Is Virtue and Corruption an Individual Matter or a Social and Structural One?

Although psychology underpins sociology, it is not the same as sociology, and sociological issues cannot be reduced to psychological ones. The psychological perspective examines social virtue and corruption from the standpoint of its reliance on the will and action of each individual, and its solutions are individualistic. Sociology, however, operates on another level, addressing how social virtue and corruption are influenced by the nature of institutions and structures, and naturally, its solutions will be social. This article seeks, by considering the views and critiques of certain analysts and experts, to clarify whether, in order to dispel corruption and attain virtue, one must proceed via the path of cultural development in each and every individual, or via the path of social policy, or both?

Mehdi Iranmanesh

Associate Professor, Shahrood University of Technology

Abstract:

Introduction:

Mr. Malekian believes that culture takes priority and that reformism must begin not with politics but with culture.[2] This approach of Malekian's is, of course, not new, but his recent remarks have faced critiques; among them, that adopting this approach leads to the depoliticization of society, and that intellectuals should not consign politics to oblivion and abandon it. Critics say that culturalism, though a commendable and necessary matter, should not drag us toward individualistic tendencies to such an extent that it results in forgetting the role of the public sphere or neglecting sociology and substituting individual psychology in its place. The reality is that our interest in either of these two tendencies can quickly lead to an exclusive focus on that domain alone. Thus, after considering this fundamental question—"Is virtue and corruption an individual matter or a social and structural one?"—the following question will arise: "Can we, by attending to both perspectives simultaneously, look at the issue from a superior paradigm in which both culture and politics regain their due worth and are considered according to their importance?"

1- Attributing the Ethical Matter to Systems and Structures

We must see whether the virtue and corruption that occur in societies are attributable solely to individuals, or whether social institutions and structures also play a role in creating and fostering them in the individual and society. This question leads us to another question, namely: can we, in principle, attribute virtue and corruption to an institution, which is a constructed entity?

In a conversation with Mr. Malekian, Mr. Hajjarian gives an example that brings us closer to answering this question. He says:

‎ ‎Obama recently went to Japan and did not apologize for the chemical bombing. Had he apologized, he would have performed a moral act. Is Obama an individual who apologizes to Japan, or is Obama the representative of the institution of the U.S. government? Could he have morally apologized to Japan as the representative of the U.S. government, or could he not? So, a moral matter can also be attributed to an institution. When you attribute a moral matter to an institution and say the institution of the government has apologized, you have spoken about something that is not an individual. The existence of society, in the strict sense of the word, is fabricated. But you cannot sacrifice this constructual existence. You can utilize constructual existence for the reform of real existence. [3]

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His example seems to clarify the issue to a large extent. Although we customarily attribute virtue and corruption to the institution, which is a constructual and fabricated matter, in reality we attribute it to a real structure, order, and system upon which the construction of the term 'institution' is based. Therefore, through this constructual existence, and in fact through the aforementioned real structure and system, one can, with some latitude, work towards the virtue or corruption of real human existences. Of course, prioritizing one of these two—that is, individual cultural reform or structural and systemic reform—is another issue that we will address after some preliminaries.

In the same conversation, Mr. Malekian emphasizes the role of each and every individual and attributes the corruption and despotism resulting from the strengthening of a politician to the weakness of the citizens:

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"‎The strength of a political man and statesman arises from the weakness of the citizens."... ‎"‎When I, within myself, am desirous of wealth, power, status, rank, social standing, and fame, I see that he has said something, and if I oppose it, I will lose power, wealth, etc. Therefore, I say you are right. Thus, the despotism of a politician emerges from within you and me as individuals.‎"

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From another perspective, in another conversation he had with Mr. Hajjarian, he also emphasizes this correct point that our intellectuals, instead of lying to the people and always addressing them as the noble and honorable nation, should show them their flaws and critique them:

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"‎Have political intellectuals made people more faithful to moral values? Have they improved people's family relations? Have they made people fairer in trade and the marketplace? What has been the record of our one hundred years of intellectualism since the dawn of the Constitutional Revolution? Our models of intellectuals are Dr. Mohammad Ali Eslami Nodoushan and Dr. Mostafa Rahimi. These individuals had a passion for alleviating the pain and suffering of the people. The book 'Let Us Not Forget Iran' was the first book I read by Dr. Eslami Nodoushan. This is a truly compassionate book for the people. It is addressed more to the people. It speaks with the people and critiques the people. I say we must speak with the people instead of inflating them. From the dawn of the Constitutional Revolution until now, at the top of all our intellectuals' statements, it has been written: The noble nation of Iran, the valiant nation of Iran. If anyone had not seen our nation and only saw our intellectuals' statements over the past hundred years, they would say they were a noble, honorable, precious, brave, and self-sacrificing nation... Our intellectuals' statements show this, but we know this is not the case. Why do we lie to the people? Let us tell the people: you yourselves have flaws." [2]

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These words are correct, but we must also pay attention to the reverse side of the issue, namely the moral susceptibility of human beings to structural virtue and corruption.

