goals.

In such circumstances, it is better for pro-democracy advocacy, as an ideal, to illuminate the path ahead for political actors but not be defined as a short-term or even long-term goal. The reality is that even if this country is saved from drought, sanctions, and mismanagement, we may still not witness the realization of democracy in it for several decades. Instead, clearer and more achievable goals can be identified that place us on the path to democratic transition but are only part of the journey.

• One of these goals could be attention to the rule of law. The rule of law is one of the necessary requirements for the realization of democracy; it is important that rulers, in any type of political system, adhere to the law. It is for this reason that the slogan "uncompromising implementation of the constitution" can still be an important goal. Going beyond this slogan, considering the aforementioned conditions, will confront pro-democracy advocates with failures that will bring them nothing but despair. Although the realization of the rule of law is also more difficult in today's Iran than before; consensus on this goal, which has been the 100-year aspiration of Iranians, dialogue with institutions of power, and rallying the people around this goal, is now easier, more possible, and more desirable than bypassing the law.
• Another goal could be striving for Iran's economic growth and development. This is a goal with fewer obstacles in its path, although some authoritarian forces practically stand against development as well. But for Iran's economic development, one can also form coalitions with conservatives; of course, not a coalition born of loss of identity or opportunism, which has sometimes been seen in recent years. But in practice, this is a goal on which consensus can be built more easily and others can be brought along with less resistance. A goal that, if realized, could be a significant step towards the transition to democracy.
• Raising awareness and promoting tolerance can also be a third goal that those whose ideal is democracy can pursue under current conditions. A society rife with violence and mistrust will never move toward democracy. Promoting a culture of tolerance is one of the necessities of transitioning to democracy, yet this culture is fading from society day by day. Furthermore, raising awareness—not in the sense of informing about daily developments, which is also necessary, but rather raising awareness of the rights, duties, and responsibilities of every citizen—can be part of this path.

Other items can be added to the aforementioned goals. Perhaps stating these goals is repetitive for the readers of this text. However, the author's suggestion is that these goals should be defined not as short-term goals, but as long-term ones, and one should not expect achievements too quickly. Perhaps the realization of each of these goals will take decades, and without their realization, the birth of a democratic society and state will be out of reach. Reformists and pro-democracy advocates must, in this dire situation, consider democracy as an ideal and strive to set themselves on its path; but they should define it neither as a short-term nor a long-term goal, and instead designate smaller steps as major objectives. Perhaps in this way, one can overcome the despair resulting from successive failures and, instead of pinning hopes on reactionary forces, lay the foundation for a new path without expecting tangible achievements in the short term.

[1] - Communication