2- The Moral Susceptibility of Human Beings to Structural Virtue and Corruption

One must ask: can the weakness or immorality of citizens not stem from the strength or dictatorship of political figures and the corruption of institutions and structures that are directly intertwined with the deficiencies of those in power? Yes, it is acceptable that the weaker citizens become, the stronger political figures grow; but the more power political figures gain, the more citizens lose the ability to control and restrain them, becoming weaker themselves. Of course, Mr. Malekian says that this very corruption of the powerful also originates from the corruption of the people. This reduction of the issue to individuals alone does not show what successful work can be done in practice to reform a structure that is imbued with despotism or any other corruption.

To combat corruption or despotism, I must either (1) reduce the level of wealth, power, status, social standing, and fame within myself, or (2) temporarily set them aside, or (3) abandon them altogether.

The third, whether viewed positively or negatively, requires a major personality transformation, which is a rare feat. The first and second are attainable only on the condition and at a level compatible with the average endurance of human beings. However, the level of despotism stemming from a political figure or a system can reach a point where, for most people, even pursuing the first and second paths becomes unbearable. Consequently, citizens may turn more toward agreement with the powerful rather than criticism and opposition, and this will promote a market of moral weakness (initially involuntary). That is, the relative determinism of the system drives them in that direction. Although it is said that human beings are free to be moral or not, having or lacking this freedom in moral elevation at the individual or public level is not independent of the state of rulers, social conditions, or the nature of structures. Individuals, in order to receive a minimum of wealth or social position to reach a state of equilibrium, sometimes endure such a level of pressure from social conditions that they are involuntarily compelled to abandon morality.

This matter, of course, is not limited solely to the despotism and personal immorality of politicians and rulers; rather, the problems, crises, tensions, and social pressures that often arise from the mismanagement or intentions of those in charge also gradually lead to the (initially involuntary) immorality of the people. This is the very subtle point that minds accustomed to "reason" may overlook, viewing only the individual aspect of the matter and saying that none of these obstacles constitute a "reason" for individuals to become immoral. The belief held by some that if we invest in the culture of each and every individual, macro-social problems will resolve themselves, supposedly due to the primacy of the individual, and perhaps even change the political conduct of politicians or rulers and their ethics—aside from the fact that a kind of subjectivism and disregard for realities can be seen in it—stems from inattention to "causes" and an exclusive focus on "reason."

But those who pay attention to "causes" in addition to "reason" are concerned with removing obstacles from the path of individual moral and cultural education on the one hand, and creating institutional and structural foundations on the other. Mr. Abolghasem Fanaei says on this matter:

"The more severe and intense social, economic, and political problems, deprivations, tensions, and crises become, the more the favorable and natural ground necessary for living morally will disappear. Human beings have a threshold of tolerance, and if the pressures and tensions that invite them to trample upon and ignore moral values exceed that threshold, naturally, fewer individuals will be able to resist those pressures. Sometimes these pressures reach a point where individuals essentially lose the concern for living morally altogether, and their preoccupation with securing livelihood, safety, and other basic needs so occupies their mind and conscience that they essentially lose the opportunity for thinking, moral self-examination, and considering moral considerations." [7]

Although Mr. Malekian has always paid attention to the role and impact of the ethics of rulers on the ethics of the people, here he says that political regimes can ultimately only be catalysts, and what matters is the inner reform of human beings:

‎»‎As long as people's beliefs, their feelings, emotions, and passions, and their desires do not change and move in the right direction, nothing can be reformed. In my belief, until this happens internally, nothing can be reformed externally. If you neglect this task, even if political currents come and go a hundred times, nothing will change. I do not deny the influence of politics, and my practical conduct also demonstrates this, but we must know that political regimes can ultimately only be catalysts, and what is important is the inner reform of human beings.» [3]

Firstly, he has only mentioned the catalytic role of political regimes and has not referred to the possibility of them being destructive or obstructive. With all the importance he places on cultural work and individual reform (which is entirely correct, and the author also firmly believes it should not be neglected), it seems this perspective has led to a neglect of the other side of the issue. Inner reform and attention to culture are important, but in a situation where the structure and system do not permit such reforms, in terms of the transformation and elevation of people's beliefs, feelings, emotions, passions, and desires, at an acceptable level, how will this important matter be realized?

Secondly, one must ask, is the role and catalytic effect at the level of the structures and institutions of political regimes—which can advance the state of people's livelihood, ethics, beliefs, emotions, and the nature of their desires by years—a small thing to be disregarded?

Thirdly, human historical experience shows that it is highly unlikely that changes in the people living under a specific institution or structure will cause that structure to simultaneously undergo significant changes with them. In addition to this asynchronicity, sometimes a corrupt structure can, in a single moment, nullify all or most of the efforts of the people within that structure who are working on their own self-reform. Sometimes a structure affects not only the current generation but also the generations after us. So, how can one be hopeful about reforming the moral, spiritual, and even economic and material condition of the people? Therefore, the recommendation to "fix yourself" does not create simultaneous positive changes in the structure so that one could rely solely on it; and since this is the case, and because political regimes also usually pursue their goals through structures and institutions, prominent individuals (who have the ability to move against the wrong structure and have managed to reform their own beliefs, feelings, and desires under these very conditions) must also strive to reform social institutions and systems. Hence, not only is there no problem with them directing part of their effort, according to circumstances, towards the intellectual and cultural growth of others and part towards changing and reforming institutions and systems, but this is a necessity that has been neglected by Mr. Malekian.

Therefore, raising awareness and educating individuals within an organization or institution, so they can use their human agency for their personal development, will be far easier and more practical in the light of a valuable catalyst such as changing and reforming existing structures and institutions, than if this valuable catalyst were set aside. Ultimately, for changing and reforming systems, one must have a theory, and one should not pin hopes on changing institutions and systems without a correct theory that is attentive to culture and well-acquainted with the relationship between culture and politics, because, like all revolutions and revolutionaries lacking a theory, it will not have a good outcome.

Based on what has been said, there is no reason to confine oneself to individual cultural efforts (with all the importance they hold), unless Mr. Malekian provides reasons that clearly prove that this catalyst itself comes into being entirely and exclusively through the intellectual and cultural elevation of each and every individual (and not just a portion of individuals who can currently play this role), which seems unlikely for him to accept.

The above remarks were, of course, based on the assumption of the existence of social institutions and structures. If such institutions do not exist, the matter is clearer. Can one speak of culture and its necessity in the present age without the existence of those institutions? Mr. Hajjarian says in this regard:

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“In countries that lack institutions, what meaning does talk of culture have? For example, in Rwanda, what meaning does cultural talk have? Or, for instance, in backward countries like Afghanistan or Syria, where institutions have been destroyed and there is neither a market institution, nor a state institution, nor even a religious institution, what relevance does prioritizing culture have? There must be a minimum of institutions before one can speak of culture and its necessity. In some countries, institutions function carefully and the state is impartial. In these countries, cultural issues take priority. But in backward countries that are not in a favorable institutional situation, one must first build a minimum of institutions before one can speak of culture.” [3]

Accordingly, intellectuals must attend to this part of their duty—namely, reforming institutions and structures—with the intention of prioritizing culture. It is from this perspective that attention to politics and sociology retains its special importance for some, and has not led them into the “fallacy of reduction,” unless it leads them into the “fallacy of monopoly”!

On this matter, Mr. Mohaddesi has addressed several of Mr. Malekian’s errors and has said:

“One of the types of Malekian’s mind-grating errors is that he reduces the social matter to the individual matter (whether psychological or ethical) and reduces corruption, based on a crude voluntarism, to the performance and desires of individuals.” ... “Mr. Malekian does not pay attention to the fact that a considerable portion of corruption arises from systems that human beings have devised; systems that were devised with the aim of realizing certain objectives but in practice cause the slowing down of the ongoing process of affairs. Hence, these systems create a breeding ground for the realization of corruption, which in the first instance does not stem from anyone’s desire or will; rather, to escape a convoluted and labyrinthine system that causes delays in getting things done, individuals perhaps unwillingly and sorrowfully turn to corruption so as not to lose their limited opportunities in the social world.” [9]

The explanation of corruption offered by Mr. Mohaddesi has been criticized by Mr. Cheroudeh, who has deemed his claim paradoxical:

“He (Mohaddesi) claims that corruption is the unintended consequence of a system that has been devised by human beings. In criticizing this claim, I must first state that this claim is paradoxical because, on the one hand, it considers humans as the system-creating agents, and on the other hand, it regards them as will-less objects and playthings of the system. Secondly, by virtue of the same reason and will by which, as Mr. Mohaddesi says, they can devise the system, human beings can, by that same reason and will, identify the unintended effects of the system (something he has done in his capacity as a researcher of corruption) and undertake the redesign of the system (something he does not engage in because he does not consider it the sociologist’s duty); and fundamentally, it is this very mechanism that means bank failures or the outbreak of wars—which were once among the unintended effects of the voluntary actions of people who are members of systems—occur less frequently today than in the past, owing to scientific reflections in sociology, economics, and psychology.” [4]

In response to this critique, it must be said that even if all the components and possibilities of a system that were the result of the will of that system’s agents remain constant (or undergo slight changes within the framework of the capabilities of the system’s agents), it still cannot be said that those system-creating agents can still disrupt or change that system, because they may well have voted for or designed a system that has limited their own authority to change it. In that case, they no longer possess that initial authority, due to the system they voted for or designed. Therefore, this claim is not paradoxical even in this situation, let alone the fact that reality extends beyond this.

The reality is that when the will of certain individuals is directed toward building a system and a system is built, from that point onward, this system undergoes such extensive and intricate changes that were not necessarily the intention of its builders. A system of collective human life sometimes practically moves toward goals that do not necessarily all trace back to the aims and ends of individuals.

Under these conditions, those builders and designers, in order to effect change, are not merely in need of altering a system with its initial relations and possibilities—so that we could say, since they themselves produced it, they can certainly change it themselves. Rather, they need to change a system with new (and sometimes unwanted or even unpredictable) possibilities and capabilities, for which they may well lack the knowledge, power, and authority to alter all the parameters and possibilities that have emerged. In other words, their will can be powerless in changing the parameters and possibilities that have been created. Therefore, even assuming they still possess the same motivation, the same will, and the same prior power to bring about change, from a more precise perspective, their will and power must be assessed in comparison with the new conditions governing the system—something that did not exist before. Hence, it is not paradoxical to say that those very individuals who were the system-builders are now incapable of changing the system, and this point should not be interpreted as meaning they are devoid of will or mere playthings before that initial system.

Another point is that Mr. Mohaddesi [9], like a sociologist such as Bauman, believes that various social factors are involved in my fate, including where I live, what possibilities I have, how much effort I exert, what limitations the available resources have, as well as the competition of others over these same limited resources, the actions of those who make decisions about me, the authority of others which delineates the extent of my authority, the means and tools I need to realize my will, and the values I have internalized by virtue of living in a particular group. All of these are also social matters and not merely individual ones dependent on personal ethics and will. Even my prior choices limit the realm of my self-determination; in other words, my choice of yesterday is my determinism of today.

On the other hand, although Mr. Malekian considers institutions to be subjective constructs, he has nonetheless repeatedly emphasized in his lectures that he does not deny the atmosphere of prohibition and encouragement that institutions provide for human behavior. Mr. Cheroudeh, in affirming the primacy of culture and rejecting Mr. Mohaddesi's view, states that this prohibitive and encouraging property of institutions occurs through the interpretation that agents make of these subjective phenomena (i.e., institutions):

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‎ ‎ «Mr. Mohaddesi's presupposition in the above claim is that human awareness and free will exist alongside structures and institutions, as well as contextual variables such as gender and ethnicity, etc. Whereas what practically happens is that structures, institutions, and contextual variables exert their influence on action through the interpretive lens through which the agents of action interpret them. However, this influence is not of the kind of determinism that would render humans as wretched, helpless beings. Institutions, structures, and contextual variables, through the interpretation that individuals make of the opportunities and threats present within them, provide a range of prohibitions and encouragements for actors. Nevertheless, the final decision-maker at the point of performing an action is the individuals themselves, not the structures, institutions, gender, or other contextual variables. It is fundamentally for this reason that individuals within a similar structure and with identical contextual variables exhibit different behaviors.» [4]

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This belief of Mr. Cheroudeh, that the prohibitive and encouraging property of institutions occurs through the interpretation that agents make of these subjective phenomena (i.e., institutions), suffers from the flaw that it confines the matter to the agents' interpretation and its voluntary aspect. It must be added that a significant part of the prohibitive and encouraging property of institutions is exerted through "structural causes" and in an involuntary manner.

Moreover, Mr. Cheroudeh claims that human awareness and free will are not on a par with structures and institutions, nor with contextual variables such as gender, ethnicity, and so on. It must be said that from the fact that two phenomena are not on a par with each other (meaning independent of one another), one cannot necessarily conclude that they are in a linear, one-way relationship, thereby inferring that the ultimate decision-maker at the moment of action is still the individual and not the structures. Decisions are made by human beings, but these decisions are not necessarily independent of structure. Therefore, the belief that the property of prohibition and encouragement arises from the interpretation that agents make of these constructed phenomena (i.e., institutions)—which may indeed sometimes be the case—does not render interpretation entirely independent of structure, and such an interpretation is more precise when it relies on sociology in addition to psychology. Thus, to say that the ultimate decision-maker at the moment of action is the individual and not the structures or other variables, if taken to mean a belief in the complete freedom and free will of the decision-maker, cannot be acceptable. It is from this perspective that Mr. Mohaddesi says:

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‎"But when such a world is constructed, it transcends the realm of the individual and becomes a supra-individual matter that can rise up against its creators and even reduce them to servitude."

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And it is from this perspective that Mr. Abdi says:

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‎"It is not as if human beings sat down and thought to be such and such. While most of the cultural and behavioral characteristics of a society and its people, more than being the result of planned thinking, stem from their reaction to the environment and the learning and transmission of this reaction across generations." [6]‎

‎ or points out that:

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"Most of those who have become steeped in corruption in economic matters were not corrupt from the beginning and even avoided corrupt behaviors, but under the normative pressures resulting from a defective structure, they either withdrew or succumbed to corruption and gradually stepped onto a path they had never even initially imagined...

Why should we ignore the structure and emphasize only individual commitments? Where in history do we have an example of individuals being reformed and sustainably shaping a healthy society? ...

One can clearly state what type of structure is synonymous with the occurrence of what type of behavior (in the sociological sense), and this does not mean negating the promotion of educational and moral teachings." [6]

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Mr. Abdi, in explaining his view on taking structures seriously, also raises this pertinent question:

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‎"Why do Iranians who go to developed and law-abiding countries become, after a while, as orderly, law-abiding, and ethically oriented as the citizens there? Is this anything other than the influence of the environment and institutions on the educable human being?... " [6]

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Moreover, Mr. Cheroudeh, in proving his claim, reminds us of the point that sometimes “individuals in a similar structure and with identical background variables exhibit different behaviors.” As previously mentioned, it must be said that the different behaviors of human beings, although partly dependent on the interpretation they make of the opportunities and threats present in systems and institutions, this dependence does not mean exclusivity in dependence on interpretation. Behaviors can differ for any cause and for any reason (including human interpretation), yet they can still be influenced by the institution, the system, the psychological apparatus, temperament, knowledge, and individual insight; this influence can, of course, also change the level of difference. That is, different behaviors can be influenced by various individual and social factors. Although individuals may appear to live within a single system, depending on their position, situation, awareness, and individual characteristics, they may have a different judgment and interpretation of that same system. But the fact that they themselves are the final decision-makers at the moment of action should not reinforce the assumption that their final decisions are independent of their position within structures and institutions and independent of how those structures and institutions are. Therefore, the existence of behavioral differences among various individuals in a similar structure and with identical background variables does not signify their independence from being affected by the system, and the behavioral difference of a single individual in different structures confirms this point.

3- Structural Politeness

The conclusion is that institutions and structures provide the role of deterrence and encouragement for human behavior, and since this is the case, in addition to the role of culture, one must also acknowledge the role of politics and institutions, and consider the effort to design, change, and reform institutions as an important platform for cultural actions, because it is often through them that one can speak of culture and its necessity, or devote effort to the intellectual and cultural cultivation of human beings. This is something Mr. Malekian also points to in one of his speeches: “With the weapon of culture, with ethics, advice, and culture, one cannot confront ISIS; they must be stopped with political tools.” [10]

Now, if we accept that in this era, there must be certain minimums of social institutions in order to speak of culture, and, as Mr. Malekian says, we do not deny the role of deterrence and encouragement of those institutions in human behavior and ethics, we inevitably cannot ignore social ethics and structural politeness. Does the structure of power not require a special politeness, and is the pursuit of justice merely an individual pursuit of justice? Cannot a structure, apart from the intentions of human beings, be just or unjust? Structures have a real existence, not a virtual one, and can be subject to moral praise and blame, be criticized, and have special etiquettes considered for them, including the etiquette of justice, the etiquette of reparability, and the etiquette of gratitude. All these characteristics, in this context, are institutional attributes and not merely individual ones. Justice, in this context, is also an attribute of institutions and social relations, not a psychic disposition. Is it not the case that a defective structure, apart from the interpretation we have of it, can be effective in eliminating justice and obstructing reform? And does confronting institutions and structures not require special planning, management, and politics? If so, must we necessarily look toward an intellectual and cultural transformation in every single individual and wait for their simultaneous transformation? Or, alongside cultural efforts, should those who are now relatively prepared think about reforming structures and take steps in that direction?

The error of many of our predecessors was precisely this: they reduced social justice to individual justice:

Ghazali was of the opinion that if the individuals of a society were just, one by one, enmity would be lifted from among them. He apparently does not realize this subtle point that treating others justly depends on accepting a particular theory concerning social justice and fundamental human rights, just as the elimination of enmity from human society depends on accepting a theory about how to restrain power and wealth and distribute them justly. The implementation of such a theory means designing, establishing, and regulating social structures and institutions based on that theory, and with the rendering just of social structures and institutions, enmities are minimized, and the elimination of these minimal enmities is also based on the acceptance and implementation of a theory concerning judicial and penal justice, the discovery or formulation of which is neither within the capacity of jurisprudence nor within that of individual ethics... In this matter, he ignores the collective identity of human beings and how collective behaviors and relations are formed, and reduces sociology and social psychology to individual psychology, and does not realize this point that in an unjust society, even if individuals want to treat one another with justice and fairness, they often cannot do so. The prevalence of moral vices in a society is a social phenomenon, and in Durkheim's words, "social phenomena demand social explanation." ([8]p.40)

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Although individual and moral culture and upbringing are very important, precisely because of that importance, attention must also be paid to shaping structural ethics and criticizing existing structures and institutions. Although institutions are made and constructed by humans, after being constructed, they require criticism, review, and reform, and their flaws and problems become apparent in many cases after the passage of time and through the criticism and reform of experts and intellectuals.

Of course, Mr. Malekian, elsewhere, accepts that political systems also have an effect on the happiness and misery of citizens:

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"I have never denied that the political regimes governing societies have an effect on the nature and destiny of the citizens of their own society, and perhaps even affect the nature and destiny of other societies as well. My discussion is not at all a denial of the influence of political systems on the good and bad, and the happiness and misery of their citizens. I accept that political regimes also have an effect. The debate is over whether the influence of politics is greater or the influence of culture. My opinion is that the weight of culture is greater than the weight of politics and economics in influencing our situation. Therefore, my saying that the weight of culture is greater than the weight of politics and economics (contrary to liberals and socialists) does not mean a denial of the weight of politics or economics." [2]

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But they consider the weight of culture to be greater than the weight of politics. Furthermore, they say:

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"If the institution of politics is to change in order to have a more positive effect on the condition and situation of citizens, how should it change? Even if the institution of politics is to change, the institution of culture must have changed.

Therefore, while I accept that the state of the institution of politics affects the condition of citizens, and thus it is good for the institution of politics to be reformed so that the condition of citizens is consequently reformed, I have no conception of the change of an institution—the institution of the family, the institution of education, the institution of science, technology, and art, the institution of economics, the institution of politics, and the institution of law, religion, and ethics—other than this: an institution changes when (one) the laws, or to use a slightly more precise term, the norms of that institution change, and (two) the executors of the newly emerged laws change. I have no other conception of institutional change. When they say a constitutional monarchy system becomes a republican system, or a democratic system becomes a theocratic system, or an oligarchic system becomes a democratic system, I understand this to mean that the laws and the executors of the laws of those systems change. If there is an error in my understanding, it must be explicitly pointed out." [2]

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And they continue that:

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If this conception of mine is correct, then I would say that for this change to be in a positive direction, the new laws must be better than the previous laws, and the new enforcers must be better than the previous enforcers. But the new laws are better than the previous laws only if those who enact these laws are better than those who enacted the previous laws. It is clearly evident that the new enforcers are also better than the previous enforcers when better human beings come to power compared to the previous human beings. If this is the case, then ultimately, changing the institution of economics, or politics, or law, or any other institution will be in the direction of reform and not corruption. So, ultimately, everything comes back to the human being, and in my analysis, institutional change—assuming I accept that the institution is realized—ultimately comes back to changing the members who are involved and engaged in that institution. Whether they are involved in enacting laws or involved in enforcing laws. I do not understand how an institution can be changed except through this path.” [2]

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It seems this conclusion that everything comes back to the human being and that institutional change ultimately comes back to changing the members who are involved and engaged in that institution is an issue that requires further discussion and re-examination. It must be said that it is true that changing the laws and norms of an institution for the better requires that those who enact these laws be better than those who enacted the previous laws, but for this task, is it possible to first create better individuals and then gather them together and, with the identity they acquire, entrust them with the “enactment of laws” for a specific institution? Let alone the fact that these individuals, before being created, are incidentally influenced by the previous institution and its correct and incorrect laws and norms, and that institutional atmosphere of prohibition and encouragement does not leave them unaffected. Therefore, the creation of these individuals is, again, not independent of the institutional situation in which they live, and the critique and change of social institutions and systems by a part of the people is effective in their creation.

The second point is that he says: an institution changes when the enforcers of the newly emerged laws are changed. Yes, that is true, but is it more feasible to first create better enforcers and then gather them together and, with the identity they acquire, entrust them with the “enforcement” of those new laws in a specific institution, or is it that they naturally take a place in an institution after being created and are both influenced by the new norms of that institution or organization and, incidentally, influenced by the efforts made to critique and reform the structural etiquette? The institution of the state, politics, and power, after its establishment, takes root so deeply throughout society that most individuals will be severely influenced by the multiple roles of prohibition and encouragement, and the correct and incorrect laws and norms. Can individuals be considered detached from the role of all their social, communicative, and belonging ties and, on that basis and in an abstract manner, can one hope for their change and transformation?

If such a thing is not feasible, or its probability is very low, we must inevitably accept that to access cultural, ethical, and educational priorities, we must not neglect the reform of structures; and more importantly, for the reform of structures, norms, laws, and their enforcers, we must not only wait for the reform of individuals and concentrate all activities in that sector. These words are, of course, spoken with the knowledge and belief that we strongly acknowledge the cultural reform of individuals and its importance and value. Also, from what has been said, it should not be inferred that primacy belongs to politics or society and that human beings are condemned, without will, to the conditions of social institutions. No, this is not the case; individuals play an important role in constructing social institutions, and the social world is the product of a shared subjective world among individuals, and individuals construct this world, but as Mr. Mohaddesi points out:

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“When such a world is constructed, it transcends the realm of the individual matter and becomes a supra-individual matter that can stand up against its creators and even reduce them to servitude.”

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Therefore, one cannot ignore the importance of the structure, system, and real order hidden behind fake titles such as institution, and by paying little attention to or neglecting the existential truth concealed behind the title of institution, place all the blame on the institution of culture and come to believe in the primacy of culture.

It seems that a significant part of the criticisms leveled at Mr. Malekian's primacy of culture stems from the belief that his psychologism and political escapism (at least in theory) have been excessive.

One must ask: does a method that relies on the efforts of specific individuals in the sphere of politics and society, and where, for example, the way to use certain mass communication tools like the internet and Telegram, etc., is opened up or restricted (which is an act related to politics), have no effect on people's beliefs, feelings, emotions, and desires, and through this, will it not have a tremendous impact on culture in the sense accepted by Mr. Malekian?

Of course, the whole issue is that politicians, elites, and social influencers can keep their cultural perspective alive in all their political, social, and structural endeavors. Otherwise, Mr. Malekian's statement is indeed very true when he says: "If you neglect this task (changing beliefs, feelings, emotions, and desires), even if political currents come and go a hundred times, nothing will change."

Therefore, a degree of cultural change among the people is dependent on changes in social conditions. For instance, who can deny that striving to create a platform for dialogue by strengthening specific dialogical institutions and expanding the use of mass communication tools like Telegram can provide such a platform for dialogue that ultimately leads to the correction of the beliefs, feelings, and desires of each and every individual?

Someone might say that this very effort for such structural changes requires that those making the effort have already undergone internal changes themselves in order to undertake such actions. Yes, that is true, but the point is that these individuals can be a part of society that already exists in actuality, and there is no need to wait to build a majority. Therefore, from a "general advisory perspective," it is correct to say: O people, until an internal change occurs within you, do not expect a change outside. This is sound advice that all people should keep in mind, positioning themselves in a positive direction and changing. Because if they themselves do not want to, whether systems and institutions are corrupt or pure, nothing will change. However, from a "methodological perspective," changing people's desires relies on changing their beliefs, emotions, and feelings, and changing beliefs, feelings, and emotions depends, in part, on changes in institutions and structures. That is, in all these subjective changes, objective changes can play a decisive role; and these changes can be carried out by a segment of the people, namely those already transformed under existing conditions. Thus, one can expect the elites and the meritorious who are already prepared for positive systemic and structural changes to fulfill this mission, while also emphasizing to others that until you change, nothing will be set right.

Hence, referring all social and political problems to psychology or individual ethics, as Mr. Malekian has emphasized, is accompanied by a kind of negligence. Emphasizing his theory of the primacy of culture, he says:

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I seriously believe that all our issues and problems have psychological and ethical roots. Even if our social institutions do not have the proper order they should, it is because those involved in those institutions are psychologically or ethically unhealthy, or both, and have flaws and defects. The more I delve into it, the more I see that there is no social problem, including political ones, that does not, through one, two, three, or several intermediaries, trace back to a psychological or ethical problem. In this respect, the two topics of mental health and moral perfection are of the utmost importance to me..» [12]

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Now, while rejecting the totality of his view, it must be pointed out that many moral problems, including hypocrisy, lying, pretense, and so on, are, in some societies, the result of the structural corruption and the despotic system governing the institutions of those societies. It must be acknowledged that both sides of the issue are correct, but not in an absolute sense. Social and, among them, political issues and problems are influenced by the psychological or moral problems of human beings, and at another level and order, at least some moral problems stem from a particular type of social system that allows, and indeed encourages, the growth of these traits.

In another speech titled “The Primacy of Culture and a Critique of Sociology,” he says we think we must reform social institutions and believe that when we reform social institutions, humanity will prosper. Not at all, absolutely not. Why? For at least three reasons:

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First, there is no such thing as a social institution; these are names. Names without a referent. Social institutions simply do not exist.

The second point is that we assume something called the institution of politics, economics, education, etc., exists. You must not think that if we reform these institutions, we human beings will prosper. That is, you think that if the exterior of human beings becomes good, the interior of the human being will necessarily become good as well. This is the error of all sociologists, who think that if everything outside becomes good, everything becomes good. It is absolutely not so.

So the second point was that even if we do not say institutions do not exist (which I believe they do not), reforming them does not necessarily lead to the reform of human individuals. I am not saying we must destroy institutions so that people may flourish; no. I am saying the flourishing of institutions does not necessarily mean the flourishing of human individuals. If I can say anything on this matter, I would say it is a necessary condition, but it is by no means a sufficient condition.

But the third point: well, how are institutions reformed? For example, this institution of politics in Iran must be reformed. Right? The institution of economics must be reformed. Have you ever asked yourselves when an institution changes and is reformed? For instance, when do you say that the institution of economics in Iran has changed? If you pay attention, it is said an institution has changed when the laws governing the relations of that institution change. Whether it is the institution of economics or the institution of politics.

Now, we also want to reform institutions. If institutions are to be reformed, does this not mean their laws must change? Who is going to change them? Human beings must change them. A human being who possesses egoism cannot write a fair law; if he is a cleric, he will write in favor of clerics. If he is an academic, he will write in favor of academics. It makes no difference; if a woman, she will write in favor of women, and if a man, in favor of men. Unless that man, that woman, that cleric, student, academic, university professor, must have their egoism eliminated. If their egoism is to be eliminated, changes must occur in their beliefs, changes must occur in their feelings, emotions, and sentiments, and changes must occur in their desires. I call these three changes cultural change. The culture of any person means their beliefs, their feelings, emotions, and sentiments, and their desires..." [11]

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It has been said: “This is the error of all sociologists, who think that if everything outside becomes good, everything becomes good. It is absolutely not so.” It must be said that sociologists, by the necessity of their work, pay attention to and emphasize one part of the truth, and psychologists another part, and if sociologists see problems from a social and structural perspective and psychologists from an internal one, the author’s supposition and recommendation is that we need the perspective of both of them" [11]

I will also bring up the views of some other analysts on this matter to complement the preceding discussions: Mr. Meysam Badamchi, in his critique of Malekian’s primacy of culture, believes that his primacy of culture is the result of a failure to differentiate between the public sphere and civil society.

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It seems that Malekian's formulation of the primacy of culture—that is, the notion that the main and foundational root of all of a society's problems is culture, and the rest of the problems are superstructural—is tied to a failure to distinguish between the public sphere and civil society" [1]

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Likewise, Mr. Hossein Dabbagh rightly believes neither in the primacy of culture, nor the primacy of politics, nor the primacy of economics:

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I believe neither in the primacy of culture, nor the primacy of politics, nor the primacy of economics. It is true that in many cases culture takes precedence over politics, and it seems that cultural issues are more fundamental. For example, according to the well-known saying, "Rulers are the offspring of the people," one can argue that for better politics, one must begin with the people's culture. But right against this argument, someone could blow the horn from the other end and say: It is well known that "People follow the religion of their kings" or "People resemble their rulers more than their fathers." That is, it is politics and rulers that influence the people's culture, so one must begin with politics. Perhaps one could even go beyond the culture/politics duality and show that in some instances, economics prevails over culture. Saadi was right when he said, "At night, when I tie the knot of prayer / I think of what my child will eat in the morning"; as long as people's livelihood is in straits, no one seeks culture. Moreover, those who beat the drum for the primacy of politics might be able to show that under certain conditions, until political issues are resolved, the economy does not flow, and until the economy flows, culture's turn does not arrive. But perhaps a fourth matter can also be conceived, and that is that phenomena such as politics, culture, economics, or even religion do not necessarily always and everywhere have precedence and primacy over one another, and only have a dialectical relationship with each other. That is, these phenomena enter a field of dialogue and competition with one another, a process of give-and-take occurs, and ultimately, whatever emerges victoriously from the field becomes primary. You might ask, what is our criterion for this give-and-take, and according to what standard does the competition take place? My answer is one thing: ethics. What, in my belief, is important in this regard and can resolve the differences among these phenomena is ethics. It is ethics that takes precedence over culture, politics, and economics alike....

The dispute among the primacy of politics, culture, and economics resembles a court where ethics is the judge. Ethics decrees where primacy belongs to which phenomenon" [5]

Ultimately, I believe that we need a superior paradigm that has digested both individual virtue and corruption and social and structural virtue and corruption together, and I would be very pleased if this article has been able to open a door in this regard.

References:

1- Badamchi, Meysam;‎‎ Between Democracy and Truth: A Critique of Malekian's Theory of Tolerance,

This article is part of an extensive chapter on Malekian's political thought and social ethics in the author's book entitled

‎Post Islamist Political Theory:‎ Iranian Intellectuals and Political Liberalism in Dialogue ‎

‎which will be published soon.

2- Hajjarian, Saeed; Malekian, Mostafa;‎‎ Politicization or De-politicization, Andisheh Pouya Monthly, Nowruz 1395 Special Issue, No. 33.

3- Hajjarian, Saeed; Malekian, Mostafa;‎‎ The Hundred-Year Achievement of Our Political Intellectuals, Andisheh Pouya Monthly, Khordad 1395, No. 35.

4- Heydari Cheroudeh, Majid;‎‎ The Taboo of Reductionism in Sociology, Sedanet Cultural Website, 19 Esfand 1394.

5- Dabbagh, Hossein;‎‎ The Authenticity of Ethics and the Ethics of Authenticity, a note from Dr. Hossein Dabbagh at Sedanet's request - Esfand 94.

6- Abdi, Abbas;‎‎ The Promotion of Psychological and Cultural Tendencies is the Product of Political Passivity and Despair. ‎

7- Fanaei, Abolghasem;‎‎ Religious Ethics and Meta-Religious Ethics, a Conversation with Dr. Abolghasem Fanaei (Part Three) | Din Online Dialogue.

8- Fanaei, Abolghasem;‎‎ Religion in the Scales of Ethics, A Study on the Relationship Between Religious Ethics and Secular Ethics; Serat Cultural Institute, Second Edition 1392.

9- Mohaddesi, Hassan;‎ Psychological Reductionism in the Works of Mostafa Malekian, Iran-e Farda Magazine, 15 Azar 1394, No. 18, (pp. 60-64)).

10- Malekian, Mostafa;‎‎ Lecture: The Way of Liberation from Religious Fundamentalism, Location: Yazd - Meybod - Imam Sadegh (AS) Cultural Complex, 12 Azar 1394.

11- Malekian, Mostafa;‎‎ The Authenticity of Culture and the Critique of Sociology, Lecture by Mr. Malekian at the Farda-ye Pars Educational and Research Institute - Mashhad - Tir 1394.

12- Malekian, Mostafa;‎‎ The Restless Soul of an Intellectual, Ordibehesht-Khordad 1391 issue, Andisheh Pouya Magazine.

PDF file of the article "Is Virtue and Corruption an Individual Matter or a Social and Structural One?"

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PDF file of this article in the scientific journal Research Approaches in Social Sciences, (Year 3) No. 10/Summer 2017/pp. 94-104

Is Virtue and Corruption an Individual Matter or a Social and Structural One?

Author: Dr. Mehdi Iranmanesh (Associate Professor, Shahrood University of Technology)

This writing on his personal website